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2.
ABSTRACT
This thesis is an assessment of the performance of the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical industry in the context of an international market 
for drugs which is dominated by the operation of multinational firms.
Chapter I begins with an analysis of the determinants of demand 
for drugs, followed by a definition of terms and a classification of 
pharmaceutical products according to their therapeutic usage and the 
technical processes involved in their manufacture. Section 3 of 
Chapter 1 describes the structure of the international market for 
drugs, exploring the major factors responsible for a significant rate 
of concentration in the industry, an excessive amount of expenditure 
on innovations and promotion, and unreasonably high prices.
Section k of Chapter I singles out the specific problems con­
cerning developing countries in their acquisition of drugs and exam­
ines the arguments so far presented on the subject.
Chapter II traces the development of the Egyptian pharmaceutical 
industry from its early start in a free enterprise environment and 
through the 1950s when government control gradually became total.
Section 1 of Chapter III describes the changing pattern of supply 
of drugs by multinational firms in various markets. This is followed 
in Section 2 by a detailed analysis of the operation of multinational 
firms in Egypt, with special emphasis on their comparative gain from 
particular forms of investment. Section 3 of Chapter III identifies 
the costs and benefits derived by the Egyptian economy from the oper­
ation of multinational pharmaceutical firms, with a quantitative 
judgement of figures obtained for the two major kinds of foreign oper­
ations in Egypt: subsidiaries and license agreements.
Chapter IV gives an assessment of the performance of the nation­
alised domestic sector of the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry over 
the period I960 to 1970/71, using indices for production, value added
and profits as basic indicators. The price structure for drugs is
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also examined for its influence on the profitability of domestic 
firms and on the production indices for the industry.
In Section 3 of Chapter IV the policy of GOPCA, the centralised 
government body in control of the Egyptian market for drugs, is 
assessed for its influence on the present and future growth of the 
industry.
Section k of Chapter IV is devoted to a close study of the pro­
blems which the industry has experienced with backward integration, 
as portrayed in the operation of the primary producing pharmaceutical 
chemicals plant, El Nasr.
Chapter V summarises the results of this study.
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Chapter I 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
I. Introduction
The pharmaceutical sector is one of the youngest and fastest 
growing branches of the chemical industry, accounting on average 
for 10% for its total output in most industrialised economies- In 
those developing countries which are in the process of industrialis­
ation, the production of pharmaceuticals accounts for an even larger 
share of the chemical sector's output,'*' the reason being that the 
bulk of pharmaceutical manufacturing requires relatively small 
capital investments, of the light as opposed to heavy industry type. 
One can also observe that many governments in such countries are 
giving special inducements to encourage the domestic production 
of pharmaceuticals which satisfy basic and immediate requirements 
in private consumption.
In the first quarter of this century, most drugs known to 
medical science were palliative in character - alleviating the 
symptoms of, rather than curing diseases - and their formulation 
took place in the pharmacy, using extracts of natural substances 
such as opium, quinine and digitalis. Today, the proportion of plant
products (phytochemicals) represents a mere 5% of total pharmaceut- 
2ical output, having been superseded by synthetic, biological and 
biochemical preparations. The introduction for general use of such 
crucial remedies as sulpha drugs, antibiotics, vitamins, specifics
1. United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, Secretariat, 
The Pharmaceutical Industries in the Second Development Decade, 
(ID/WG.37/2, May 2, 1969), p.5. This" paper is among a series 
presented for the Expert Working Group Meeting on the Establish­
ment of Pharmaceutical Industries in Developing Countries, 
Budapest, k to 10 May 1969, under the sponsorship of UNIDO.
2. Ibid., p.^ f.
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for tropical diseases, hormones, dieuretics and tranquilisers only 
started in the mid-thirties, following a series of vital break­
throughs in pharmacological research and development-1 These great 
advances in medical science originated in Western Europe and the 
United States, with the major pharmaceutical companies in those 
countries playing a leading role in the R&D efforts involved.
Many of these firms branched into pharmaceuticals from other man­
ufacturing such as general chemicals, dyestuffs, food, brewing and 
fermenting, where important discoveries were made in the use of their 
respective raw materials and/or production processes. With the 
prospects of a new and potentially enormous market for their products, 
these eventually giant firms were to set the pace for innovation in 
the ethical drugs field as well as influence its direction. The 
rate of innovation and of product obsolescence in the ethical drugs 
market is perhaps the highest in all manufacturing.
Pharmaceutical production consists of the application of a wide 
variety of technological processes to arrive at a few thousand drugs. 
'Whereas the machinery and equipment used in some of the manufacturing 
processes may be easy to acquire and simple to operate, advanced pro­
fessional skills are required continuously in all stages of production 
because of the paramount importance attached to the quality of medi­
caments. Furthermore, the sale and marketing of drugs takes place 
in a highly complex legal environment covering registration, licen­
cing, patents, advertising and trade restrictions.
1. For background reading on the discovery of modern drugs, see L. 
Earle Arnow, Health in a Bottle, J. B. Lippincott Co., Phila­
delphia, 1970* For a more summary account of the industry's 
development, see Organisation for Economic Co-operatibn and 
Development, Gaps in Technology : Pharmaceuticals. Paris 1969*
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For all of the reasons indicated above, the production of 
pharmaceutical goods is concentrated in the industrialised coun­
tries. According to the study of UNIDO,^ the share of developing 
countries in world production of pharmaceuticals was 9»5% in 1966.
In the same year, again, a look at the figures for world trade in 
pharmaceuticals shows that 9k.8% of world exports originated from 
Western Europe and the U.S., five countries alone accounting for 
79*6% of these exports.
The demand for pharmaceutical goods is closely related to the 
availability of health services. A simple way of measuring the dis­
parity in per capita consumption of drugs between countries would 
be to look at physician density. In Europe and America, the number 
of patients per doctor is under 1000/1, in Egypt it is approximately 
2000/1, India, 5»800/1, Indonesia *+1,000/1, Nigeria 50,000/1 and 
Ethiopia 91,000/1.^ But even this method of calculation underest­
imates the real gaps in per capita consumption, since it ignores the 
distribution of doctors and therefore medical services within coun­
tries. In developing countries, the density of doctors is much 
higher in urban as opposed to rural areas. The following figures 
give the number of patients per doctor for four countries:
1. UNIDO, Secretariat, (ID/WG.37/2, May 2, 1969), p.25.
2. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Gaps in 
Technology : Pharmaceuticals, (op.cit. Paris, 1969) , p.*+2.
3» C.R.B. Williamson, "Exporting Pharmaceuticals", in Innovation
and the Balance of Payments: the Experience in the Pharmaceut­
ical Industry, ed. George Teeling-Smith, (Office of Health 
Economics, London, 1967) p» 5»
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Table 1. Distribution of Doctor Density in Four Countries
Country Urban Areas Rural Areas
India 500/1 ^0 ,000/1
Indonesia 2,800/1 6,000,000/1
Nigeria 2,050/1 59,000/1
Ethiopia 3 ,000/1 200,000/1
Source: Medical Care in Developing Countries (Office of
Health Economics, paper No.Vf, London, 1972), p.26.
The health service in Egypt is typical of that in many devel­
oping countries.
Figures for Egypt show a notable improvement in the general 
availability of health services, both in terms of the growth in 
number of doctors and pharmacists in relation to the population, and 
in terms of the development in the consumption of drugs regionally.
The number of doctors and pharmacists has significantly risen 
so that population per physician has fallen from 5,170 in 1952/53 
to ^,150 in 1960/61 and 1,990 in 1969/70 (Table 2). Similarly, 
population per pharmacist has fallen from over 25,000 in 1952/53 to 
15,^80 in 1960/61 and 6,900 in 1969/70 (population per pharmacy stood 
at 20,000 in 1969/70.)
Table 3 gives the regional distribution of drug consumption in 
Egypt in two comparative years, 1959/60 and 1969/70. The growth 
index over this ten year period shows a significant improvement in 
the regional distribution of consumption favouring those areas with 
the lowest per capita consumption. Consumption in Cairo and Alex­
andria thus grew by 185% and 210% respectively, while consumption 
in Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt increased by 325% and ^23% respect­
ively.
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Table 2. Growth in Egyptian Population and in Number of
Physicians and Pharmacists
Year Popul­
ation 
in Mi­
llion
No. of 
Grad­
uates*
Physicians
Total
No.of Pharma­
cists 
Grad- Total 
uates*
Popul­
ation
per
Physi­
cian
Popul­
ation
per
Pharma-
cist
1952/53 21.9 35^ 42^8 53 870 5170 25220
1960/61 26.6 799 6393 260 1717 4150 15480
1961/62 27.3 851 7244 296 2013 3760 1354C
1962/63 27.9 283 7527 314 2327 3700 12000
1963/64 28.7 935 8462 228 2555 3380 11220
1964/65 29.3 1042 9504 299 2854 3090 10300
1965/66 30.1 1201 10705 327 3181 2810 9470
1966/67 30.9 1290 11995 406 3587 2570 8020
1967/68 31.7 1676 13671 587 4174 2310 7590
1968/69 32.5 1339 15010 709 4-473 2160 7290
1969/70 33.3 1690 16700 354 4.827 1990 6900
* Figures give annual number of graduates from Egyptian Universities 
only.
Source: Statistics Department of GOPCA.
Table 3* Regional Distribution of Consumption of Drugs in 
Egypt» in 1959/60 and 1969/70
Region Consumption of Drugs 
£.E. million
Growth
59/60
Index
69/70
Popul­
ation
mill­
ion
69/70
Number 
of Phar­
macies
69/70
Coneump- 
- per 
Capita
69/70
£.E.
1959/60 1969/70
Cairo 6.550 18.720 100 285 4.961 636 3.77
Alexandria 2.002 6.315 100 310 2.032 212 3 . H
Suez Canal* 0.503 0.677 100 134 1.023 48 0.66
Lower Egypt 2.652 11.278 100 425 13.745 401 0.82
Upper Egypt 1.551 8.120 100 523 11.193 303 0.73
Total 13.260 45.110 100 340 33.329 1600 1.33
* The relatively small increase in consumption of the Suez Canal region 
is due to the evacuation of civilians after the 1967 war. The estimate
of the population living in that area in 1969/70 is therefore inaccurate. 
Note: The Suez Canal region comprises the governorates of Port Said,
Suez and Ismailia. Lower Egypt comprises the governorates of Damietta, 
Dakahlia, Sharkaya, Kalioubaya, Kafr A1 Sheikh, Gharbeya, Menoufieh, 
Beheira. Upper Egypt comprises the governorates of Guiseh, Beni Suef, 
Fayoum, Menya, Assiout, Sohag, Kena and Assouan.
Source: Statistics Department of GOPCA.
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Table 3 shows nevertheless very large and obvious gaps in per 
capita consumption between the two major cities and the rest of 
Egypt. In 1969/70, per capita consumption of drugs was £E.3«77 and 
£E*3.11 in Cairo and Alexandria respectively, while it stood at 
£E.0.82 and £E.0.73 in Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt respectively.
These figures might be qualified to the extent that government health 
bodies might order supplies intended for rural areas from city based 
distributors. But as the proportion of drugs bought by government 
agencies out of total expenditure on drugs is only 30%, and more than 
half of this 30% is consigned to Cairo, Alexandria and the armed 
forces (see Tables 5 and 6) this consideration will obviously not 
affect the central argument.
One can also observe that there are wide differences in the
availability of pharmacies serving different regions in Egypt. Table 
3 indicates that population per pharmacy is 7-8 thousand and 9*5 
thousand for Cairo and Alexandria respectively, while the figures 
for Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt are 34.2 thousand and 37 thousand 
respectively.
The past few decades have seen a change in the public attitude 
towards health services in all countries: rich and poor alike now 
expect medical care to be provided on a collective basis. The reason 
for this change is twofold; on the one hand, the general rise in stan­
dards of living has led to the addition of medical goods to the con­
sumer's budget necessities. Secondly, the great advance in medical 
science and its discovery of remedies to cure a great many ills means 
that medical care is no longer accepted as a palliative luxury for 
the rich who can afford it, but is held to be a basic right which,
1. The General Organisation for Health Insurance benefits civil ser­
vants and workers in industry, the majority of whom live in the 
cities.
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like education, should be available to every citizen.
Another factor favouring the socialisation of medicine is the 
random nature of disease. Unlike other necessities, the need for 
medical services is not equally distributed among the population, 
and it is widely felt that the burden of its material cost should be 
borne by the state. Health insurance is being introduced or expanded 
in most countries where it does not already cover the majority of the 
population. The British National Health Service represents one of the 
most comprehensive health insurance schemes in the West, having started 
as early as 1948. The U.S. is one of the latest countries to follow 
this general trend; in 1950 only 10% of the U.S. population was in­
sured in some way, by 1967 80% of it was covered. It is estimated 
further that by 1975* approximately 63 million Americans will receive 
drugs without cost through Medicare.^
In Egypt, public expenditure on health has increased from £E.l6.2 
million in 1961/62 to £E. 50.2 million in 1969/70. This last figure 
includes expenditure on health insurance which was introduced in 1964 
to benefit civil servants and workers in industry who contribute 1% 
of their salary or wages towards it. (The government or employer con­
tributes about 3% of this wage). By 1970 more than 1.5 million Egypt­
ians were covered in this way.^
The fast increase in government expenditure on health in Egypt has 
had an obvious and immediate effect on the growth in consumption of 
drugs. This is clearly shown in Tables 4 and 5- In the five year 
period 1964/65 to 1969/70, public expenditure on health rose by 40%
1. J.J. Ingola, "Is Ethical Drug Marketing in Step with Medical Pract­
ice?", in Pharmaceutical Marketing, ed. Bernard G. Keller, Jr. and 
Mickey C. Smith (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Co., 1969)1 
pp.23-24.
2. Ministry of Health, Report on a Study in Health as a Productive 
Investment. Cairo, 19711 pp.l9i 26-27- The death rate in Egypt 
fell from 19.6 per thousand in 1952/53* to 14.2 per thousand in 
1969/70.
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Table 4. Growth in Public Expenditure on Health in 
Egypt. £E millions
Year Budget of General Medical Treat- Medical Treat- 
Ministry Org. for ment Organis- ment Organis- 
of Health Health In- ation for ation for 
surance Cairo Alexandria
Total
1961/62 16.217 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.217
1962/63 23.026 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.026
1963/64 26.094 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1964/65 28.789 4.388 0.050 0.039 33-266
1965/66 31.283 4.530 0.119 0.112 36.044
1966/67 32.659 4.275 0.249 0.247 37.430
1967/68 33.988 4.772 0.235 0.215 39.207
1968/69 36.869 5.304 0.558 0.277 43.008
1969/70 39.665 5.992 0.697 0.374 46.728
1970/71 41.463 7.149 1.106 0.525 50.243
Source: Ministry of Health, Report on a Study in Health as 1 
Productive Investment, Cairo, 1971» pp.26-28.
a
Table 5* Breakdown of Total Expenditure on Drugs between 
Public and Private Purchasing Agencies. £E. millions
Year Ministry of Health Other Governmental Instit- Chemist Total
Rural Hospitals 
Health run by 
Units Ministry
utions Sales Expen­
Health Health 
Insur- Organ- 
ance isat- 
ions
Arm- Other 
ed prices)
For­
ces
diture 
£E mil.
64/65 1.216 2.613 1.785 0.476 0.100 24.810 31.000
65/66 1.617 3-421 2.097 0.699 0.155 26.010 34.000
66/67 1.710 2.472 1.110 2.242 0.751 0.192 26.122 34.600
£7/68 1.865 2.383 1.417 1.891 0.794 0.210 24.615 33-240
68/69 2.714 3.241 1.964 2.363 0.891 0.230 26.298 38.140
69/70 3.125 3-715 2.816 3.142 0.966 0.246 31.100 45.110
% in­
crease 
over 
period
157% 42% 154% 76% 103% 146% 25% 45%
Source: Statistics Department of GOPCA.
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and total consumption of drugs rose by 45% TaHe 5 shows that public 
sectors - mainly rural health units and the health insurance organ­
isation - were responsible for the major share of growth in total 
expenditure on drugs with rates of increase of up to 157%» whereas 
private consumption grew much less rapidly at the rate of 25%.
Many authors have shown interest in aggregate expenditure on 
health services or on drugs specifically as a percentage of nat­
ional income for various countries, and try to explain or qualify 
their findings with normative judgements on what constitutes a 
desirable or adequate level. The observation that some poor coun­
tries spend a relatively higher percentage of their national income 
on the purchase of drugs is also found to be 'puzzling' or 'curious'.1
The attempt at deriving an international norm for percentage 
drug expenditure to income when countries vary so considerably in 
their per capita income would seem irrational since these very differ­
ences in per capita income would lead one to expect national differ­
ences in the proportionate expenditure on drugs needed by each country. 
As to the observation that poor countries spend relatively more of 
their national income on drugs than rich countries, this can be ex­
plained by the fact that drugs as a group constitute a basic necessity 
in a country's budget, and one can therefore expect the marginal pro­
pensity to consume drugs to rise more slowly than increases in national 
income, at least beyond the stage where the minimum necessary level 
of drug consumption is reached.
The above observation on the falling percentage of drug consumption 
to national income as income rises is also substantiated by figures
1. M.H. Cooper, Prices and Profits in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
Pergamon Press, London 19&6, p.151. Also, R. Titmus, Drugs in Our 
Society, and Social Policies and Population Growth in Mauritius 
(with B. Abel-Smith), 1961, both studies reported in M.H. Cooper 
above, p.151.
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obtained from the World Health Organisation for 1969/70, as shown in
the following Table.
Table 6. Drug Consumption and Income, Selected Countries 
1969/70, values in £E.
Country Income
per
Capita
(1)
Consump.
per
Capita
(2)
Percent­
age (2) 
to (1)
Country Income
per
Capita
(1)
Consump.
per
Capita
(2)
Percent­
age (2) 
to (1)
Burma 29 1.52 5.23% Libya 460 3.18 0.6996
Cambodia 39 1.23 3.15 Poland 587 5.23 0.8996
Egypt 73 1.37 1.82% Hungary 597 6.00 1.0096
Brazil 80 1.91 2.3996 Czecho­
slovakia 610 5.50 0.9096
Tunisia 96 1.81 1.8996 Holland 770 7.80 1.0096
Irak 109 0.50 0.4696 Austria 820 6.10 0.7496
Jordan 121 1.51 1.2596 Switzer­
land 920 8,00 0.8696
Chile 142 1.99 1.4096 France 927 7.00 0.7796
Turkey 164 3.02 1.8496 Sweden 930 8.82 0.9596
Formosa 240 1.94 0.81% U.S. 1340 8.00 0.61%
Mexico 244 1.15 0.^796 Kuwait 1602 8.47 0.5396
-4--
2.0 0 (q O O lOO o 120 0 'M-OO >bOO
Source: Statistics Department of GOPCA, using figures obtained from
WHO publications and the official rate of exchange, 1971.
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The graph to Table 6 depicts the relationship between per 
capita income and per capita consumption of drugs across the 22 
countries listed in Table 6. Any biases due to the use of official 
exchange rates are removed since we are only interested in the com­
parison of consumption to income in each country. Differences in 
prices of drugs between countries are also unlikely to affect the 
figures significantly for our purposes.'1'
A simple regression line fitted for the 22 observations gives 
the following coefficients,
Although this fitted line oversimplifies the real shape of the 
graph, it does show a high intercept of 1.4 which conforms to our 
notion of drugs being a basic necessity. The graph also shows that 
expenditure on drugs remains fairly constant for a wide range of low 
incomes, so that the low income countries are spending a relatively 
higher percentage of their income on drugs.
The graph is also compatible with the idea that the minimum level 
of consumption per capita is for the more essential drugs in the low 
income countries, whereas people living in the richer countries are 
consuming drugs in both essential and luxury classes (such as anti­
obesity drugs, tranquilisers and hormones), but this interpretation 
would ignore our previous observation on the consumption of drugs in 
poor countries which is much less evenly distributed among the popul­
ation than in rich countries, with the possible result that consumption 
of luxury or unnecessary groups of drugs may be taking an equal share
1. Figures in Table 6 should not, however, be taken as accurate des­
criptions of any one country's condition, since there are possibly 
some errors in individual estimates of drug consumption or national 
income.
x^ = 1.4 + 0.006x2 where x^ = per capita consumption of 
drugs,
X2 = per capita income
R2 = correlation coefficientR2 = O.85
20.
of total drug consumption in both rich and poor countries.
2. Classification of Products and Terminology
Pharmaceutical preparations are not a clearly defined class of 
goods, and the nomenclature used to describe them varies greatly from 
one country to another. Although efforts are being made to standard­
ise pharmaceutical statistics, there is as yet no strictly comparable 
international classification of products used for human health. Some 
preparations which are classed as pharmaceuticals in one country may 
be regarded as food or cosmetics in another. In Egypt, unlike Europe 
for instance, infant milk and baby foods are included in pharmaceutical 
statistics. Again, some figures for the value of production of the 
Egyptian firms we are concerned with in this study includes their out­
put of veterinary preparations and toileteries, but as these two 
groups of non-human medicines together account for less than J>% of 
the total pharmaceutical sector's output,'1' the figures we are using 
will not be seriously affected.
There are three useful ways of classifying drugs for the purpose 
of our study, in order to define and analyse the products we are deal­
ing with. The first classification is based on the therapeutic usage 
of drugs, the second relates to the marketing regulations governing 
their sale, and the third classification describes the stages of pro­
duction involved.
a) Classification into Therapeutic Groups
Drugs can be classified into approximately forty five thera­
peutic categories, according to the type of illness or disorder that 
the preparation treats. The following therapeutic groups are of major 
importance in terms of sales volume and value to all countries: anti­
biotics, analgesics and vitamins. Advanced countries are moreover,
1. Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, The Pharma­
ceutical Industry, (No. 319-10, Cairo, December 1967), p.14.
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greatly concerned with treatment of diseases of the heart, of the 
central nervous system and psychosomatic conditions. This translates 
itself into high levels of consumption of drugs in the following thera­
peutic groups: cardiovascular preparations, dieuretics, hormones,
sedatives and tranquilisers.
The relative importance of different therapeutic groups in a 
particular country is supposed to reflect the disease spectrum of the 
population,1 but this is only true among the developed countries where 
medical services are reasonably evenly distributed between different 
segments of the population. In almost all developing countries, the 
high incidence of parasitic infections, fevers, malnutrition and other 
specific regional diseases would suggest that the relative weight of 
therapeutic categories treating these diseases should be significant 
in such countries. Unfortunately, even in countries like Egypt 
which boasts a high doctor to patient ratio,, a highly advanced pharma­
ceutical industry and a marked improvement in the regional distribution 
of medical services, we still find wide gaps between the actual and 
the necessary pattern of consumption of drugs in the different thera­
peutic categories. The following is a Table comparing the shares of 
high ranking therapeutic groups in terms of sales value for Egypt 
(in two different years) and the United Kingdom.
Table 7- Percentage of Total Market (Sales) Accounted 
for by Important Therapeutic Groups
Therapeutic Group Egypt 64/65 Egypt 1970 U.K. 1964
Antibiotics 18 16 20.9
Vitamins 17 16 0*2
Hormones 8.2 7 10.7
Analgesics 7.5 8.4 9
Gastro intestinal 5.9 3 3.5
Broncho pulmonary 5.2 3.8 7.8
1. OECD, Gaps in Technology: Pharmaceuticals, Op.cit., p.67.
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Table 7 contfd
Therapeutic Group Egypt 1964/65 Egypt 1970 U.K. 1964
Antiparasitic 5.2 1.1 -
Antidysenteric n.a. 3-4 1.3
Sedatives and 
Tranquilisers 2.1 3.2 9-3
Sulphas 3.2 1.7 0.7
Cardiovascular 1.6 3.5 8.1
Dieuretic n.a. 2.2 3.4
Ophthalmic 1.6 3.3 n.a.
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: U.K. figures from M. H. Cooper, Prices and Profits
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Pergamon Press, 1966, 
p.80. Figures for Egypt compiled from data in the 
Statistics Department of GOPCA and Central Agency for 
Public Mobilisation and Statistics.
Figures in Table 7 give the percentage value of expenditure on 
drugs in those therapeutic categories which account for the largest
shares in total expenditure on all drugs.^ Both ethical and non-
2
ethical drugs are therefore included. Differences in national 
classifications mean that we have had to regroup some of the thera­
peutic categories relating to the U.K. market, such as adding anal­
gesic and anti-inflamatory groups to compare with the Egyptian figure 
which included both. All pharmaceutical categories accounted for in 
the totals in Table 7 are common to both Egypt and the U.K. except 
for one class which is included in the Egyptian total only - Infant 
Milks and Diets. But this last group accounts for only 2.5/6 of total 
Egyptian consumption in 1970 and does not therefore seriously affect 
our comparative analysis.
1. See Appendix Table for complete Table of drug consumption
according to therapeutic group for Egypt in 1970.
2. Ethical drugs are those drugs which are only advertised to the 
medical profession.
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Whereas all vitamins are classed under one group in the U.K. 
market, the comparable figure for Egypt is obtained by adding four 
separate groups (single vitamins, complex vitamins, minerals,and 
vitamin and mineral combinations). It is obvious from Ta&le 9 that 
the consumption of vitamins is significantly higher for Egypt at 16% 
than in the U.K. at 0.2%. This can only partly be explained by differ­
ences in needs for the treatment of vitamin and mineral defficiencies 
and is basically a consequence of self-medication by the majority of 
the population in Egypt. In Britain, the pattern of pharmaceutical 
consumption is much more closely related, often compulsorily, to medical 
prescription, which means that the British are not as likely as the 
Egyptians to self-administer fashionable and vigourously marketed 
products.
Another result of limited access to doctors and the subsequently 
greater invitation to self-administered drugs in Egypt is a great 
reliance on analgesics. This is not clearly reflected in the Table, 
because the group heading 'Analgesics' includes approximately 50% of 
British consumption of anti-inflamatory drugs to treat arthritis, a 
disease uncommon to Egypt.
Table 7 also seems to suggest that the consumption of antibiotics 
is higher in Britain than in Egypt, although one would expect the opp­
osite situation to be true, because the incidence of infectious diseases 
is much higher in Egypt. But the difference in the figures for anti­
biotics in Table 7 is probably a result of the pricing policy of the 
Egyptian authorities towards that particular group of drugs. The most 
commonly used antibiotic preparations in Egypt are penicillin and 
chloramphenicol, and both types of drugs are expressly priced at manu­
facturing cost levels to ensure that low-income earners can afford 
them. Because the volume of these two groups of low priced drugs is a 
high proportion of the total class of antibiotics, the value of the
2*f.
total class will therefore underestimate the physical volume of this 
group as a whole.
In Egypt again while vitamins and analgesics together account 
for 2*f.*f% of total expenditure on drugs, for what are comparatively 
minor illnesses, the most serious and widespread diseases in the 
country remain relatively untreated as shown in the figure for anti- 
parasitics. The drug group 'Antiparasitic' includes both Anthelmin­
tics and Antimalarials, two major groups of drugs used in the treatment 
of what are obviously the most widespread diseases in the country, 
but the percentage consumption for the total group is only 5.2% 
in 1 9 6 and 1.1# in 1970.
The most widespread diseases in Egypt are Bilharzia, ancylos- 
toma and ascaris, all three parasitic infections requiring anthelmin­
tics for treatment (a sub-group under antiparasitic). Also serious 
are eye infections, tuberculosis, dysentry and the threat of malaria. 
The estimated percentage'1' of the Egyptian population affected by some
of these diseases are:
Disease 1952 i960 1970
Bilharzia *f6% J6.1 %
Ancylostoma 12.9% 11% 5-8%
Ascaris 39.6% 26.1#
Tuberculosis n.a. n.a. 0.9%
A great deal of research has been done on the development of 
antibilharzia drugs, much of this work in Egypt itself. Although 
specific drug therapies have been developed to treat this disease, 
they are not very efficient (the patient needs continuous medical super­
vision during treatment), they are expensive,and by themselves useless 
if the patient is going to be immediately reinfected after treatment 
(Bilharzia only affects people living in rural areas). Another method
1. Ministry of Health, Report on a Study of Health as a Productive 
Investment, op.cit., pp.5-6.
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of combating bilharzia is the eradication of the snail vector in­
habiting the edges of water streams by the large scale use of mollus- 
cicides. This method has proved extremely difficult to control and 
maintain and is again very costly. The only solution appears to lie 
in substantial improvements of the rural environment such as the ex­
tension of purified water to all villages and in educating the
farmers to understand the causes and cycle of the disease. The annual 
funds needed to combat bilharzia have been estimated at several million 
Egyptian pounds.
It is widely held that "...the drugs needed for urgent therapeutic 
requirements are not necessarily those that will be profitable to manu­
facture .,fl; and that "Production programmes based solely upon thera-
2peutic needs are generally not profitable." The reasoning behind 
this is that many of the vitally needed drugs have long been on the 
market, are therefore out of patent, are produced efficiently and are 
available on the international market at very competitive prices. 
Examples are penicillin, sulpha drugs and some of the anti T.B. drugs. 
The experience of Egyptian pharmaceutical firms bears out this import­
ant fact. Their return on the sale of penicillin, sulpha drugs, anth­
elmintics and antituberculosis drugs is negligible. Another reason is 
the fact that drugs treating serious diseases in poor populations will 
be purchased by central authorities like hospitals and health depart­
ments. Such institutional purchases are carried out in a very compet­
itive climate and the prices arrived at are usually a small fraction 
of list prices used by firms in normal marketing of their products.
1. UNIDO, Establishment of Pharmaceutical Industries in Developing 
Countries, Report and Proceedings of Expert Working Group Meeting, 
Budapest, 5-9 Hay 1969 (ID/35) (ID/WG.37/3), p.13*
2. Ibid., p.20.
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This is true of most countries. It must finally be mentioned that 
demand cannot be directed into the desired consumption pattern by 
merely reorganising production programmes and making vitally needed 
drugs available at low prices. Demand for such drugs can only stem 
from an adequate system of health facilities and medical care.
b) Ethical versus Household Drugs
A second recognised classification of medicines distinguishes 
between those drugs which by law are advertised only to the medical 
profession (prescription or ethical drugs), and those which sellers 
are allowed to promote directly to the general public (household or 
proprietary drugs). Each of these two classes accounts for a substan­
tial share of the total pharmaceutical market in all countries.
The class of ethical drugs can further be subdivided into two 
groups:
i) One group which is available by law only on a doctor*s pre­
scription, e.g. barbiturates;
li) A second group of medicines which although advertised only 
to doctors, (and therefore used mainly on prescription), is neverthe­
less available to the general public to purchase directly should they 
so wish.
The proportion of ethicals in the second group is much larger in 
poor countries where there is no strict control on the sale of drugs.
In Egypt for instance, one can purchase any antibiotic, hormone and 
most tranquilisers without a prescription; furthermore all prescriptions 
are returned to the patient who can use them time and again. Although 
the list of drugs which the chemist is required to dispense only on a 
doctor's valid prescription is very long, and the law is similar to 
the laws of Europe, it was found impossible to enforce it because of 
the economic hardship the patient would endure in being obliged to pay
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for a doctor's services. Tight control is kept, however, on the 
attendance of a qualified pharmacologist at all times in the pharmacy 
to ensure some measure of advice and control of sales. In a study of 
chemist sales in Alexandria, it was found that two-thirds of drugs 
were bought without medical prescriptions, although a half of these 
were chosen on the advice of the attendant pharmacologist.1
One of the harmful effects of self medication has been the excess­
ive use of antibiotics in the treatment of minor illness with the re­
sult that many disease organisms have become resistant to the anti­
biotics in common use. An example of this is the development of re­
sistant strains of gonnococci which are responsible for gonorrhoea.
The usual dose of penicillin - 1.2 million units of benzathine intra­
muscular divided into two doses in two consecutive days - is normally 
sufficient to treat the condition. In resistant cases however, larger 
doses of synthetic penicillin have to be administered.
Another consequence of self-medication in Egypt is the observed 
habituation and addiction of large numbers of people to sedatives in 
common use such as barbiturates.
Turning now to household drugs (sometimes referred to as propriet­
ary or 'over the counter' drugs) this terra applies to medicines which 
are advertised directly to the public and which by tradition are pur­
chased without medical advice. They are mostly preparations used for 
minor disorders as compared to ethicals. Examples are analgesics (the 
most popular one of these is Asprin, Egypt alone consuming approximately 
^50 tons each year), cough and cold preparations, antacids, laxatives 
and vitamins.
In the marketing of both ethical and household drugs manufact­
urers can use either trade marks (brands, 'specialities') or the
1. Interview with Dr. Abdou M. Sallam, Minister of Health, Cairo, 
1971.
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Official names of the product (generic, approved names). Official 
names, like trade names, may apply to a single chemical or a mixture 
of chemicals in the same preparation. The chemical name of a substance 
describes its molecular structure and is therefore sometimes long and 
complicated, such as L-3-ketothreohexuronic acid for Vitamin C. Gen­
eric names are normally chosen by the originator of the drug and are 
coined so as to simplify the chemical name; phenobarbital is the 
generic name for the chemically described 5-ethyl-5-phenylbarbituric 
acid (chemical name).
There has been a long-standing debate about whether manufacturers 
should be forced to market their products under their generic name. 
Prohibiting the use of brand names is expected to simplify the job of 
the physician in recognising and choosing between drugs and would also 
reduce the monopoly advantages of firms able to maintain relatively 
large advertising budgets. Since the majority of prescriptions are 
written using brand names (in the U.S. 90% and in the U.K. 88.8% in 
1965)1 1 such a measure should have some effect on competitive condit­
ions. But it must be remembered that in such markets as the U.S. and 
U.K., the level of duplication of drugs is small.
2
In the U.K., for instance, according to Cooper, the average number 
of brand names per geberic drug is only 1.1. Cooper also points out 
that the number of drugs for which there are equivalent preparations 
of the same generic composition are very limited (because of patents 
held on both the generic product and its brand name), but when equi­
valents are available, these are very large in number per generic com­
position. As a result, one can only expect an increase in competition 
due to the abolishion of brand names after the expiry of patent rights 
on any particular product.
1. M. H. Cooper, Op.cit., p.9^*
2. Ibid., pp.93-9^.
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For developing countries, this issue has perhaps greater impli­
cations, especially where domestic production of pharmaceuticals has 
made a start. The problem will therefore be reconsidered in the 
section on the domestic firms in Egypt and licence agreements, where 
it will be suggested that there is a definite advantage to the dom­
estic firms of a developing country from the enforcement of such a 
law that limits producers to the use of generic names only.
c) Finished Products versus Raw Materials
Pharmaceutical goods in their finished form are medical pre­
parations ready for administration in any of their possible dosage 
forms: tablets, capsules, ampoules, salves, syrups, powders, oint­
ments or suppositories. The choice of a particular dosage form of a 
drug is as important as the choice of the basic drug itself (active 
substance or ingredient), to ensure the desired physiological response 
from its administration.
The processing of drugs into their final dosage form from ready 
made active ingredients is a very exacting science, if high standards 
of quality are to be maintained; variations in pressure in stamping
tablets aan cause changes in the rate of absorption of the drug, the
application of coatings can determine whether the tablet can disin­
tegrate satisfactorily. The choice of binders and auxilliary ingred­
ients can also modify the onset, intensity and duration of the physio­
logical response. Indeed, in quality control, there are a large number
of tests that must be applied to ensure the purity, uniformity, and 
stability of the active ingredient and of course its freedom from 
contamination.
It is clear, however, that the machinery, equipment and product­
ion methods required for the formulation of' drugs into their dosage 
form are relatively well known and standardised all over the world.
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Improvements in such processes as freeze drying or the introduction 
of more efficient ampoule filling and sealing machines can be easily 
adopted within an existing laboratory at reasonable cost of equip­
ment and know-how. It can also be observed that in the processing of 
pharmaceutical intermediates into finished drugs, there is no optimum 
size of laboratory; if one singles out any particular product, the 
firm seems capable of adapting its structure to marginal changes in 
output without affecting costs.1 This is because formulation into dos­
age forms requires the same apparatus for different active substances 
and there is consequently great flexibility with respect to product 
mix (not between different dosage forms but between different active 
ingredients and hence basic drug for any given dosage form). It does 
appeaE, however, that the increasing sophistication in quality control 
procedures will make it difficult for the very small laboratories to 
absorb the high cost of newly developed equipment: for operations
such as quality control where analytical methods involving the use of 
costly instruments have become essential, the minimum effective level 
of investment has risen to some extent independently of imposed con­
trols. Thus very small firms which have hitherto been able to maintain
a competitive position in this sector will find survival increasingly
2
difficult in the future." , and "... in the production of pharmaceutical 
preparations there have in the past been few obstacles to the involve­
ment of small companies or new entrants. However, it does appear that 
the raising of standards of manufacturing practice, and the increasing 
cost of items, such as quality control, will increase the difficulties 
faced by very small firms.
1. National Economic Development Office, Focus on Pharmaceuticals, a 
report by the Pharmaceuticals Working Party of the Chemicals EDC,
(a NEDO publications), London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
pp.11-12.
2. Ibid., p.12.
3« Ibid., p.15.
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The manufacturing processes used in the production of active 
ingredients (pharmaceutical intermediates), are much more varied and 
complex than those involved in the final processing of drugs. Bulk 
active ingredients used in formulation have their source in five basic 
types of production processes: chemical synthesis takes the leading 
share with 55% of total pharmaceutical raw materials (e.g. chloramph­
enicol, sulpha compounds, aspirin); fermentation, extraction from 
animal organs, and micro-biological processes present kO% of sources 
of raw materials (examples of each process are penicillin, insulin and 
vaccine production); and finally, the fifth type of process is the 
extraction of medicinal substances from botanical sources which accounts 
for 5% only of pharmaceutical raw materials.1
There are clearly defined stages of production in the manufacture 
of pharmaceutical intermediates, and it is wrong to think of the 
operations involved as one integrated process which the firm chooses 
either to undertake itself or delegate to other concerns. The manu­
facture of bulk ingredients is split into a host of consecutive and 
fairly independent steps, each step of backward integration involving 
greater specialisation (less flexibility), relatively larger invest­
ments in installations and machinery, higher capital/labour ratios, 
more economies of scale, and greater dependence on the output of other 
industries (which is especially true of chemical synthesis).
The primary stage® of production of synthetic medicinal chemicals 
require a corresponding development of the chemical sector of any given 
country because of the strong dependence of each pharmaceutical chemical
1. A Sectoral Study on the Pharmaceutical Industry, document prepared 
by a Group of Experts for the Asian Conference on Industrialisation, 
held at Manila, Philippines, from 6 to 20 December 1965i under the 
sponsorship of ECAFE with the co-operation of the United Nations 
Centre for Industrial Development (UNIDO), E/C0NF.5*f/R.B.P./2,
United Nations, New York, 1966, p.468.
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output on a large number of fine chemicals as inputs. Production 
methods and the technology needed for the operation of pharmaceutical 
chemicals plants are also very similar to those available in advanced 
chemical industries.
3. The International Market for Pharmaceuticals
a) Concentration
Both world production and world trade in pharmaceuticals are
concentrated in a small number of countries in the West. According
to a UNIDO report,'*' world production of pharmaceuticals in 1965 was
2
estimated at 12.7 billion U.S. dollars, and OECD figures for the 
same year show that production undertaken in the OECD area (excluding 
Switzerland) amounted to 9 billion U.S. dollars, almost three-quarters 
of world production.
3
The following Table describes world exports of pharmaceuticals, 
but the foreign operations (subsidiaries and license agreements) of 
international firms belonging to the five major exporting countries 
is growing at a much faster rate than direct exports, and explains the 
apparent decline of the U.S. trade position.
Table 8. Percentage Share of World Exports of Pharmaceuticals_______
Year U.S.A. W.Germ. U.K. Switz. France Other Rest Total 
________________________________________________ OECD. World___________
1954 39.1 7.8 13.0 n.a. 10.4 11.0 0.7 100
1965 20.0 17.6 14.7 14.3 10.8 21.4 1.2 100
1966 18.8 18.1 1^.3 14.1 11*3 21.7 1-7 100
Source: "Trade in commodities, Series C", and "World Trade Annual",
Division 54 : Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Products, OECD 
Publications, Paris, 1967-
1. UNIDO, Secretariat (ID/WG.37/2, May 2 1969), p.25-
2. OECD, Gaps in Technology: Pharmaceuticals, Op.cit., p.32. Note 
the mistake in the heading, where thousands should be substituted 
for millions.
3« Ibid., p.42.
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According to R. C. Fenton,1 the world market for ethical drug 
sales excluding the U.S. and Communist areas, was of the value of 
3.5 billion U.S. dollars in 19^3i and U.S. companies and their 
foreign subsidiaries accounted for 20% of this value.
The concentration of production is also significant within the 
national market of each of the major exporting countries, although 
this fact is sometimes obscured because of the large number of pro­
ducts and producers engaged in pharmaceutical manufacture. If one 
narrows down the national market to individual therapeutic groups, 
concentration is even more substantial than for the drug market as a 
whole. The U.S. is the largest manufacturer and supplier of drugs 
internationally. Its pharmaceutical industry was composed of 1,600
2
companies in 19&5 » ethical drug sales amounting to 2.3 billion dollars.
3Yet, according to a study by William Comanor, the total U.S. ethical 
drugs market can be described as type II oligopoly (where the largest 
8 firms account for at least 33% of industry output). Furthermore, 
when analysing particular therapeutic classifications (for which the 
cross elasticities of demand approach zero), Cornanor found that in 
twenty such markets, the proportions of output accounted for by the 
leading 5 firms ranged from 56% to 98%, describing type I oligopoly 
(where the largest 8 firms account for at least 50% of industry output).
This highly skewed distribution of firm size is characteristic 
of the market in all advanced countries. In Britain, with 320 firms,
10% of firms account for 70% of turnover; in Italy, with over 700 firms,
1. Richard C. Fenton, "Worldwide Ethical Drug Markets", in Pharma­
ceutical Marketing, Op.cit., p.30^.
2. A. Mason Harlow, "Pharmaceutical Marketing and the Public Inter­
est in Perspective", in Pharmaceutical Marketing, ed. Keller and 
Smith, Op.cit., p.239*
3« William S. Comanor, "Research and Competitive Product Different­
iation in the Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States", in 
Economica (November, 196*0.
3*f.
25% of firms account for 90% of turnover; in Germany, the bulk of 
turnover is concentrated in 17% of firms.1
Despite a tendency for the larger companies to grow at a faster 
rate than the industry average (either individually or through the 
process of amalgamation), and for small companies to be driven grad­
ually out of the market (in France the number of companies has de- 
clined in fifteen years from 2000 to 800), there remains in all 
countries a considerable proportion of small firms. In Britain, 63% 
of firms employ less than 25 people; in Italy, 300 firms have less 
than 9 employees; in Japan, 571 firms (out of a total of 1306) have 
less than 10 employees.^
The emergence and survival of such small companies alongside the 
giants of the industry illustrates the fact that a large part of 
pharmaceutical production is very economical on a small scale,
b) Production Costs
A great number of drugs can be produced in small quantities 
comparatively cheaply. This is true of two main kinds of production: 
the first is the final processing and packaging of most drugs, and the 
second is the complete manufacture of those drugs for which the total 
market is small.
The majority of small pharmaceutical firms tend to purchase ready­
made basic substances in bulk (most active ingredients are available as 
intermediates in pdwder form) , and confine their operations to those of 
formulation into dosage forms and packaging. Several representatives
/f
of medium sized companies have expressed the opinion that it was even
1. OECD, op.cit., p»p.*f7-*f9*
2. M. H. Cooper, op.cit.,p.62.
3. OECD, op.cit., pp.*f7-^9*
*f. Interviews with representatives of 'Reckitt & Colman' in the U.K., 
1971* and of ‘Alexandria’ and 'CID' companies in Egypt, 1971*
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cheaper for the tiny laboratory to perform such processes as tablet- 
ting or admixture of solutions because these small establishments do 
not bear the high overhead costs (administration, coordination) which 
running a large enterprise involves. This suggests the possibility 
that long run marginal costs of manufacturing remain fairly constant 
for a wide range of output in the formulation of drugs. But it is 
difficult to believe that a larger enterprise specialising in these 
final stages of production (processing into dosage forms and packaging) 
could not be made to run more efficiently than small businesses and 
effect the savings which one would expect from the economies of large 
scale production, such as in bulk purchases of raw materials and in 
transport costs. A more plausible explanation for the profitability 
of such great multitudes of very small and sometimes inefficient 
sizes of pharmaceutical firms is the well documented fact that vari­
able costs are an extremely low proportion of total costs in the pro­
duction of pharmaceutical goods,1 and this, together with the lack of 
price competition in the market for drugs means that higher costs of 
production due to inefficient size will have a negligible effect on 
total costs and competitive position.
There is evidence that the recent entry (a totally new trend) of 
the large firm specialising in the formulation of generic drugs into 
the American market is posing a real threat to the small producer; 
McKesson & Robbins, hitherto the largest drug wholesaler in the U.S., 
has decided to integrate backwards into formulation and packaging and 
"has promised to undersell the low price operators already in the 
field.1'2
1. William S. Comanor, "Research and Competitive Product Differentiat­
ion in the Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States", Op.cit.,
P.575.
2. Christopher A. Rodowskas, J. "Competition in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry", in Pharmaceutical Marketing, Op.cit., p.1^5.
Evidence of important economies of scale in the storage of pharma­
ceuticals will be given on pp.173-17^ of this thesis.
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Although the majority of small pharmaceutical firms engage in 
the last stages of production only, a significant number of these 
are highly specialised and integrated in their field of manufacture.
In almost all therapeutic categories there are numerous examples of 
drugs which can be produced efficiently on a small scale: in ophthalmic, 
cardiac and derraatological classes, for example. Such specialised 
small laboratories usually carry out a large amount of research and 
development on their products. Studies show that in the manufacture 
of drugs for such narrow but specialised segments of the market, there 
is no tendency "for the large enterprises to spend, necessarily, more 
on research and development in proportion to their turnover than the 
small, and above all, the medium sized, enterprises."1
Looking at the production of the small group of giant firms in
the pharmaceutical industry, there is a high degree of manufacturing
2specialisation. To take an example, Squibb, the eighth largest Amer­
ican firm in terms of sales has the fourth broadest line of products 
on the market, with 227 different drugs in 30^ different formulations 
and *+35 different package sizes. Yet Squibb is fully integrated with 
respect to few of its products. Out of a total of 51 drugs representing 
at least two-thirds of the total value of all U.S. output of ethical 
drugs in 1958, Squibb sold Nineteen but produced only seven.^ This 
firm produces some of its antibiotic products preparations from their 
very primary stages, examples are nystatin, streptomycin and penicillin 
potassium G.
1. UNIDO, Secretariat (ID/WG.37/2, May 2 1969), p.8.
2. Richard M. Furlaud, "Statement before Senate Subcommittee" in 
Pharmaceutical Marketing, Op.cit., p.162.
3« U.S. Senate Report, Administered Prices, Drugs, 1961. U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, Washington, 1961, p.67.
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In the production of eight vitamins, sulfadiazine, and tetra­
cycline, Squibb relies entirely on the purchase of the active ingred­
ients in bulk form from other large establishments, and confines its 
operations to formulating, packaging and marketing these drugs under 
its own brand names.^ This pattern of interdependence characterises 
the entire range of firm sizes and is in reality a lot more complex 
than described here, because, as mentioned earlier, the production of 
pharmaceutical raw materials is itself segmented into many separate 
stages and backward integration can be extended to embrace as many 
steps or processes as a firm may need to.
Judging from the wide spectrum of firm sizes in the pharmaceutical 
industry and from the magnitude of interdependence across its whole 
range, one can infer with some confidence that economies of scale in 
the production of pharmaceuticals are largely unimportant as a barrier 
to entry.
c) Innovation
In a market characterised by a highly inelastic demand for 
existing drugs, and a lack of size/cost advantage in capital require­
ments or manufacturing techniques, the absence of some other form of
entry barrier like product differentiation would send the pharmaceutical
2mdsutry into intense price competition, and bring pressure on profits.
It is generally agreed that the leading pharmaceutical firms in the
West have pursued a policy of competitive innovation to ensure the
3security of their position of oligopoly. High research and development
1. U.S. Senate, Ibid., p.6?.
2. This happened in the case of penicillin and streptomycin, neither
protected by patents; the price of 10 mil. units of penicillin fell
from #60 in 19^5 to #^.75 in 1930 to #0.21 in i960. Similarly,
10 grams of Streptomycin fell in price from #160 in 19^6 to #3*15 
in 1950, to #0.36 in I960.
3« William S. Comanor, Op.cit., pp.372-375.
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expenditures have provided the means of furnishing the firm with a
continuous flow of new products, and the patent system has allowed the
legal enforcement of restrictions on entry to their market.
This trend for the rapid introduction of both major advances and
minor modifications to existing therapeutics was accelerated in the
1950s and early 1960s with the result that in Britain for instance,
the number of branded preparations as a percentage of prescriptions
rose from 16% of the total in 19^9 to 68/o in 1963 an(* 73/° in 1966.^
When it is remembered that there are some 3000 drugs available for
2
prescription on the National Health Service and that their average 
duplication ratib is 1.1 brands per official name , the extent of 
product differentiation becomes evident.
In the U.S., William Comanor has shown that in the ten year period 
1951 to I960, 57 firms introduced ^,632 new products. Of these, *f32 
were new chemical entities, 760 duplicate products, l,06*f new dosage 
forms, and 2,376 compound products (combinations of drugs already on 
the market). This last type of preparation is the least desirable 
from a medical point fo view, and there is much criticism of the fact 
that the U.S. law allows the issue of new patents for mere combinations 
of old products.^
Nevertheless, while these laws still stand, companies make full 
use of them. Between January 1972 and November 1973 three American 
companies alone - Squibb, Merck and Upjohn - filed 3^9 international 
patents, at a cost of £15 million which they claimed as part of their
1. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Relationship of the
Pharmaceutical Industry with the National Health Service, 1965-67* 
(Sainsbury Report), Cmnd. 3^10* London, HMSO., 1967* p.25«
2. Ibid., p.5«
3. Henry Steele, "Patent Restrictions and Price Competition in the
Ethical Drugs Industry", Journal of Industrial Economics, 12:198,
July 196^.
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research and development budgets. According to the testimony of Dr. 
Robert Aries as to the new Senate subcommittee investigation the 
American drug industry, very few of the patents filed are original.
In 1972, only *f5 out of 1,500 patents registered internationally - by 
American companies in two other countries - were genuine new drugs.^ 
The pattern of research in the industry is also directed towards 
making patents unassailable. Drug companies claim that they face odds 
of 5000:1 against finding clinically useful drugs, and that only one 
in 5000 pharmaceutical compounds tested succeeds commercially. But 
these odds are greatly inflated by the synthesis and testing of com­
pounds made necessary only by consideration of patents. Because any 
new drug discovered almost always leads to a host of structurally sim­
ilar but separately patentable imitations, too much emphasis is placed 
upon strengthening the patent by synthesising and screening a whole 
series of chemicals related to the first active compound. It has 
been shown that in a series of up to V?5 tests, the chances of find­
ing a successful marketed compound within the first *f0 tests of the 
series was 825©, clearly a reflection that a tremendous amount of chem­
ical and pharmacological effort is wasted except for the purpose of 
acquiring patents.^
High rates of product obsolescence in the industry are a direct 
outcome of competitive innovation, and in many cases are self-imposed 
by firms in their attempt to improve their position in any particular 
therapeutic market. The following Table is adapted from the results 
given in an article on the product life cycle of ethical drugs.^
1. The Economist, February 16, 197^ -, p.88.
2. John R. Vane, A Plan for Evaluating Potential Drugs, Chap.2, of 
Evaluation of Drug Activities: Pharmacometrics, Academic Press, 
London and New York.
3« William E. Cox "Product Life Cycles as Marketing Models", in 
Pharmaceutical Marketing, ed., Op.cit., pp.76-80.
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Cox's model is based on a sample of 75^ ethical drugs introduced in 
the U.S. market in the years 1955-1960.
Table 9* Life Cycle of Ethical Drug
Stages of Product Age Length of Time 
between Stages
Catalog Birth (product is introduced in 
the catalog of the firm)
Coramericial Birth (product attains 5000 
new prescriptions in one month). Only 
kl.5% of products reached commercial birth
Maximum Monthly Revenue
Commercial Death (monthly revenue of pro­
duct declines to 10% of maximum reached)
1 month 
(median)
6 months 
(average)
20 months 
(median)
As apparent from the Table, the typical ethical drug life is 
just over two years. The dangerous threat which such unreasonable 
proportions of new introductions is posing has been emphasised by a 
leading pharmacologist'*': MIn the past the pharmaceutical industry has 
shown admirable restraint, but such restraint no longer exists... 
Excessive numbers of drugs are now being introduced - excessive in 
view of the working capacities of those competent to test their safety 
and utility in man, excessive in view of the subjects available for 
the testing of their effects, dangers and uses in man, and excessive 
in view of the ability of those who must assimilate the essential 
knowledge and learn how to prescribe them effectively and safely, 
rationally rather than routinely."
d) Marketing
A major deterrent to true competition and an important factor 
in maintaining high retail prices in the international pharmaceutical 
market is the high cost of promotion.
Advertising practices of the large pharmaceutical companies have 
received the attention and criticism of most writers on the subject.
1. Walter Modell, nThe Drug Explosion - An Editorial", in Pharmaceut­
ical Marketing, ed., Op.cit., p.261.
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Promotional expenditure is considered excessive in proportion to 
other outlays of the large firm, and it often is the case where ad­
vertising costs are as high or higher than research cost, themselves 
a considerable proportion of sales revenue. In Britain, in 19&5t the 
industry spent 17% of sales on distribution and sales promotion, as 
compared to 9.7% on research and development.1 The Kefauver invest­
igations showed that in 1958 the American companies spent 2*f.8% of 
the industry's total sales on advertising and selling expenditure, 
as compared to 6.3% on research. In 196*f, the American industry is
further reported to have increased the percentage of sales spent on
2
distribution and promotion to 35%» The actual figure involved re­
presents an average promotional outlay of #3,000 per prescribing 
physician per annum.
When one considers the physician population, a small homogeneous 
and clearly defined group as the firm's customer, even the most com­
prehensive marketing effort aimed at making a product known would need 
to be only a modest proportion of actual outlays.
Advertising to a trade (in this case, physicians) is known to 
be much cheaper per unit of sales than advertising to the ultimate 
consumer. However, an American manufacturer justifies the large ex­
penditure by saying: "If we think of the physician as our customer,
our market is small numerically, but our potential sales per customer
3
are so large as to justify a very considerable promotional effort."
But admitting that the money is only spent because more than enough 
is available is obviously also an admission of an unhealthy market 
situation resulting from an oligopolistic domination.
1. Sainsbury Report, Op.cit., p.108.
2. Scherer, F.M. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 
Rand McNally and Co., Chicago, 1971» p*329»
3« Richard L. Hull, "Marketing Concepts", in Pharmaceutical Marketing, 
ed., Op.cit., p.5*
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Although marketing expenditure are far above the necessary 
level to inform the prescribing public, their magnitude has served 
the giant companies as the most effective barrier against the entry 
of the smaller firms into the pharmaceutical market. Large firms in 
the industry have thus increased the normal advantages which their 
size offers them in advertising costs. They have inflated the mini­
mum threshhold level necessary for an advertising campaign to be 
effective, so that small firms need to spend ridiculous sums on ad­
vertising in relation to their turnover if they are to make any impact 
on the ethicals market.
Because economies of scale in production are unimportant to the 
pharmaceutical industry, average production cost gives a minimum opt­
imal size of firm which is small in relation to the size of the market. 
But massive advertising costs, when added to average production costs 
gives an average total cost curve which has a minimum point at a much 
higher level of crntput. Small firms are therefore unable to compete 
in the largest segments of the market which are dominated by the big 
firms' brands, and compensate for their inability to match the advert­
ising budgets of the giants by offering their products at prices which 
are substantially lower than those of the leading firms.
e) Prices
The few dimensions covered so far have obvious implications 
for pricing. Prices in the pharmaceutical industry are characterised 
by their lack of relationship to costs of production and by their great 
rigidity, two essential aspects of oligopolistic price behaviour.
Although it is difficult to construct a comprehensive index for 
the price level of drugs,^ one can make several observations which 
apply to the majority of drugs and which have been verified.
1. A general price index would require stability in the share of diff­
erent drugs in the total and would ignore the importance of new 
drugs which are continuously introduced.
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i) There are significant price differentials for the same drug 
as between manufacturers, branded products being higher priced than 
generics. H.D. Walker discovered in an analysis of 636 ethicaldrugs 
that the prices of branded, advertised preparations were two-thirds 
higher on the average than the price of equivalent drugs sold under 
their generic names.^
ii) There is considerable price discrimination by manufacturers 
among different market^, and among different buyers within the same 
market. Studies of price,levels for the product of a single manu­
facturer in different countries have often revealed vast differences 
in pricing. The latest case to be given coverage in the press is the
price of Beecham's Ampicillin which is sold in France for 2-J times
2its level m  Britain.
It is also a general rule that in all countries, large institut­
ions are powerful buyers which are conscious of price differentials 
and are therefore favoured with lower prices by manufacturers.
iii) The price trend for any particular static group of drugs is 
downward, because the expiry of patents introduces new competition and 
forces a reduction in the prices of existing products. But the aver­
age price level for any group of commonly used drugs treating a part­
icular disease shows an upward trend, because new products displacing 
older drugs are much higher priced. A good example is the group of 
antibiotics.
1. Hugh D. Walker, "Market Power and Relative Prices in the Ethical 
Drug Industry", Abstracts of Econometric Society. Papers, Dec. 1967, 
meetings, pp.73-74.
2. The Guardian, April 1974.
44.
4. The Cg.se of the Developing Countries
The pharmaceutical industry in the West has been thoroughly in­
vestigated, but there has been little published work on the problems 
facing developing countries in the acquisition of drugs."*"
The demand for drugs in most developing countries can be expected 
to rise at a higher rate than the demand for any other single consumer 
good, because of the disproportionate increase in those segments of 
the population having access to medical care, of the acceleration of 
government expenditure on health, and of the increased awareness of 
the public of the existence of remedies.
This is clear in the case of Egypt for instance, as shown by a 
comparison of the development of consumption levels for various basic 
consumer goods.
Table 10. Index for Growth of Consumption of Basic Commodities in
Egypt , 1952-■1970
Year Drugs Grains Fab­
rics
Sugar Fruit Veget­
ables
Oils and 
Fats
1952 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
60/61 307 112 109 114 129 149 132
64/65 639 175 207 131 197 215 178
69/70 930 198 234 148 223 244 202
Source: Statistics Department of GOPCA.
Given the near monopoly over supply of ethical pharmaceutical 
goods by international companies based in industrialised economies, 
developing countries have an obvious interest in finding means of 
obtaining drugs on better terms. But before settling on a particular 
strategy, developing countries must be fully aware of the essential
1. Notable exceptions are C.V. Vaitsos, Transfer of Resources and
Preservations of Monopoly Rents, Economic Development Heport, No. 
168, Development Advisory Service, Center for International Aff­
airs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970. Also 
the general survey and papers presented to the UNIDO meeting on 
the Establishment of Pharmaceutical Industries in Developing 
Countries, Op.cit., (Ip/WG. 37/3)» 1969*
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differences between their own pharmaceutical markets and those of 
the more advanced countries.
One aspect of a developed pharmaceutical market that developing 
countries have still to realise is the greater degree of competition 
created by the large number of efficient small firms operating in 
technologically advanced countries. These firms specialise in the 
production of standard unbranded drugs. The expiry of a patent is 
quickly followed by the appearance of much lower priced generics from 
the small companies to compete with the original product from the 
larger, initiating company. But this benefit is only slowly transferred 
to developing countries because these companies are too small to 
afford to market their products internationally.
Even in their home market, these small firms are unable to sell 
their products to the private sector because of the barriers to entry 
which the larger companies have erected with their huge marketing and 
advertising outlays. As a result, the sale of low priced generics 
is concentrated on supplying bulk buyers such as government agencies.
In the U.S. for instance, the bids of military establishments and state 
hospitals come to these small competitive producers.^ The list of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers who have met the inspection requirements 
of the Defense Supply Agency and are authorised to submit bids for 
contract from the government is very long. There are over 500 such 
"responsible prospective contractors".
One of the very useful suggestions made by UNIDO in its summary 
recommendations is that developing countries "should consider channel­
ling most of their import and domestic buying ... through a central
1. See Christopher A. Rodowska, Jr., "Competition in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry", p.lVf; Regina Brown "The New Shape of the Medical Market", 
p.lO^ f; and F.D.C. Reports, "Two Dominant Trends in V/holesale Drug 
Business", pp.90-91 - All in Pharmaceutical Marketing, Op.cit.
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agency and purchase commonly used drugs in bulk for greater economy•"
But the above measure does not apply to developing countries
alone, since many nations that are concerned with the cost of drugs
to their public have considered such centralised control of purchases.
In Britain since 1957, the National Health Service has operated a
Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme for drugs commonly presented on the
N.H.S., with the result that the price level for drugs on the British
market is reported to be lower than in most other countries in the 
2
West. To achieve savings of any magnitude, the central purchasing 
agency must develop a system of price control to complement its role 
of monopsonist.
The centralised purchasing agency can adopt one or more possible 
measures to obtain competitive prices, both from foreign and domestic 
producers. One criterion widely used by governments for fixing the 
price of drugs from a foreign producer has been the requirement that
this price must not exceed the price charged for it by the producer
in the country of origin. The opposite criterion is likewise used 
by other countries. In Britain for instance, until 1959* the export 
criterion was a formula whereby the purchase price to the National 
Health Service must not exceed the average export price to other mar­
kets. This formula was criticized by the Sainsbury Committee because 
it assumes that prices in international markets are competitive, 
"...certain of the formulae, and particularly the export criterion, 
must be viewed with some suspicion in a world industry operating with­
in an international network of patents."^
1. UNIDO, Op.cit., (ID/WG. 37/3), P-13-
2. M.H. and A.J. Cooper, International Price Comparison, A study of 
prices of pharmaceuticals in the U.K. and eight other countries 
in 1970i prepared for the Pharmaceuticals Working Party of the 
Economics Development Committee for the Chemical Industry (NEDO 
publication), London, August 1972, p.11.
3* Sainsbury Report, Op.cit., p.31«
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After the publication of the Sainsbury Report, a new Volunt­
ary Price Regulation Scheme was introduced in the U.K. in 1969«
Price negotiations are now based on the Company’s profits on sales 
of N.H.S. products in the U.K. alone. Firms supply the Department 
of Health and Social Security with details of sales, costs and capital 
employed for the previous year. Negotiations take place on the basis 
of these, taking account of the company's advertising expenditure, 
transfer costs of materials between affiliated concerns, and a degree 
of the parent company's foreign research and other expenditure.-^-
Another method of fostering competition is by inviting tenders 
for bulk supplies of basic generic preparations. In this respect, 
developing countries should be made aware of the existence of little 
known but reliable foreign producers who offer their products at a 
small fraction of those advanced by the giants in their home market. 
There seems to be no reason why these small efficient firms in the 
West should not be approached as sources of potential supply.
Because of the imperfections of the market, the price charged 
by one firm will vary substantially from one country to another, being 
a function of potential competition in each market. Since the major­
ity of developing countries do not have a national pharmaceutical 
industry, potential competition is greatly reduced and the prices of 
foreign drugs can be expected to be higher than in developed markets. 
Centralised purchasing can therefore be a valuable means of obtaining 
lower prices, and bargaining strength becomes the decisive factor 
affecting the terms reached from negotiations.
A second aspect of a developed market that developing countries 
must take into account is that the monopoly elements in drug manufact­
ure stem from the patented results of research and from know-how, which
1. See M.H. and A.J. Cooper, International Price Comparison, Op.cit.
Jf8.
are two very scarce resources in developing economies. This means 
that antitrust legislation designed to weaken such monopoly elements 
can only be effective if it is carried out by countries with suffic­
iently developed home industries to take advantage of such weakened 
protection of the multinationals.1 For example, government restrict­
ions on the issue of patent s, reductions in the period of patent 
protection, or compulsory licensing, are all expected to lead to the 
entry of more firms into themarket for patented products, with a 
resulting increase in competition. But such measures can only have a 
significant impact if they are initiated by the governments of the 
more technologically advanced countries.
A case in point is Italy which is the only country in Western 
Europe that does not recognise patents in drug manufacture, and where 
therefore, neither processes nor products are patentable. The result 
is that Italian firms are quick to copy any newly discovered drugs 
using the most efficient manufacturing techniques, because they do 
not need to circumvent the patent. To Egypt, for instance, the Italian 
pharmaceutical industry has been the cheapest source of pharmaceutical 
active ingredients in bulk form, the prices of which are used by Egypt­
ian firms in negotiating with the multinationals over the purchase of 
raw materials for final processing.
On the other hand, a less developed country like India has lim­
ited scope for taking advantage of a weakened patent system, without
1. It is important not to confuse the present argument about the in­
fluence of patents on the domestic industry of a developing coun­
try with the ability of a centralised purchasing agency to buy 
drugs from non-patented suppliers. Purchasing from unlicensed 
sources can and does happen whenever a central purchasing body 
has sufficient evidence of excessive prices by patentees. This 
occured with Tetracyclin for instance in Britain, the U.S. and 
Egypt at varying dates.
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all of the sophisticated technical resources. It has been pointed 
out by Kust1 that after eight years of operating compulsory licen­
sing provisions in India, very few applications were made by indig­
enous firms and only one was granted.
Patents in Egypt are for processes only, so that alternative 
methods of production for a given product have smraetimes been sought 
as a means of reducing cost. This was forcefully demonstrated by the 
Egyptian acquisition of Russian technology for the manufacture of 
chloramphenicol, the second most important antibiotic on the Egyptian 
market both in volume and value. Parke Davis had discovered and pat­
ented the drug only eleven years before, in 19^7» so that its price 
was still very high on the international market. The cost of manufact­
uring chloramphenicol using the Russian technique proved to be con­
siderably higher than the price of the product in its bulk powder form
2
when later available on the international market. It is sometimes 
cheaper in the long run to pay for direct access to documentation on 
original research and development than for possibly inefficient sub­
stitutes.
It is interesting to consider why the Egyptian government decided 
to continue to observe international patents and not to follow the 
Italian or the Indian^ example. The basic reason seems to be that 
technical know-how from foreign patentees is thought to be a suffic­
iently valuable commodity to pay for voluntarily rather than to use
1. Kust, Matthew J., Foreign Enterprise in India: Laws and Policies 
(University of North Carolina, 1964), as mentioned in Edith T. 
Penrose "International Patenting and the Less-Developed Countries", 
The Economic Journal (Sept. 1973) Vol.83, p.778.
2. See Chapter IV, Section k for more details.
3« India has significantly weakened its patent system. In 1970, patent 
protection was reduced from 16 to 7 years, product patents were 
abolished, and compulsory licensing was allowed after 3 years for 
a royalty not exceeding 5% of value of production.
50.
unreliable immitations as shown in the above example. Both patented 
and non-patented technology must be paid for either directly or in­
directly, and the Egyptian authorities, although recognising the right 
of patent owners have nevertheless legislated against the abuse of 
patents or excessive profits. Royalty payments are limited to a maxi­
mum of 3% on sales, while prices of raw materials delivered to licensees 
may not be more than 10% higher than competing international prices 
from licensed or unlicensed sources. The Egyptian government also 
stipulates that all patent licenses include an option granting access 
to complete manufacturing know-how; and the period of royalty payments 
on any single product is limited to five years.'1'
The advantage to a country of having one negotiating body such 
as GOPCA in Egypt while working within the patent system is precisely 
to be able to limit license payments to a reasonable level. In most 
countries in Latin America, numerous manufacturers megotiate separately 
for patent licenses and this invariably forces payments to a higher
level. One country which, like Egypt, has benefitted from having a
2
central negotiating body is Colombia. Vaitaos reports that the Col­
ombian Committee of Royalties participated in the negotiations of 191 
companies in the private sector from the middle of 1967 to the end of 
1969- This resulted in a reduction of the total payment of royalties 
amounting to U.S. #*+,560,900 for 1968 alone.
It must also be mentioned that the power of the negotiating body 
in Egypt is sufficiently wide to permit it to use its own discretion 
in assessing different situations. It has therefore been very flexible 
at times, allowing the extension of the period for which royalties are 
payable to twenty years, while in other circumstances it has ignored
1. See Chapter III for details.
2. Vaitsos, C. V. Transfer of Resources and Preservation of Monopoly 
Rents, Op.cit., p.4£.
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patent rights and purchased raw materials from unlicensed sources.
The bargaining power of GOPCA and its well informed judgment have 
together ensured local pharmaceutical companies the continued co­
operation of foreign international firms at very reasonable cost.
It has been claimed, particularly by Vaitsos,'1’ that observance 
of patents has led to considerable 'overpricing' of pharmaceutical 
products on the part of patent holders. The suggestion that patents 
alone have led to excessive prices is not substnatiated by his evidence. 
As Professor Penrose has pointed out, "..., for one can think of a 
number of considerations other than patents which could produce similar 
results, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, such as brand-name 
protection, transfer pricing to subsidiaries which would continue re­
gardless of patents, subsidised or loss-making exports which would not
2
be available on a continuing basis, etc." In fact, many of the pro­
ducts listed by Vaitsos are protected only by brand names, and have 
competing lower priced equivalents from among the pharmaceutical com­
panies operating in those same countries that observe patents."^ The 
evidence offered by Vaitsos is therefore more useful as an argument 
for the abolishment of brand names, an argument referred to earlier in 
the text.
The working group set up by UNIDO agreed in its summary recommend­
ations that "a developing country should institute, if not already in 
force, conditions whereby protection for patent holders will be provided 
as regards transfers to domestic producers and their foreign assoc-
1. Vaitsos, C.V., Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing 
Countries, Journal of Development Studies (Oct., 1972) Vol.9i No.l.
2. Penrose, Edith T., International Patenting and the Less-Developed 
Countries, Op.cit., p.777»
3. Vaitsos, C.V., Transfer of Resources and Preservation of Monopoly 
Rents, Op.cit., Appendix 2, pp.A-10. to A-l*t.
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iates of patented technologies, materials and the like'.'1 This is
perhaps a recognition of the fact that as long as the patent system
is tolerated in the industrialised world, a developing country cannot
benefit from its own legislation designed to weaken protection, if
such legislation is carried out unilaterally. It also reflects the
2prevailing attitude of the United Nations which considers a strong 
patent system a necessary condition for the transfer of foreign techno­
logy • to developing countries. The United
Nations position has been criticised by Professor Penrose: "•••, if 
the international patent bureau, and other international organisations, 
especially the more conservative among them such as those represent­
ing primarily business interests, would give explicit recognition to 
the special needs of the developing countries and accept that special 
restrictions imposed by them may be sanctioned internationally, adverse
reactions from the multinational firms and others among the chief
3
channels of technology transfer would be minimised,"
The UNIDO study on the pharmaceutical industry gives the impress­
ion in some places that the views expressed are strongly biased towards 
those 'primarily business interests' quoted above. An argument against
the possibility of excessively high profits in the pharmaceutical mar-
.
ket is thus made by the Secretariat of UNIDO, in agreement with those 
contentions usually advanced by proponents of the multinational pharma­
ceutical firms,
1, UNIDO, Establishment of Pharmaceutical Industries in Developing 
Countries, Op.cit., (ID/WG.37/3)» p.l6.
2. United Nations, The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology 
to Developing Countries (New York) 196k. Doc. E/3861/Rev.l.
3- Penrose, Edith T., International Patenting and the Less-Developed 
Countries, Op.cit., pp.78 —^ 785.
k. UNIDO, Secretariat, The Pharmaceutical Industries in the Second 
Development Decade, Op.cit., (ID/WG.37/2)•
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The Secretariat claim that quality competition - by which pre­
sumably they mean the existence of closely comparable products - is 
an important factor in holding down prices, "It (quality competition) 
increases the choice open to doctors and ensures that the varieties 
demanded by consumers will be manufactured. It is often hard to judge 
which of two or more different products is the best...; but, basic­
ally, quality competition fulfils the same function as price compet­
ition. Whenever the price is too high for a drug - or, in other words, 
if the quality of the product is too low for its price - manufacturers 
must bring their bids into line with the competition and make their 
goods more attractive. For this reason quality competition and price 
competition bring about behaviour that results in the suppression of 
excessively high profits. The position of an enterprise on a market 
with unvarying prices but with freely variable quality, seems to be 
similar to the position achieved on a market with constant quality 
but with mobile prices."^
This argument infers that the producer of a close substitute 
would willingly introduce his product at a price below that of the 
original drug, resisting the temptation to maintain that high level 
with the use of expensive promotional aids easily permitted by the 
high profit margins. But clearly, if the new variant were sold with 
sufficient sophistication as a scientific improvement on the original 
drug, there would be no need to bring down its price.
An aspect of the developed markets that developing countries have
no clear need for is the high rate of innovation in the range of pro­
ducts being sold. This rate is even excessive for developed countries
where health care has reached a finer stage of development in the
1. Ibid., p.l*f
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field of, for instance, psychosomatic disease. The principal need 
in developing countries is for far more fundamental drugs to treat 
the more pressing diseases.
The cost of discovering, developing and promoting the continuous 
stream of new drugs, when spread over a company's products, then 
affects the cost of the older drugs that developing countries most 
need. There is a tendency, also, to introduce these new drugs, in 
place of the old drugs, in developing markets, with expensive consumer 
advertising, combined with a steady withdrawal of the original, and 
still appropriate, drug. All these costs, in developing countries, 
are largely unnecessary.
An interesting study by WHO'1' on comparative treatment costs for
tuberculosis, using four effective drugs, illustrates how the drug
of choice should differ between developed and developing country;
Drug Standard adult Cost per year
  daily dose (U.S. #)
Isoniazid 3°0 mg 0.90
Thiacetazone 150 mg 1.00
Para-aminosalicyclic acid 10 g 9-25
Streptomycin 1 g 17-25
"Under North American or European living conditions, the choice 
of drugs..., would depend, predominantly, on their antibiotic and 
toxic properties and on the prevalence of drug-resistant strains of 
pathogenic organisms in the area. Considering both benefit and risk, 
the anti-tubercular drugs of choice in these areas are isoniazid, 
para-aminosalicyclic acid and streptomycin.
In developing countries of low economic potential..., the mini­
mal amount of money which must be spent for a single patient in order
1. H. Friebel, Therapeutic Needs and Production of Drugs, (ID/WG.37/6) 
paper presented for the Expert Working Group Meeting, Op.cit., 
Budapest, 5 to 9 May, 1969-
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to perform effective treatment becomes the critical figure which de­
termines the choice of drug, since the drug which provides the least 
costly treatment per person permits the treatment of the greatest 
number of patients.
It is quite obvious that, from the above figures, because of 
their low price, isoniazid and thiacetazone would be the drugs of 
choice in a developing country, and that the predominant prescription 
of them would be advisable.
This last example presented by WHO shows that within a small 
group of standard generic drugs for the treatment of the most infect­
ious diseases, developing countries cannot afford to ignore prices.
This suggests that it is even easier for these countries to reduce the 
conventionally high number of preparations for the treatment of other 
less vital diseases requiring such drugs as antibiotics, hormones, 
tranquilisers, sedatives, psychotonics and barbiturates. It is in 
these groups of drugs that product differentiation and promotional 
competition are most prevalent, leading to the wasteful use of resources 
and high prices.
Governments concerned with the unnecessary proliferation of var­
iant compounds resulting from imperfect competition in the drug market 
can take steps to discourage the abuse of the patent system and trade 
marks by introducing more stringent regulations on the registration of 
new drugs and by enforcing appropriate restrictions on the promotion 
of drugs to physician and public. Furthermore, governments can decide 
to abolish the use of brand names as a major step towards reducing the 
monopoly advantage of patent holders after the expiry of their patent 
rights, and towards placing the sales and marketing of drugs on a more 
scientific basis.
1. UNIDO, Expert Working Group, Op.cit., (ID/WG.37/3), pp.33-3^.
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In addition to the above considerations, developing countries 
must realise that certain drugs which have been passed by registrat­
ion authorities in their country of origin as therapeutically safe 
and efficacious, may in developing countries turn out to be toxic or 
incompatible with the change in conditions. This "can occur under 
conditions of malnutrition or even different nutritional habits, of 
different types or incidence of drug resistance, of genetic disorders 
or average body size and weight, or different climate or other envir­
onmental factors that affect the absorption, metabolism and excretion 
of drugs."'1' According to UNIDO, co-operation can be sought from the 
World Health Organisation to assist developing countries in the train­
ing of the necessary personnel and in the establishment and maintain- 
ance of lists of "drugs of choice."
A number of developing countries have considered it useful to 
have a domestic production facility for pharmaceutical goods. Al­
though the reasoning behind such plans has varied (prestige, the con­
servation of foreign currency, strategic considerations) and although 
investment in this industry has taken various forms (in terms of the 
level of integration and the extent of foreign participation), it 
seems fair to say that these decisions have at the very least been 
successful in placing the countries in a better bargaining position on 
the international market by giving them some degree of control over 
the supply of pharmaceuticals.
Planning the development of a national pharmaceutical industry 
is commonly part of a more general programme for industrialisation.
The category of drugs as basic non-durable consumer goods places it 
within that group of products requiring relatively small capital 
investments and enjoying a ready and fast growing market. As shown
1. UNIDO, Expert Working Group, Op.cit., (ID/WG.37/3)» p.22.
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in Table 10, the consumption of pharmaceuticals in Egypt increased 
ninefold in l8 years, whereas the consumption of other basic consumer 
goods approximately only doubled.
The stage at which a developing country enters into the pharma­
ceutical industry is an important decision that has perhaps up to now 
not been fully realised. The Secretariat of UNIDO pointed out in 
their report1- that the primary production of pharmaceutical chemicals 
would not be advisable to a developing country because of the high 
cost of importing the many constituent raw materials and the know-how 
needed for such basic manufacture. Starting materials for the pro­
duction of pharmaceutical chemicals are the output of an advanced 
fine chemicals industry which does not exist in developing countries. 
The technology and skills needed for operating plants producing pharma­
ceutical chemicals are again similar to those used in well developed 
chemical industries.
The report fails to reveal however the small part that basic 
pharmaceutical chemicals play in the total cost of finished drugs.
This is a result of the lower degree of competition in the later 
stages of manufacture, a feature we have earlier noted when describing 
the economic relationships between the different producers comprising 
the international pharmaceutical industry. This crucial factor has 
been confirmed by the director of the production department of the 
Egyptian General Organisation for Pharmaceuticals and Medical Appli­
ances (GOPCA), who described how raw materials used in the production 
of finished drugs accounted for a mere 16% of the value of final out­
put at retail prices. In retrospect, it now seems obvious to Egypt 
that entering the industry at a primary production level was an unnec­
essary step in view of the negligible foreign currency saving this re-
1. UNIDO, Secretariat, Op.cit., (ID/WG.37/2), p.11.
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suited in, and judging by the competitive world prices in comparison 
to which the cost of domestically produced raw materials is higher.
After fixing the most appropriate stage at which to enter the 
pharmaceutical industry, according to the size of a country's market 
and the stage of development of auxilliary industries, the next most 
critical factor is the decision of what form of protection, if any, 
should be given to the domestic industry. Too great a degree of 
state protection, especially in the form of high duties on imported 
drugs, creates unduly high profits for domestic firms which are en­
couraged to breed and multiply with the resulting waste of resources 
and excess capacity.
Other measures can be taken to encourage domestic producers. The 
most useful of these, given the character of the international pharma­
ceutical industry, are state financed research and quality control 
centres that can serve the needs of local firms on a collective basis, 
and collective advertising which can greatly assist the promotion of 
domestic products in the first years of the national industry's life.
The state can also provide the domestic industry with the most reason­
able terms for the purchase of foreign technology by adopting a common 
attitude to all foreign suppliers and taking an active part in any 
negotiations.
The relative merits of various forms of foreign investment in the 
domestic industry of a developing country deserves special attention.
This subject, together with other problems encountered in the develop­
ment of a pharmaceutical industry are clearly illustrated in the ex­
perience of Egypt. In a survey of different groups of developing coun­
tries according to their stage of development in the production of 
pharmaceuticals, Egypt is included in the most advanced group comprised 
of seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Spain and 
Egypt), which have become self-sufficient to some extent in the production
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of pharmaceuticals.^
Egypt is an example of interest in that it is probably (with the 
exception of China) the country least dominated by the operation of 
international companies in its domestic market. This is because Egypt 
has allowed the entry of foreign capital and know-how both from the 
West and Eastern Bloc to build its domestic pharmaceutical industry, 
because it engages in trade with countries of both sides for its 
supply of raw materials, and above all, because the operation of the 
multinationals in Egypt has been under strict control from the special­
ised government agency, GOPCA.
The percentage of total domestic output of pharmaceuticals acc­
ounted for by foreign firms in Egypt was 17% in 1966 and 16% in 1970. 
The percentage share of foreign firms in the total market for pharma­
ceuticals (that is, including imported drugs) was under 30% for Egypt 
in 1970* This last figure contrasts with the following reported mar­
ket shares of foreign firms in some other developing countries in the 
late sixties2 : Brazil 78/0, Argentina 65%, Peru 95%» Venezuela 90%, the 
Philippines and Central America over 80%, The figure for India in 
1969-70 is reported to be somewhere between 65% and 75%.
1. UNIDO, Secretariat, Op.cit. (ID/WG.37/2), p.23* According to this 
study, concentration of production within the group of developing 
countries is again evident. Six developing countries account for 
about 70% of the output of pharmaceuticals of the entire developing 
world (composed of 113 countries), nine countries account for app­
roximately 80% of total production.
2. Wortzel, L.H., Technology Transfer in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
UNITAR, Research Report No.l*f, New York, 1971.
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Chapter II
THE EVOLUTION OF THE EGYPTIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
This chapter traces the growth of the pharmaceutical industry 
in Egypt from its early origin in a private enterprise environment 
and through the decade 1952-62 which started with the Egyptian revol­
ution and ended with the nationalisation of the domestic firms in 
the pharmaceutical industry. This decade witnessed the development 
of state intervention and control, a particularly slow and gradual 
process in the pharmaceutical sector, involving a two-way relation­
ship of action and reaction between a centralised policy-making agency 
on the one hand, and the industry on the other.
1. Private Enterprise and Free Trade
The manufacture of pharmaceuticals in Egypt started on a very 
small scale in 1933 with the operation of a number of laboratories 
engaged in the production of a very few standard pharmacopeal pre­
parations like zinc drops and protargol, or in the packaging of im­
ported household medications like castor oil, sodium bicarbonate and 
glycerin.'1'
In 1937 Bank Misr founded the first large pharmaceutical firm 
with a capital of £E.100,000. This company, "Misr", met with great 
difficulty in the first years of its existence, unable to market its 
own brands of the same drugs distributed by the large international 
pharmaceutical firms under their brand names. It was not until 
World War II that "Misr" began to make positive profits, the shortage 
in imported drugs making way for the acceptance of Misr preparations. 
But profit margins were small, the company having to depend on imports 
of all the necessary raw materials, both for the manufacture and the 
packaging of its products. Growth of Misr sales was very slow, the
1. The Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics.
The Pharmaceutical Industry (319-10, December 1967) Cairo, p.11.
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range of products successfully marketed being limited and subject 
to severe competition from the well established international brands.
By 1956, twenty years after its creation, the company's total capital 
employed^amounted to £E.167*000, a mere increase of 67% over the per- 
iod, gross profits as percent of capital employed standing at 7%»
These results contrast with a figure of 35% profitability only ten 
years later in 19^7♦ capital employed having increased to £E.2*337*000.
In 1939* a second large pharmaceutical company, "Memphis", was 
set up with a capital of £E.*f0,000. The founder being an Egyptian 
pharmacologist, the company was to specialise in the extraction of 
active substances from some medicinal plants growing in Egypt, namely 
Ammidin and Khellin. The production of preparations based on these 
substances relied on the original research work of the founder and his 
company was able to market its products both at home and abroad. But 
outside its field of specialisation, "Memphis" did not venture to di­
versify into any of the several pharmaceutical groups that its plant 
capacity and know-how might have enabled it to, until some measure 
of protection was given to the domestic industry in the late fifties. 
Thus, we find that by 1959* after twenty years of operation, capital 
employed amounted to £E.300,000 and net^ profits stood at 2h% of cap­
ital employed. Ten years later, in 1969* capital employed had risen 
to £E.3*355*000 with gross profits standing at 39% of capital employed. 
Whereas the production and profitability of Memphis were based solely 
on its output of natural medicinal substances until the.late fifties, 
the company's progress in the following period is largely attributable 
to diversification into other drug groups.
1. Capital employed is defined as the sum of its long term liabilities 
(paid up capital, reserves, provisions and long term loans) and is 
therefore gross of depreciation.
2. Gross profit is defined as total profits before payment of inter­
est, depreciation or taxes but net of administration expenses.
3. Net of taxes, interest and depreciation.
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In 19^ +7, a third large pharmaceutical company was established, 
"Chemical Industries Development” or ”CID". This was the most am­
bitious venture into the pharmaceutical field by domestic private 
enterprise. The company was set up by an Egyptian capitalist who 
convinced a large number of physicians to buy shares. Expenditure 
on fixed assets exceeded the original capital paid, £E.100,000. New 
shares were floated and the participation of the "Industrial Bank" 
was sought twice.
By 1952, paid up capital of "CID" amounted to £E.250,000 and 
the company was still facing enormous difficulties in its finance and 
management. The total value of sales was very small in proportion 
to capacity and 73% of these sales consisted of the packaging of im­
ported finished drugs. In the following years, the performance of 
"CID" v/as not improving as can be seen from the results of its oper­
ation in the period 1952-56.
Table 11. Annual Results for "CID", 1952-56
Year Paid Capital 
£E.
Value of Own Production 
(market prices)
Net Accounting 
Losses £E.
£E. % to total 
Sales
1952 250,000 17,055 27% 2^,005
1955 250,000 15,555 70% 41,077
195** 250,000 50,182 86% 32,619
1955 285,000 37,658 73% 54,666
1956 285,000 125,477 80% 7,646
Source: Annual reports of "CID". Figures are book values from the
balance sheet of the firm.
An enquiry into the firm's operation was demanded in 1955 by 
the shareholders, the largest being the "Industrial Bank" with a 
3^% holding, and the government appointed a member of the Committee 
for Health Services as its representative on the Board of Directors 
of CID in November 1955* This was the first instance of government
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direct involvement in the operation of the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry. Its early timing, a chance event, was to give the govern­
ment Committee (later to become the General Organisation for Pharma­
ceuticals, Chemicals and Medical Appliances" GOPCA) first-hand exper­
ience and insight into the structure of the market for drugs and drug 
manufacture. The new member on the Board of Directors of CID'1' (soon 
to become its Chairman) was to bring renewed support for and confid­
ence in the viability of the company. CID was thus able to maintain 
its liquidity with a new injection of capital obtained from the In­
dustrial Bank and a complete reassessment of the firm’s production and 
marketing policies was made.
The most important change to affect CID's progress was to come 
in the following year, 1956. As with all other Egyptian firms, the 
range of products CID was restricted to manufacturing or packaging 
consisted of the older non-patented drugs, whether ethical or house­
hold. This limitation was partly due to lack of some of the necessary 
technical know-how, but the main reason was the difficulty of entering 
the market for new drugs, which was dominated by the international 
giants. The market for all modern drugs treating serious diseases 
(tetracyclines, chloramphenicol, hormones, tranquilisers and cardiac 
drugs) was totally restricted with insuperable barriers in the form of 
legal patent rights and marketing and distribution advantages held by 
foreign international firms. Drug imports thus accounted in 1955 for 
89% of consumption in Egypt. In 1956, CID decided to seek the co­
operation of a Belgian firm, Union Chimique Beige, to reorganise the 
production and distribution of its preparations; the agreement included
1. The newly appointed member was Dr. Abdou M. Sallam, who was event­
ually elected as the Chairman to the General Organisation for 
Pharmaceuticals, Chemicals and Medical Appliances, GOPCA.
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the production by CID of many of the Belgian firm's specialities^" 
which were soon to account for the major share of CID sales. The 
following figures show how CID's production and profit position im­
proved after 1956.
Table 12. Annual Results for CID, 1956-68
Year Paid Capital 
£E.
Value of Production at 
market prices 
£E.
Net Profit
£E.
1956 285,000 125,477 - 7,646
1957 36^f,980 254,407 +57,723
1958 513,000 *+55,526 +48,557
1968* ^,008,000 *+,11+7,855 1,136,144
* Figures for 1968 are gross capital employed, value of production 
and gross profits.
For the first time, a domestic firm was to become the licensee to 
a famous international pharmaceutical company, which although not among 
the group with the highest exports to Egypt (the majority of exports 
into Egypt came from Britain, Switzerland and France), could offer CID 
all the technical and managerial skills that it lacked. The royalty 
payments on this all-inclusive type of license agreement is probably 
the highest ever incurred by any Egyptian pharmaceutical firm, being 
calculated on net sales of all CID products, whether licensed brands 
from the Belgian firm or not. But in return, CID received not only 
production know-how as in ordinary license agreements but also exten­
sive co-operation at all managerial levels of the firm, especially with 
marketing and distribution. In 1966, when the agreement was terminated 
CID was left with a legacy of the highest ratio of advertising and 
distribution expenditure to sales among domestic firms.
1. These specialities included penicillin and streptomycin derivatives, 
tranquilisers, cough syrups and antihistamine preparations. They 
were all marketed under their foreign brand name.
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With the exception of the three domestic firms discussed above, 
the size of manufacturing establishments (which numbered sixty-five 
in 1952) was very small, the entire pharmaceutical sector employing 
1,100 persons and producing an output worth half a million pounds at 
market price. Thus, in spite of a comparatively early start, the 
Egyptian pharmaceutical industry was, after twenty years of existence, 
still struggling to maintain a 105o share of the growing home market. 
According to a study carried out in 195^, excess capacity in the 
industry was 37%»1 Unused machinery and installations were mainly in 
the larger companies which were doing very poorly as compared to the 
smaller establishments. The kind of drugs produced in the whole of 
the industry until 1956 come under only ten of the forty-five possible 
therapeutic groups. The market was flooded with a proliferation of 
domestic brands of household drugs such as analgesics, cough and cold 
preparations, laxatives, antacids, vitamins (coming under four thera­
peutic classes). Of the ethical drugs treating serious diseases, very 
few preparations were manufactured by the larger firms, that is the 
ones adequately staffed with skilled personnel and housing sophisticated 
quality control units. Until 1952, no antibiotics were produced in 
Egypt, and for many years after this date, domestic firms were relying 
on the import of penicillin, streptomycin, and various types of sulpha 
drugs in their bulk finished form, together with all the necessary 
packaging materials to perform the imple packaging operation for these 
drugs in their laboratories. Newer types of antibiotics like tetra­
cyclines or chloramphenicol were produced in Egypt only after 1959.
A study of the list of 150 raw materials constituting the requirements 
of the five major pharmaceutical firms for their production in 1957
1. The Pioneers, Committee of Physicians, The Problem of Drugs.
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shows that not a single substance required is less than ten years 
old, and that the majority of these are in fact much older medicinal 
compounds whose official names can be found in the pharmacopeas of 
the early thirties.'1'
The Egyptian consumer market thus depended for its supply of 
all newly discovered drugs on imports from some 500 foreign pharma­
ceutical firms, with 88 agents engaged in the import and distribution 
of more than 20,000 foreign drugs accounting for 90% of the total 
market in 1952. Until the late fifties, the whole-saling and distrib­
ution of foreign drugs was carried out by the same agents who were 
engaged in their import, giving them considerable power over the 
entire market. Although actual figures for the level of concentrat­
ion in the market for imported drugs are not available for this period,
2it has been widely reported that only a handful of Egyptian agents 
controlled the import of the majority of foreign drugs, the source of 
which was concentrated among the group of Swiss, British, German and 
French Pharmaceutical giants. The importing companies owned a network 
of 180 storage depots throughout the country’, employing 2,500 salaried 
employees and workers to advertise and distribute their drugs (when 
it must be remembered that total employment in the domestic industry 
equalled 1,100). Given the importance of marketing expenditure and 
marketing skills in determining the relative success of particular 
brand names in the pharmaceutical market, foreign drugs promoted by 
and sold through the distribution channels of the major pharmaceutical 
agents (agents that is, to the international giant firms) held many
1. The list is appended to a letter addressed to the Ministry of 
Supply and is written by the head of the Committee for the De­
velopment of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 30 Jan. 1957*
2. Dr. A. M. Sallam, The Production of Pharmaceuticals in Egypt, 35th 
Annual Congress of the Egyptian Institute of Scientific Studies, 
6-11 March 1965.
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advantages over equivalent brands marketed by other less famous 
foreign companies or the domestic producers. With their superior 
experience in distribution at the retail end of the market, and 
with their sophisticated advertising techniques directed at the pre­
scribing physician, those international companies could not be dis­
lodged from their dominant position. Whenever a local brand of any 
promise was to appear on the market, and before it had the opportun­
ity to achieve any significant sales, large quantities of its foreign 
equivalent would flood the market, chemists being offered free supplies 
at no cost until sold. Such credit facilities, special discounts, free 
goods and bonuses are just some of the several tools which were used 
by the established sellers in manipulating the market.1
It can therefore be said that although the larger domestic pharm­
aceutical firms had both the production capacity and the necessary 
know-how to imitate a large proportion of the newer and most profit­
able drugs introduced into the market by the international giants - 
as will be shown they successfully did this soon after this period - 
these Egyptian firms could not surmount the entry barriers created by 
the sheer magnitude of advertising budgets supported by the foreign
firms, true giants when compared to the size of any of their local 
2competitors. That advertising and marketing were the crucial factor* 
inhibiting the success or growth of domestic firm's sales is
clearly demonstrated by the changing fortunes of CID once it had de­
cided to adopt a new advertising and marketing strategy comparable to 
that of the large foreign manufacturer, with heavy promotional expen­
diture directed mainly at the physician (a large sales force of detail 
men, organised meetings and conferences for doctors, a monthly medical
1. Dr. A. M. Sallam, Ibid., p.^ f.
2. In The Pioneers, Op.cit., page 8, it is assetted that the Egyptian 
doctor relied almost completely on the advertising of foreign firms 
for information on modern therapies.
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journal distributed free, etc.).
Turning now to the role of the small pharmaceutical laboratories 
operating in Egypt in the 1950s, these confined their production to 
the very last stages of processing drugs into the simpler dosage forms, 
the typical firm investing in the purchase of a tablet making machine 
and some vessels for the admixture of solutions, relying on the crudest 
quality control procedures and the barest standards of hygiene. Al­
though the products of these laboratories were limited to household 
remedies such as tonics, cough syrups and aspirin, so that their exist­
ence was no serious threat to the health of the poorer sections of the 
population consuming their cheaper products (cost of producing was 
obviously lower for these firms employing the minimum of machinery and 
personnel), the larger domestic firms were suffering from and complain­
ing of the additional competition which the multitude (about 65) of 
tiny laboratories presented to them. Domestic medium-sized and large 
establishments were thus unable to make any serious headway into the 
market for ethical modern drugs by the marketing and distribution ad­
vantages of the international firms, and found the most lucrative 
portion of the household drugs market encroached upon by the low cost 
laboratories concentrating on the production of only those preparations 
and dosage forms offering the highest markups. When the Committee for 
Health Cervices was asked to make a study of the domestic pharmaceuti­
cal industry, it recommended the shutting down of the majority of exist­
ing laboratories, but this step was only taken much later, after the 
nationalisation of the domestic sector in 1962.
The main reasons why the existence of the very small pharmaceutical 
laboratories was thought detrimental to the rest of the industry seem 
to have been the following:
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a) Quality standard; As mentioned in Chapter I section 2, the 
final processing of drugs into their dosage forms must undergo several 
tests for ensuring the purity, uniformity and stahility of the active 
ingredient, even if the source of the active ingredient is a reliable 
foreign manufacturer. Small laboratories did not have their own fac­
ilities or the resources to employ outside services to perform such 
essential quality control operations. The hazards involved in allow­
ing them to sell their products which could only be assayed by the 
Department of Health on the occasional routine checks that this de­
partment carries out, meant that these small laboratories should 
either be encouraged to expand their activities sufficiently to en­
able them to afford quality control procedures or else force them to 
shut down.
The low quality of packaging materials used by small laboratories 
was also an important factor responsible for the patient's lack of 
confidence in the therapeutic value of the drug. This translated 
itself into a general distrust for any local product.
b) Research capacity: Although the importance of research is 
only secondary in the production of simple household drugs, the pres­
ence of qualified pharmacologists and chemists on the premises enables 
the firm to keep in touch with developments and improvements in the 
processing of drugs. The manufacture of pharmaceuticals involves the 
continuous introduction of new ingredients and techniques to improve 
the absorption of basic pharmaceutical chemicals into the system and 
diminish their side effects.
The most common outcome of low standards of expertise in pro­
cessing tablets for instance is the choice of inappropriate binders 
(to mix with the active ingredient) or the selection of unsuitable 
pressures in stamping out tablets. This results in tablets which,
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although conforming to required standards of purity, will neverthe­
less fail to be absorbed satisfactorily in the body.
Research facilities would also enable the firm to have a minimum 
rate of innovation in its range and quality of products. The pharma­
ceutical industry must be seen as a dynamic sector, scientifically 
oriented towards change since its development depends upon the con­
tinuous introduction of improvements to existing therapies. Small 
laboratories lacking in research facilities remain static, producing 
and selling drugs in the same way as producers of confectionary. Even 
the know-how involved in imitating modern drugs is itself dependent on 
the availability of advanced research techniques.
In view of the above considerations, the Committee for Health 
Services judged that on balance, the arguments against allowing small 
laboratories to continue operating outweighed any economic benefits 
derived from their competitive prices. Whereas the policy needed to 
cut down the number of domestic firms and their products on the market 
could be easily formulated, the task of reducing the number of foreign 
drugs in Egypt was far more complex. The import of drugs was of a 
very profitable nature. Several of the agents dealing with the major 
pharmaceutical giants are reported to have made large fortunes from 
their operation in a highly restricted sellers market.1 The pricing 
of foreign drugs was supposedly fixed by the Ministry of Supply which 
allowed a margin of 65% on the formal invoice FOB price of these drugs, 
to be shared by impoters, wholesalers and retailers. But these FOB 
prices were decided u^on by the importers themselves According to their
judgment of market conditions, and blank invoices were often received
2from foreign manufacturers for his agent to fill in Egypt.
1. Minutes of meeting of "Higher Organisation for Pharmaceuticals, 20 
September I960.
2. Ibid.
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In 1952, within two months of the revolution, it was announced 
by presidential decree1 that the markup on the import price of drugs 
was to be reduced from 65% to *f6%, thus reducing the price of drugs 
to consumers by approximately 15%* To evade a reduction in their 
profit margins, the importers retaliated by gradually raising the
n 2
FOB price of drugs to the benefit of their bank accotints abroad.
The Ministry of Supply was unable to deal with the situation since it 
had hitherto accepted the price stated on an invoice and added the 
agreed markup on it to arrive at the final retail price. It was clear 
to the authorities that the only way to deal with such a situation 
was to have some kind of knowledge of the level of prices in countries 
of origin or in the international market, but with a market as wide 
and complex as that for pharmaceuticals, the task was almost imposs­
ible at the time. The number of foreign pharmaceutical firms regist­
ered as exporters of drugs to Egypt was over 500, of diverse origin 
and selling about 20,000 products of varying importance in terms of 
medical or commercial value. When the Committee for Health Services 
was set up in 1955 to study and advise on the pharmaceutical market, 
it started by collecting information on all imported drugs according 
to origin and manufacturers.
The complete lack of any statistics on drug consumption made the 
work of the Committee very slow and difficult. Retail outlets kept 
no continuous record of their sales»and distribution depots could not 
be relied upon to give accurate information because they all belonged 
to importers. Furthermore, ministerial control over drug imports was 
dispersed among several independent government departments. The Min­
istry for Supply was responsible for pricing, the Health Ministry was
1. Decree No.177 for 1952.
2. Ibid.
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responsible for registration, and the Department of Commerce was 
regulating the distribution of the imported drugs. The Committee 
therefore had to rely on the customs to tabulate all the data it 
required.1
The main effort of the Committee was to group pharmaceutical 
imports into their therapeutic classes according to their generic 
names, with information on their source, the name of the manufacturer, 
the brand name, and the price of each drug. Two important recommend­
ations were made. First it was suggested that the proliferation of 
equivalent drugs be curtailed by withdrawing import permits from all 
foreign manufacturers of unknown reputation on the international market 
(it was alleged that many foreign laboratories of low quality standard 
had entered the Egyptian market because of the lack of restrictions 
from the Health Ministry, in spite of the fact that these same labor- 
atories were not allowed to sell in their country of origin). The 
second recommendation was that a single government body should under­
take the responsibility for drug imports so as to achieve some measure 
of control over prices which were found to be greatly divergent accord­
ing to source and overtime. These recommendations were carried through
at a later date, the first resulting in the elimination of 465 foreign
3firms from the import register, and the second in the complete nation­
alisation of the import and distribution functions by the state in I960, 
thereby removing the monopolistic advantages of the international com­
panies which were held through their control over the marketing and 
distribution channels for drugs in Egypt.
1. The statistics were collected for the Committee by officers of the
"Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics" at the
customs offices. This work which was supposed to take 6 months to 
complete in fact took one year and a half.
2. Lecture 3 in the Economics of Medical Care, Dr. Abdou M. Sallam,
Minister of Health, Ain Shams University, 1968, p.4.
3» Ibid.-, p.4.
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The introduction of government control over the sale of foreign 
drugs was to offer the domestic industry in Egypt a significant im­
provement in its competitive position*
2. Developments in the Institutional Framework, 1952-61
Interest in the state of medical care and the pharmaceutical 
industry in Egypt was shown soon after the revolution by the Council 
for Production and Services, a new government body created in 1955 
to promote the growth of national income and of social services. The 
division of the Council concerned with domestic production was res­
ponsible for introducing the first measure of protection to the 
domestic pharmaceutical industry in the form of a 10% preference on 
the prices it came forward with in any government tenders. The division 
in charge of the growth of social services initiated the first pro­
jects for the mass control of tuberculosis and for the setting up of 
rural health units.
In 1955, those two branches of the Council for Production and 
Services examining pharmaceutical production and health projects were 
merged into a separate Committee for Health Services. This Committee 
was independent of the Ministry for Health and its duties were to study 
and advise the government on ways by which the supply of drugs could 
be directed to satisfy the real needs of the population. A thorough 
study of the domestic consumption of drugs was undertaken for the first 
time in Egypt in conjunction with a survey of the incidence of disease. 
One of the principal objectives of the study was to arrive at a plan 
for the encouragement and development of the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry.
As mentioned on page 72 , the committee started by grouping all
drugs on the Egyptian market according to their generic names. Although 
this analysis was to throw much light on the source of drug imports
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and the international drug market, the main concern of the Committee 
was to draw from the figures information on those drugs widely con­
sumed by the public which could be produced economically in Egypt.
The five groups of pharmaceutical raw materials most commonly used 
in the preparations on the market were found to be salycilates, 
penicillin, sulpha compounds, streptomycin and chloramphenicol.
Both the quantities and value of these substances formed a large 
percentage of total consumption of pharmaceuticals, they were all 
imported from abroad either as finished drugs or as active ingred­
ients ready for packaging (the special conditions relating to each 
product are described in full in Chapter IV, Section 4), and the 
medical importance of all five groups was deemed sufficient to suggest 
that it was in Egypt's interest to establish primary production fac­
ilities for their manufacture.
In 1956, the first Ministry for Industry was created in Egypt,
Among its first decisions, it set up a new Committee for the Devel­
opment of the Pharmaceutical Industry,1 to make final recommendations 
on the work prepared earlier (by the Committee for Health Services) 
for projects in the establishments of domestic plants producing 
pharmaceutical raw materials. Membership of this new Committee was
partly made up of members of the previous bodies, plus an engineer
and a chemist (former members were two doctors and a pharmacologist). 
The committee was to receive all necessary cooperation in preparing 
its report from the Ministry of Industry and it was requested to 
present its report before September 1956.
This last Committee was unable to complete its task in time, and 
referred in its report to all the complex problems besetting the 
domestic pharmaceutical industry which could not be solved by controls
1. See Ministerial Decree number 5, issued on 29 July 1956 by the 
Minister for Industry.
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on imports alone, on prices alone, or by encouraging domestic pro­
duction alone. It called for the creation of a single government 
body to deal rationally with all aspects of the market for pharma­
ceuticals, one central agency with control over imports production, 
distribution and pricing of drugs.
In 1957, after the Suez war and with the ensuing economic block­
ade on Egypt, many vital drugs were in short supply and the need for 
greater self sufficiency in domestic production was strongly felt.
By presidential decree a Higher Organisation for Drugs and Medical 
Requisites was set up as a permanent body.'1' The organisation was 
headed by the Minister of Health and included in its membership 
representatives from the Ministries of Trade, Industry, Supply and 
Finance, as well as the Presidents of the Association of Physicians 
and the Association of Pharmacists.
The role of the Higher Organisation was defined as the supervision 
and guidance of all matters pertaining to the domestic production and 
general supply of pharmaceuticals in the country.
A separate executive committee was set up under the Ministry for 
Industry to implement any decisions taken by the Higher Organisation 
for Drugs and Medical Requisites after their ratification by the Pres­
ident. The power and responsibilities of the Higher Organisation were 
now much more comprehensive than those assigned to any previous govern­
ment committee concerned with the pharmaceutical market, which was 
soon to undergo many important changes.
GOPCA was to make plans for the provision of all the country*s 
needs for drugs and medical requisites, to examine the import of 
pharmaceuticals with special attention to prices and quality, to har­
monise the work of the government departments responsible for the import
1. Presidential Decree number 19 for 1957 * issued on 7 January 1957*
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production and distribution of pharmaceuticals, to supervise the 
growth of domestic firms, and, finally, to administer the manufact­
ure of pharmaceutical raw materials.
One of the first significant achievements of the Higher Organ­
isation was the publication of a guide to doctors and pharmacists, 
providing them with information on all available domestic and foreign 
medical preparations. The Index for Medical Specialities was pre­
pared by some university professors of pharmacology and attempted 
for the first time to classify all drugs according to their thera­
peutic group, giving under every group heading a complete list of 
known therapies by their generic composition (whether a single 
substance or a combination) with a sublist cf all available brands 
for each generic composition.
In the first section of the book, the products were classified 
into drug groups according to their pharmacodynamic action. There 
were kk drug groups, many further subdivided into subgroups (e.g.
Group "Cardiac and Vascularetics" was subdivided into Cardiac Gly­
cosides, Cardiac Depressants, Antihypertensives, Hypertensives, 
Xanthines, Vasodilators, Sclerosing Agents etc...). Products are 
described in the form of a monograph to provide the following inform- 
atiomdrug group, form, scientific code, approved name, mode of action 
or indication. Detail is further given on commercial name, pack, 
manufacturer, available sizes and strengths. Even though a particular 
brand name may be absent from the market, it is usually listed, esp­
ecially if well known, so that the physician can take note of available 
substitutes.
Section 2 of the book gave an alphabetical index by trade names. 
These brands are listed alphabetically with the manufacturers name
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following. The number following the brand name refers to the page 
in Section I where the product is described.
Section 3 gave an alphabetical index by approved generic names. 
The numbers following the approved name referred to the pages in 
Section I where the product was described.
Section gave an alphabetical index by manufacturer names, each 
followed by the list of specialities (brand names) of the firm.
The early publication of the Index of Medical Specialities was 
particularly useful to the domestic industry as a form of free pub­
licity for its little known products. New editions of this book are 
now published every three or four years and distributed free to doc­
tors and pharmacists.
The independent role and authority of the authors makes the 
index they prepare a competent source of information on new domestic 
products of equivalent generic composition to international brands 
which are normally widely advertised.
In 1957 the Higher Organisation began to plan for future ex­
pansion by examining three groups of projects in particular.
1. The first set of projects was designed to accelerate the 
growth of existing firms by supplying them with capital and arranging 
license agreements between them and large foreign concerns for the 
manufacture of specific groups of drugs of medical and commercial 
importance to the Egyptian market. The Higher Organisation was 
instrumental in seeking the cooperation of foreign pharmaceutical 
establishments, in negotiating the form of the individual license 
agreements and in insuring the good faith of the Egyptian Government 
in fulfilling all the licensee's obligations towards the foreign 
licensor.
Examples of the earlier projects which were implemented are:
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a) Expansion of "Misr" company
Building a new unit for the processing and packaging of 
chloramphenicol and various penicillin and streptomycin derivatives. 
Technical assistance obtained from a Dutch firm, "Delft" to instal 
new machinery and equipment at an approximate cost of £E.55iOOO* 
License agreement to produce and sell these drugs under Delft trade 
marks at royalty cost of 5% of exfactory sales value. Production 
started in 1959-
b) Expansion of "Ama" company
New unit for the processing and packaging of insulin pred­
nisone, testosterone and liver extract from their raw materials. In­
stallation of machinery at capital cost of £E.l40,000. Technical 
assistance from an Italian firm "Vister", royalty payments at 5% of 
sales for 10 years to be reduced to y/o for following 5 years, then 
stopped. "Vister" to participate in 20% of capital investment and 
annual value of production was estimated at £E.120,000.
In the next ten year period, the trend for the employment of 
foreign know-how in domestic production was accelerated, and local 
firms were encouraged to take the initiative in contacting large in­
ternational firms and negotiating license agreements, subject to the 
general conditions laid out by the Higher Organisation.
2. The second set of projects involved the setting up of a 
number of plants for the manufacture of basic raw materials (active 
ingredients) used in secondary manufacturing by the existing domestic 
pharmaceutical firms. The preliminary studies on these projects had 
been started in 1955 by the Committee for Health Services who made an 
assessment of the therapeutic needs of the country, and based on it 
the selection of items for basic production.
1. See Chapter III
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As mentioned earlier, the primary production of pharmaceutical 
raw materials on the horizontal level is typically non-complementary 
(antibiotics require fermentation processes, synthetic compounds re­
quire chemical processes...), so that projects were evaluated on an 
individual basis. Foreign assistance was sought from the different 
specialised manufacturers in the West, and by 1957» various European 
companies had submitted their schemes for the construction of raw 
material pharmaceutical plants. Each firm would supervise the con­
struction of a particular factory, the purchase of equipment and the 
training of Egyptian staff in all economic and technical matters.
Although several competitive proposals were advanced by foreign 
firms, none of these was backed by the necessary finance from abroad. 
Capital requirements for such heavy industrial investments are typic­
ally high, running in the million pound region. The Ministry for 
Industry which was to implement any investment plan, was unable to 
finance these costly undertakings, having already contributed substant­
ial amounts of foreign currency in the purchase of machinery and 
equipment for expanding the production capacity of the domestic firms 
(in the first set of projects discussed above).
Shortly after the Suez war, Russia offered the Egyptian govern­
ment substantial loans for investment in projects of Egypt's choice 
(the largest loan contracted was for the construction of the High 
Dam, amounting to £E.113 million). The idea of one grand investment, 
a huge pharmaceutical chemicals complex covering five different pro­
duction processes, found favour both on political and economic grounds. 
Politically, the size of the project acquired a special meaning to the 
public, which christened the complex "The Medicine City". Economic­
ally, it was thought that economies of scale would be gained in two 
directions:
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First, a single research and quality control unit would need to 
be built to serve the separate plants. This meant lower costs per 
unit of output, both in terms of research and quality control equip­
ment and in terms of qualified personnel.
Second, the extension of public utilities to serve the entire 
complex would again cut down the cost per unit of output of such 
costly services as the supply of water and electricity, road works 
and effluent disposal systems.
Concensus was reached on the site and size of the entire project 
and the agreement between Egypt and Russia for the setting up of "El 
Nasr Company for the Production of Pharmaceutical Chemicals" was signed 
in January 1958. Section k of Chapter IV reviews the establishment 
and operation of this enterprise.
3. The third set of projects studied by the Higher Organisation 
was the setting up of subsidiaries of large international pharmaceut­
ical firms in Egypt. Bargaining on the terms of the agreements took 
place between the foreign companies and the Ministry for Industry.'*'
The main subjects of argument were concerned with the ownership of the
subsidiaries and the extent of control by the government. Some members
of the Higher Organisation were dissatisfied with the joint venture 
nature of the arrangement whereby the foreign parent company would own 
60% of the capital investment and Egyptian private shareholders the 
remaining *f0%.
1. Details of the terras of the agreements and the operation of foreign 
subsidiaries in Egypt can be found in Chapter III.
2. After nationalisation of the public sector of the pharmaceutical 
industry, GOPCA tried to acquire some of the shares held by Egypt­
ian nationals whose property was sequestrated so as to derive a 
measure of control over the subsidiaries.
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But the power of the Higher Organisation was still limited to 
the extent that the various ministries concerned could make their own 
decisions independently. In 1958 and 1959 three foreign concerns 
were thus awarded contracts by the Ministry for Industry to build and 
operate subsidiaries in Egypt.
Another notable instance where the policies of the Higher Organ­
isation were thwarted by the ability and insistence of another minis­
try to demonstrate its independence occured in 1959. The pricing of 
domestic drugs had not been subject to government control, and the 
Ministry of Industry now took it upon itself to review the prices 
charged by all domestic firms without consulting the Higher Organis­
ation,"* and without taking into consideration the fact that the
system of control on foreign drug prices (by another ministry) was
2totally ineffective.
The Ministry for Industry collected figures on unit cost of 
production for most domestic drugs and allowed oncost percentages 
arbitrarily decided for other expenditures (free samples, administ­
ration, advertising) and profit to arrive at what were considered 
reasonable prices. These new prices were enforced in March 1959* with 
the result that some of the domestic firms found that they were making 
negligible profits. With the ensuing stream of complaints from the 
industry and the Higher Organisation, a reappraisal of the system of 
pricing was made and some prices were readjusted upwards.
1. According to the memorandum presented by CID on 30th March 1959*
both the Higher Organisation and the Executive Committee for In­
dustrialisation had made an earlier study of domestic prices and
concluded that pricing should be left to the discretion of the
firms themselves. See Chapter IV.
2. See page above. The importance of foreign drug prices on
the pricing policy of domestic products is discussed in Chapter 
IV Section 2.
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Despite this kind of opposition, the Higher Organisation was 
still able to develop an increasingly important position as the 
formulator of a national policy for the control of the pharmaceutical 
market.
In 1957» domestic production had risen to £E.1.7 million,1 but 
local firms were still finding it difficult to capture more than 20% 
of the total market for pharmaceuticals. One of the greatest obstacles 
to achieving a reasonable level of sales of domestically produced drugs 
was the proportionately smaller profit margin earned by the retailer. 
The more expensive foreign products naturally produced greater profits. 
To counteract this, the Higher Organisation decided to allow a profit 
margin of 19% to the chemist on domestic brands as opposed to 10% on 
foreign brands.
An earlier attempt to protect the domestic industry had been the 
offer of 10% price preference to Egyptian manufacturers in competitive 
bids for government orders. But most of these orders for hospitals, 
rural health units, and the armed forces, were for drugs not made in 
Egypt, and only available on the international market.
The next move to protect the home market was a halt to the import 
of any drug formulation which was domestically produced by at least 
three manufacturers. To encourage the sale of the range of products 
selected, manufacturers agreed to reduce their price levels. The re­
duction in prices was to be compensated by the rise in demand so that 
total revenue would not be affected. Examples of drugs reduced in 
price by CID in 1958 are penicillin, streptomycin, some antacids and 
laxatives.
1. Egyptian Federation of Industries Yearbook 1957-58, Cairo, p.152.
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Two years later, in February I960, an important step was taken
to establish a greater degree of autonomy for the Higher Organisation.1
Previously dependent on central government for the remuneration of
its members and the finance of its operations, it was now granted the
2
status of a corporation, with responsibility for its own finance. 
However, all the members of the original Higher Organisation were 
elected directors of the new organisation, thus ensuring continuity 
of purpose.
A few months after this, foreign manufacturers were asked to
bid for future supplies of government orders through the Higher Organ-
3 .isation. The Higher Organisation collected the separate orders of
the government departments, with the drugs grouped under their generic 
names, and added the orders from the public sector for the same drugs • 
The next step was to take over all systems of import and dis­
tribution but, before doing that, the Higher Organisation borrowed 
£E. 3 million from the Treasury and ordered all essential drugs to 
arrive in Egypt by a stated date, which was actually the date set for
the take-over. The plan here was to ensure a proper stock by the time
the take-over was announced, and thus to avoid a sudden fall in supply.
Despite these safety precautions, though, foreign suppliers sensed 
the intention behind the move and immediately created a campaign ag­
ainst it in the news media. Newspapers carried warnings of the supposed 
dangerous effects of the concentration of supply through one body and
of the obvious effect of a great many of the existing brands of medi­
cines quickly disappearing from the market.
1. Presidential Decree No.291 for the reorganisation of the Higher
Organisation for Drugs and Medical Requisites.
2. The newly established board of directors was empowered to fix
charges for any services rendered by the Higher Organisation, to
accept donations, and to borrow, in order to supplement the allo­
cations voted to it from the national budget.
3* Presidential Decree No.292, 1st February I960.
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This campaign led to panic buying, which meant that the initial 
stocks built up to guard against the effects of a change in the system
were more quickly depleted. For instance, supplies expected to last
six months, in fact lasted only for three.
Then, by Presidential Decree,1 it was announced on July 14, I960, 
to coincide with the opening of the sealed bids, that the state would 
immediately take over all importing agencies, all distribution agencies,
and all inventories. The Higher Organisation was given the sole res­
ponsibility for the import of all drugs, pharmaceutical chemicals and 
medical appliances.
Compensation for agency owners was fixed at a 6% profit margin 
over the agreed inventory prices. The prices themselves were agreed 
upon by a compensation committee, which included owner representatives, 
as well as representatives from the Ministry of Supply, and was headed
by a legal member of the Council of State.
The Presidential Decree made it clear that all agency employees 
were to stay employed for the time being, automatically becoming em­
ployees of the Higher Organisation.
The Decree laid down that the advertising bureaux attached to the 
agencies could only resume their trade with permission, given in the 
form of a licence from the Ministry of Supply.
Finally, a public corporation was established to run the market­
ing agencies, and distribute all drugs whether domestic or imported, 
while the Higher Organisation was left to control import supplies.
The new corporation was called The General Organisation for Trade 
and Distribution of Drugs and was given a far greater financial autonomy
1. Presidential Decree for enactment of law No.212 for I960, concerning 
the Organisation of the Trade in Pharmaceuticals, Chemicals and 
Medical Appliances.
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than was possible for the Higher Organisation alone, because it 
would generate its own income from the commercial operations it 
was assigned to perform.
Eventually, despite the earlier panic buying, it was clear that 
the Higher Organisation had achieved its aim of reducing the FOB 
prices of many imported drugs. The public soon gained the benefit 
of this when the Ministry of Supply announced the reduction in price 
of all foreign drugs by 25%.1
It was soon found, however, that the Higher Organisation and the 
General Organisation were overlapping, to a degree,in their functions, 
so it was agreed to set up a consultative body to achieve a degree of 
liaison. Directors of each organisation were appointed to sit on 
this body to ensure maximum cooperation.
There were three major problems as yet to be solved, which called 
for immediate attention.
The first was how to use the advertising bureaux inherited from 
the former agencies. So in December 19^0, the Higher Organisation 
decided to allow them to stay in business, but employing what was then 
to be called 'Scientific Officers.' The head of each office would 
have to be a suitably qualified pharmacologist, but the remaining 
staff would have to be, as far as possible, the same staff as before. 
Foreign companies were allowed to operate individual or joint scient­
ific offices, on the condition that all expenses of the office would 
be financed from abroad (this condition was later relaxed in all in­
stances where the foreign company is a licensor to local companies).
1. Ministry of Supply Decree N0.I67, 25 August i960. Reduction of 
retail prices of all imported drugs and infant milk by 2536 of 
last price fixed by Ministry. Profit margin to chemist to remain 
fixed at 16% of CIF price (equal in practice to 10% of retail 
price). These new prices rule to this day.
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Advertising by all bureaux, though, would have to be restricted to 
ethical journals only, and thus considerably reduce advertising 
budgets below previous levels, while other publicity and information 
techniques would be allowed in the form of direct contacts with doc­
tors and the distribution of free samples. These samples would them­
selves be rigorously controlled and recorded, with the Higher Organ­
isation controlling their importation, including the receipt of a 
quota of each free sample import.
The second most immediate problem was to work out the most 
effective method of ensuring continued employment of the staff of the 
former independent agencies in the face of an apparent excess of 
1,800 staff above the new requirements. This obviously called for 
long-term solutions, with the maximum amount of cooperation between 
the new organisations, each supplying staff as posts became vacant 
in other organisations, but still, all the same, paying wages.
The third main question requiring an answer was the proper pos­
ition, in the new national structure, of the retail chemist.
It was decided that the retail chemist would continue to play 
his previous part independently, receiving the same trade discounts 
allowed to him before take-over.
As mentioned earlier, the role of the chemist in Egypt is not 
limited to that of dispensing drugs according to prescriptions. His 
knowledge and experience are continuously called upon to give advice 
to consumers on the choice of drugs to treat all kinds of ailments 
from eczema to dysentry.
GOPCA was therefore careful in ensuring the continued profitab­
ility of running pharmacies. The following account describes the 
regulations (which govern to this day) and the income which was
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generated by the average pharmacy in Egypt in 1962/63.1 The total 
number of pharmacies was 1200, owned and run by registered pharma­
cologists.
—  Imported drugs 10% profit margin allowed on retail price.
Imported milks 7% profit margin allowed on retail price.
Total value of sales of imported drugs in 1962/63 &E. TO million. 
Domestic drugs - 19% profit margin allowed on retail price. 
Subsidiaries drugs - 15% profit margin allowed on retail price.
Total value of sales of domestic drugs in 1962/63 £E. 6.8 million. 
Additional 1% discount allowed for cash payments.
-- Medicaments prepared by the pharmacist - *f0% profit allowed on 
retail price. The average value of sales of this group to total 
sales was 2-5%.
Cosmetics - 20% profit allowed on retail price. Average sales 
2-5% of total sales.
p
Gross profits of the 1200 pharmacies for the year 1962/63 equalled 
£E. ^32,200 before allowance for the remuneration of pharmacologists 
(owners). This yields a very low income if compared to the income of 
1200 similarly qualified pharmacologists employed by the government who 
can earn between them an annual £E. 1,272,000 plus paid holidays, pen­
sions and lower tax payments (income taxes being lower than commercial 
taxes)•
It would therefore seem from these figures that although GOPCA 
did not reduce standard profit margins allowed to pharmacies when it 
took over the function of import and distribution from private importing 
agencies, the income of the retail chemist was, nevertheless, substant­
ially lowered in comparison to pre-takeover levels. This is confirmed
1. Dr. Abd Allah Badry, Study of the Economics of Pharmacies, paper 
presented to the Second Conference on Pharmaceuticals, the Assoc­
iation of Pharmacists, Dar El Hekma, 12 July 196^ -.
2. Gross profits defined as total revenue from sales minus total costs 
of running the pharmacy (rent, services and wages of assistants).
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from conversations with the owners of some pharmacies in Cairo who 
explained that previous to the nationalisation of distribution, 
private agents and wholesalers supplemented the standard profit mar­
gins allowed to chemists with important benefits in the form of 
additional discounts, free goods and special bonuses. The situation,
as described, is very similar to that which still exists in the dis­
tribution of drugs in unregulated markets like the U.S.1 Represent­
atives of pharmaceutical firms would have an even greater incentive 
to encourage the Egyptian pharmacist to promote their products, since 
he is known to have considerable influence on the consumer's choice 
of brand or even drug type.
The profits made by private pharmacies in Egypt have probably
increased since 1963 because of the great increase in their turnover 
(total drug sales through chemist outlets in 1969/70 were £E. 31 
million at retail prices). The increase in the sale of domestically 
produced drugs as a percentage of total sale of drugs in Egypt (this 
percentage moved from 53% in 1962/63 to 86.3% in 1968/69) has also 
meant an increase in the earnings of pharmacies since they receive 
larger profit margins on domestic as opposed to imported drugs.
3* Nationalisation of the Industry 1961-63
The nationalisation of all imports ofpharmaceuticals, finished 
drugs as well as raw materials, was the first dramatic step in the re­
organisation of the domestic market for pharmaceuticals. But this was 
only part of the Higher Organisation's plan for playing an active role 
in the affairs of the pharmaceutical sector. It was now to press the 
government to give it direct control of the domestic industry so as to 
execute its plans for development with greater efficiency.
1. See Christopher A. Rodowskas, Jr. "Competition in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry" in Pharmaceutical M.arketing, Op.cit., p.I*f4.
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By 1961, Egypt's plans for industrialisation were well under 
way, and the government decided to introduce state control in all 
major industries. With this objective in mind, several General 
Organisations were created to administer the industries, on behalf 
of the respective ministries. For example, The General Organisation 
for Spinning and Weaving was established under the Ministry of In­
dustry, while The General Organisation for Pharmaceuticals, Chemicals 
and Medical Appliances, GOPCA, was similarly created under the Minis­
try of Health.
But because centralised control of the pharmaceutical sector 
was already well advanced, the structure and responsibilities of 
GOPCA were to a large extent formulated by the members of the Higher
Organisation for Drugs who had already experienced the evolution of
the industry and contributed so much to its progress.
On July 20, 1961, the state declared its decision to take a con­
trolling interest - in the form of at least 50% of capital - in the 
ten largest pharmaceutical firms. This coincided with similar moves 
in other industries.1
The value of each company's capital was defined according to the 
price of its shares on the Cairo stock market on the last day before 
the announcement of state control* For those companies whose shares 
were not deal with on the stock exchange, capital was valued by a 
Committee headed by a judge from the Court of Appeal. The decision of 
the Committee, which was to study any case for a maximum of two months, 
was irrevocable.
In the pharmaceutical industry, the ten largest firms to be part­
ly nationalised included CID, Misr and Memphis which were to maintain 
their identity and management; another six firms were merged into two
1. Presidential Enactment of Law 118 for 1961 for Government Partici­
pation in Some Companies and Establishments.
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large Companies, Kahira and Ein Shams (later to be enlarged and re­
named Nile); and the tenth was to form the nucleus for the establish­
ment of the Alexandria company.
The General Organisation for Pharmaceuticals, Chemicals and Med­
ical Appliances, GOPCA, was created by Presidential Decree in January 
1962. Its structure and responsibilities (which rule to this day) 
were defined as follows:1
GOPCA must take over all the duties of the Higher Organisation 
for Drugs and of the General Organisation for Trade and Distribution 
of Drugs. Moreover, GOPCA must take steps to rationalise domestic 
production by merging small establishments, encouraging specialisation, 
reducing wastage. It must allocate a proportion of its expenditure 
to research in the industry, devise a pricing policy in the light of 
studies made on costs and profit margins, and it must establish a plan 
for exporting surplus production to suitable marketd aborad.
Decisions of the Board of Directors are taken by majority vote,
the Chairman passes decisions to the Minister of Health for ratifica­
tion. The Board of Directors is to determine wages and salaries of 
all GOPCA employees, select GOPCA representatives to sit on Boards of 
Directors of nationalised companies., arrange long-term loans, accept 
donations, fix charges for any services it renders. Administrative 
expenditure in importing should not exceed 2% and in distribution 3% 
of value of sales.
Sources of finance for GOPCA operations are allocations voted 
from the national budget, profits on the state's share in the capital 
of the nationalised companies, earned incorr.e from GOPCA activities, 
and borrowing.
1. Although GOPCA was created along with other General Organisations
in 1961, its duties were finally defined in 1962 when it actually
began to operate (by Presidential Decree No.99^ for 1962).
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The Directors of GOPCA were again elected from among the group 
of doctors, pharmacologists and chemists who were members of the pre­
vious series of government committees.
The first five year plan (1960-65) f°r "the development of the 
pharmaceutical industry was already under way.1 Large allocations 
for investment were available from the Treasury and GOPCA hastened to 
draw up its programme for the reorganisation of the sector now under 
its control. Four specialised departments were set up to deal with 
planning, imports, production and distribution.
The major objectives of GOPCA were disclosed in a memorandum 
issued by its Board of Directors one month after its creation. The 
salient features of the programme were the following:-
1. Planning
The research team was to construct complete and detailed in­
dices for consumption of drugs over time so as to forecast future demand 
in the various therapeutic categories. The forecast was to take into 
account the spectrum of disease of the population and the expected 
growth in public expenditure on health. It was then used to assess 
the requirements of the different sectors consuming drugs, private 
and public.
The existing capacity of the domestic industry was supplying 20% 
of the consumption in i960 and it was planned that this capacity should 
be better utilised and expanded so as to satisfy 65% of total estimated 
consumption by 19&5*
A thorough study of all foreign sources of prospective imports 
was to be made with special emphasis on quality, prices and payment 
terms (hard currency being more scarce than trade agreement funds).
1. The first five year plan for industrialisation (of which the pharma­
ceutical sector was a major target ) had started in 1957, but was 
now supplanted by a new five year plan for 1960-65.
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A classification of therapeutic groups was to be made according 
to priorities for imports so that in case of currency shortage, those 
groups more vitally needed (antibiotics, cardiac, diabetic drugs) 
would be purchased in preference to the less urgent drugs.
The planning department was also responsible for establishing a 
new pricing policy for foreign and local drugs for the different con­
suming sectors according to the "principles of socialism".
2. Production
To ensure a proper foundation for the growth of domestic pro­
duction it was necessary to evolve a system of effective quality control 
in manufacturing establishments. This was one of the first tasks 
that GOPCA pursued with great thoroughness. Quality control depart­
ments were expanded in .all GOPCA firms and the latest scientific 
equipment was imported.
The penalty for not reaching a sufficiently high standard of pro­
duction was the withdrawal of a laboratory's license. This did in 
fact happen a year after this rule was introduced to approximately 50 
firms. Many of these were firms which had been noted for their low 
quality standards by the Higher Organisation before the rule became 
effective.
A Scientific Research and Control Centre was established in 1963 
to ensure that quality standards were maintained. Another important 
side of the Centre's responsibilities was to analyse the potential of 
foreign drugs specifically for the Egyptian market.
A further critical part of the Department's work was to evolve 
systems for accelerating production techniques and in particular re­
ducing wastage. One of the most severe causes of loss was seen in the 
breakage of ampoules during filling. A loss of up to k3% of ampoules 
in some of the firms studied in 1962-63 was reduced to 25%.
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The five year plan for the pharmaceutical industry stipulated an 
increase in production of 30% a year, a target which was in fact 
exceeded.
Another essential phase in the industry's evolution was the swift 
amalgamation of a great many nationalised companies. The plan was to 
establish new laboratories with more obvious potential for increasingly 
expensive investments.
The new amalgamations were generally based on completely new sites 
of sufficient size to allow for plant expansion. Existing machinery 
and equipment were moved from old laboratories to the new installations.
3* Import and Export
An export department was set up, not so much to increase sales 
aborad, as to dispose of surplus production. This was because it was 
thought impossible to consistently compete with the established foreign 
companies on the international market.
k• Distribution
Distribution was also rationalised by offering incentives to 
retail chemists to set up shops in more distant rural areas, eomple- 
mented by other pharmacies set up by GOPCA.
A critical list was also drawn up of essential stock that all 
chemists must keep, at risk of losing their license. Many of these 
drugs were often not kept due to insufficient profit margins.
Public participation in the pharmaceutical industry continued in 
19631 by the state extending its controlling interest in the nine prin­
cipal firms to a direct and total control, together with an additional 
nine but smaller laboratories, followed by cancelling the licenses of 
the remaining kG firms.
In 196^ f, four companies producing auxilliary materials used in
1. Presidential Decree No.65, 13 June 19^3.
2. Presidential Decree No.50, 1 March 19&*f.
94.
the manufacture of pharmaceuticals were nationalised and placed under 
GOPCA's control. Two of these were absorbed into existing pharmaceut­
ical firms and the other two (producing aluminium tubes and plastic 
containers) were merged to form The Pharmaceutical Packaging Company.
Two commercial companies were set up by GOPCA to undertake the 
distribution of pharmaceuticals:
The Egyptian Company for Drug Trade distributes finished drugs 
through 40 branches to 1,428 retail pharmacies.
Al-Goumhouria Company supplies laboratory chemicals and other 
raw materials to manufacturing and research establishments. It also 
provides the health sector with its requirements of medical and scient­
ific apparatus and mechanical equipment. It also equips and furnishes 
hospitals and health units belonging to the Ministry of Health. Besides 
it runs 23 pharmacies of its own.
With this complete control of import, manufacturing (the only 
exception being the three foreign subsidiaries) and distribution, GOPCA 
had achieved its objective for the reorganisation of the structure of 
the Egyptian pharmaceutical sector. The number of manufacturing est­
ablishments was finally reduced to seven firms engaged in the process­
ing and packaging of drugs, while one large primary chemicals plant,
El Nasr, was to start operating in 1964.
4. Present Structure
The final structure of the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry was 
established in 1964, after all processes of reorganisation by GOPCA 
had been accomplished.
In terras of ownership, the industry is divided into two sectors.
The small private sector consists of three subsidiaries to foreign inter­
national firms, operating as joint ventures between their parent compan­
ies and private Egyptian shareholders. Control of the administration is 
with the foreign partner who owns 60% of share capital.
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Apart from these three subsidiaries, all other firms in the in­
dustry belong to the public sector. 'i’here are seven manufacturing 
firms comparable to the subsidiaries in terms of the manufacturing 
stages performed, and one primary producing company for pharmaceutical 
chemicals.
The following Table gives a brief description of the total of
eleven domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Table 13* Private and Public Sector Pharmaceutical Companies
Name of Company 1st Year 
Product­
ion
Capital
Employed
1967/68
Labour
1968
Sales
1967/68
Sales
1970/71
Private Sector
Pfizer-Misr 1962 1.200 257 1.2 1.4
Hoechst-Orient 1962 .624 247 1.3 2.4
Swiss-Pharma* 1965 .313 220 0.9 3.0
Public Sector
Nile 1963 5.828 2,367 4.7 6.2
CID 1950 4.008 1,619 4.2 6.1
Kahira 1963 3.141 1,071 2.7 4.2
Memphis 1940 2.729 795 2.1 2.9
Misr 1937 2.337 1 ,4l4 2.6 3.6
Arab 1964 1.857 504 1.5 2.3
Alexandria 1963 1.521 435 1.4 2.6
Nasr 1964 8.000 1,666 1.1 3.6
Source: Balance sheets of all firms. All figures for sales; and
capital employed in £E. million.
* Swiss Pharma is the subsidiary to a consortium of three Swiss 
international firms, Ciba, Wander and Sandoz.
To understand the administrative structure of the firms, we shall 
look at the rules governing the setting up of two of the public joint 
stock companies, Kahira and Arab company, by the process of merging 
a series of small firms after nationalisation.
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The share capital of the new companies consisted of the total 
net worth of the individual companies amalgamated, that is, book 
value of total assets less current liabilities and fixed liabilities.
This share capital was transferred to GOPCA and compensation paid as 
follows: where the original company was already a joint stock company
the value of the shares was to be repaid to shareholders according to 
their market value on the stock exchange at the day of closure before 
nationalisation. Where the original company was a private concern, 
owners were to be paid the value of the net worth. The new joint 
stock company formed was given legal existence for a period of fifty 
years renewable by government decree.
Administration of the new companies is the responsibility of a 
Board of Directors, composed of at least three and at most seven 
members. Two members represant the workers and the salaried employees, 
elected by secret ballot by each group. One to five members are 
appointed by Presidential Decree, one at least being among the Manag­
ing Directors of the Company, appointed on the recommendation of the 
Chairman of the Board. Appointment is for three years, renewable.
The Board of Directoes is to meet at least every four months and 
the decisions are taken by majority vote.
Net annual profits of the company are distributed as follows:
5% of net profits are appropriated to statutory reserves equal to 
fifty percent of capital.
5/o of net profits is appropriated to the purchase of government 
bonds.
5% of share capital is distributed among shareholders and 'workers 
and employees' in the ratio 3»1 as a first dividend payment.
10% of the residual is the maximum payment to the Board of Direct­
ors. The Board then chooses whether to distribute the new residual among
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shareholders and 'workers and employees' as a second dividend pay­
ment (again in the ration 3 *1) or to allocate it for future growth.
Taxes are presently at the rate of 35% of profits before dis­
tribution.
Although the firms are autonomous agencies, GOPCA has effective 
control as the majority shareholder. In its capacity as major share­
holder (only a small proportion of shares are owned by the Industrial 
Bank and the Treasury), GOPCA has the right to elect the chairman of 
the Board and to approve the increase or decrease of the firms' author 
ised capital. GOPCA's duty is to guide and harmonize the operation 
of all the firms under its control, by approving of their annual plans 
for production and investment, which are prepared by their Boards of 
Directors. This approval is normally given without much alteration, 
because there is a high degree of consultation and coordination be­
tween the planning departments of GOPCA and the firms.
In Chapter IV, the behaviour and performance of the domestic 
firms are discussed in relation to the new structure described above.
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Chapter III
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE EGYPTIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
1. Introduction
The pattern of supply of pharmaceuticals to world markets has 
gradually been changing in response to changes in the type of com­
petition between the pharmaceutical firms, and also because of changes 
in tariff levels and non-tariff barriers such as drug registration pro­
cedures, import quotas and foreign exchange restrictions.
Many developing countries are gradually instituting regulations 
and trade restrictions designed to favour the domestic production of 
drugs. The various measures taken have either encouraged or forced 
the international companies to increase their local operations within 
many of the individual markets being supplied.
An opposite trend is expected to take place in the European Ec­
onomic Community with the harmonisation of drug regulations and the 
lifting of tariff barriers between national markets, factors which 
should boost interregional trade at the expense of local manufacture. 
Most international companies which have set up over the past two 
decades individual production facilities in every important European 
country, a trend we shall discuss below, are now likely to centralise 
their production operations for greater economy.^ The entry of Britain 
to the Common Market is also likely to reduce its importance as a base 
for supplying pharmaceuticals to Commonwealth countries because of the 
change in the tariff structure.
In general, before the 1950s, most international drug manufact­
urers concentrated the bulk of their production activities in their
1. Peter S. Mould, "The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Balance of 
Payments", in The Pharmaceutical Industry and Society, ed. George 
Teeling - Smith, Office of Health Economics, London, 1972.
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country of origin. All stages of manufacture of drugs were located 
at the source of research and development in the five major innovat­
ing countries, Germany, Switzerland, Britain, France and the U.S.A.
Each national group of companies was confined by political and market 
forces to supplying its traditional foreign customers with exports of 
finished drugs in relatively limited and stable competitive conditions.
In most countries of Africa and Asia, drug sales were dominated 
by the European companies of the nation which was the present or former 
colonial power. Outside the British Commonwealth and the former French 
territories, the old established German and Swiss companies dominated 
the market.^
In Europe itself, with the exception of Britain, each country is
2to this day dominated by its national companies: the largest firms
in Germany being Boehringer, Hoechst, Bayer and Schering. In Switzer­
land the dominant firms are Hoffman - La Roche, Ciba, Geigy, Sandoz 
and in France Rhone-Poulenc Specia and Uclaf Roussel.
The American drug industry was relatively small until the second 
world war when it began to operate on a wide scale in Latin America, 
Canada, Britain and the Philippines.^
Competititon on the international pharmaceutical market was thus 
limited in terms of traditional geographical areas served by companies 
of the five different nationalities and in terms of the degree of pro­
duct competition which had not reached the peak level of the 1950s. 
"Prior to World War II a fraternal attitude of live and let live served 
as a 'modus operandi' for the industry. If one firm developed an effi-
1. Richard C. Fenton, "Worldwide Ethical Drug Markets", in Pharmaceut- 
ical Marketing, ed. Op.cit., p.305.
2. Walter Guzzardi, JR., "The Untranquilised Drug Makers", in Pharma­
ceutical Marketing, ed., Op.cit., p.297.
3. Richard C. Fenton, Op.cit., p.305*
100.
cacious product within a certain field, the other firms were apt to 
avoid that field in their plans for research and product development.
In the decade since the end of the war, this attitude has changed to 
one of intense competition".^ Another writer expresses the view that: 
"Before the technological upheaval, competition was really only a de­
corous kind of tug-of-war,... At one time the Swiss companies arrived 
at a ‘gentleman’s agreement' under the unwritten terms of which no 
Swiss company would push into a product line that was meat and drink - 
and good wine too - for a Swiss brother. No one had to poach - there 
was plenty to go round for everyone.
But that amicable condition no longer obtains. The main engineers
of the change have been the invading American companies, which arrived
2
in force after World War II."
The multinational activity of American companies was to expand 
very rapidly in the 1950s, together with the world demand for newly 
discovered antibiotics and psychotropic medicines in whose research 
and development these firms had played an important role. Direct ex­
ports from the U.S. "in the immediate post-war years were dampened by
3the world dollar shortage". There was therefore a great incentive 
for the American firms to operate outside the U.S.
American firms chose Europe as a base for overseas expansion.
Demand for drugs in Europe was expected to grow faster than in any 
other area. In the late fifties, this market was growing at the rate 
of twelve percent a year, and in 19&3 the size of Europe's drug market
1. Joseph D. McSvilla, "Price Determination Theory in the Pharmaceut­
ical Industry" in Pharmaceutical Marketing, ed., Op.cit. pp.1^-6-1^7*
2. Walter Guzzardi, JR., "The Untranquilized Drug Makers", in Pharma­
ceutical Marketing, Op.cit., p.299»
3« Reaching World Markets, A report on international marketing in 
the pharmaceuticals industry. Prepared by the Centre for the 
Study of Industrial Innovation on behalf of the Pharmaceuticals 
Working Party of the Economic Development Committee for the 
Chemical Industry, Nov. 19711 London (NEDO Publication).
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v/as still only 70% of its U.S. counterpart, while the population of 
Europe was 60% larger than the American population.^
"In those years the U.K. became a favoured location for the multi­
national growth of foreign-owned firms. It had special attractions.
It was politically and economically stable. For the American firms, 
it was English speaking and it was encouraging to inward investment 
compared with other potential European locations. The establishment 
of the NHS in 19^8 coincided with these factors to provide a unified 
market which was expected to offer companies a potentially profitable 
environment.
The additional advantage which the U.K. could offer, and which 
was mentioned by most companies, was its links with Commonwealth coun­
tries. In several cases foreign-owned subsidiaries were established 
with the special brief of developing sales in Commonwealth nations.
This was not simply a case of taking advantage of Commonwealth prefer­
ences..., many Commonwealth countries share social features which are
historically British in origin. These include legal systems, British
. . . .  2 medical tradition and practices, and similar sets of poison regulations."
The leading American firms in the international market are Pfizer,
Merck Shar^ and Dohme, Parke Davis, Lederle, Upjohn, Smith Kline and
French, Lilly, Squibb, and Searle. In 1962, Pfizer is estimated to
have made k6% of its total business in foreign markets, returning dollars
to the U.S. at the rate of around &k0 million every year. In Britain,
Pfizer moved from practically nothing in 1953 to an estimated ethical
drug business of #20 million in 1962. Pfizer's total sales in Europe
in that year were about #50 million (out of an estimated total of #176
million of foreign sales), placing it among the top three companies
3
with Roche and Rhone-Poulenc.
1. Walter Guzzardi, Op.cit., p.302.
2. Reaching World Markets, Op.cit., p.8.
3« Richard C. Fenton, "Worldwide Ethical Drug Markets", Op.cit., p.305-
and Walter Guzzardi JR., "The Untranquilized Drug Makers", Op.cit.
p .299.
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But not all European markets were as easy to penetrate as the 
British, because of traditional doctor preference, especially in 
France and Germany, for the products of local companies.^ Multi­
national companies have therefore entered into licensing and other 
marketing agreements among themselves to facilitate their entry into 
many of these national markets. In France, for instance, Pfizer,
Wyeth and Searle entered into such arrangements with the Clin-Byla 
group, while Parke Davis was selling through Roussel. In Germany 
Pfizer sales were handled from 1950-58 by Boehringer and in return 
Pfizer established in the U.K. a Boehringer division which was sub­
sequently the basis of Boehringer1s own British subsidiary. Lederle 
was in business for eight years with Chemie Grunenthal, and Squibb 
owned 25% of Heyden in Germany. Fisons has entered into a joint venture 
operation with the Belgian UCB to introduce a new Fisons ethical pro­
duct in Germany and France, the British company providing technical 
and marketing expertise and UCB providing local management services. 
Fisons has also entered into a marketing agreement with a Swedish com­
pany which is providing distribution and representation in some Scan­
dinavian markets.^
But cross licensing and other marketing agreements are only temp­
orary stages in the gradual establishment of independent corporate 
existence by the multi-national firms. "Most companies stressed that 
in achieving their fundamental goals, the immediate task of developing 
overseas markets is usually the acquisition of direct marketing control 
by the company itself; that is, managerial control by the company over 
the direction, emphasis and timing of product launches, sales programmes 
and budgets, promotional campaigns and so on. This cannot be achieved
1. Walter Guzzardi* JR., "The Untranquilized Drug Makers", Op.cit.,
p.300.
2. Examples taken from V/alter Guzzardi, JR., Op.cit., p.300, and from 
Reaching World Markets, Op.cit., pp.15-16.
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so effectively when exports are distributed by an agent as when the 
company handles its own distribution by establishing a marketing 
subsidiary.
The trend towards setting up production or marketing facilities 
in every important country was accelerated in the 1960s, spurred by 
the growth in the number of firms competing for sales in each partic­
ular market, and by the high rate of innovation which meant a growing 
and fast changing range of products which each company tried to market
as quickly and as efficiently as possible. Price competition continued
2to have little significance in the international market for drugs, 
while product differentiation and marketing control have assumed 
growing importance. "Patented products almost certainly constitute 
the major element of pharmaceutical sales for any company, and generate 
the majority of growth. But the period of a patent sets a limit to 
profitable product life... Moreover it is common for pharmaceuticals 
to be superseded technically by competitive development prior to patent 
expiry and this may further reduce effective product life. Because 
the approach of patent expiry and the threat of competitive obsolescence
are quite exogenous to the firm, a premium is put on speedy generation
3
of maximum sales volume."
1. Reaching World Markets, Op.cit., p.9.
2. The increasing share of Eastern European exports in world trade in 
pharmaceuticals may however introduce a new era of price competition 
on relatively older but medically essential products (i.e. products 
embodying the major threrapeutic advances). According to the U.N. 
figures for Commodity Trade Statistics, six East European countries 
accounted together for 10% of world trade in pharmaceuticals in 1968.
3. Robert H. Jones, "The Modern Multinational Structure of the Pharma­
ceutical Industry", in The Pharmaceutical Industry and Society, 
Op.cit., pp.1-2.
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The multinational activities of pharmaceutical firms differ in 
important respects from those of other industries operating inter­
nationally. The most striking peculiarity that emerges from a close 
study of international pharmaceutical firms is that conventional pro­
blems of location such as relative production costs are not of major 
significance in the decisions of companies to branch overseas, and the 
second peculiarity is the wide degree of flexibility in the form of 
representation that companies can achieve in any particular market.
The study sponsored by NEDO found that "in general, within the pharma­
ceutical industry, neither transport nor direct production costs have 
a central effect on the location of production. Several companies in 
the sample emphasised that the activities of the pharmaceutical firm 
were oriented towards the development of new products and their market­
ing, with production being a subordinate function. As an extreme view, 
it was stated to be * irrelevant'.
As discussed earlier in Chapter I, economics of scale in product­
ion are only important in the basic stages of manufacturing active 
pharmaceutical ingredients. Multinational companies therefore find it 
economical to concentrate their primary production facilities in a 
limited number of locations where the availability of raw material 
chemicals and skilled labour as well as their cost becomes an import­
ant consideration.
But secondary stages of pharmaceutical production require small 
capital investments and relatively little technical expertise. Pharma­
ceutical processing, finishing and packaging can be carried out econ­
omically on a very small scale. This characteristic of the production 
process, together with the fact that transport costs for pharmaceuticals 
are low, means that products can be manufactured up to some early semi­
final stage and then exported for further processing in their country
1. Peaching World Markets, Op.cit., p.^ f.
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of destination. This flexibility in production explains the poss­
ibility for a multinational firm to achieve great variations in the 
form of its representation in foreign markets.
The factors which influence a company's decision on the location 
and extent of its operation in any particular country are mainly ex­
ternal to the firm itself - market size, trade regulations, registration 
requirements and political conditions in the market. Some countries 
will not allow the importation of finished and packaged products, but 
will admit partly processed chemicals. Others give purchasing prefer­
ence to products with a local element in their manufacture. The trend 
towards the encouragement of domestic production is particularly strong 
among developing countries and the result, as one American represent­
ative put it, is that Mthe tendency in our industry operating around 
the world is to decentralize and build small pharmaceutical plants in 
order to comply more easily with the local preferences and regulations... 
However, small pharmaceutical plants can be reasonably economical. So 
long as the pressure does not extend to the local manufacture of the 
basic substances, which would be very uneconomic, the trend is not too 
bad."1
The choice of methods of overseas marketing - exporting, licen­
sing, or manufacturing through subsidiaries - are not mutually exclusive 
alternatives. Local manufacture even in the largest subsidiaries never 
completely replaces the export of finished drugs to that market, and 
considerable quantities of semi-finished raw materials are normally 
shipped from the parent firm for overseas processing.
The setting up of a local subsidiary is itself no indication of 
the extent to which local production is carried out in a particular
market. Companies often register a new subsidiary with nominal capital
2
for the sole function of marketing.
1. Richard C. Fenton, "Worldwide Ethical Drug Markets", in Pharmaceut- 
ical Marketing, ed., Op.cit., p.509.
2. Reach in;: ,.'orld Markets. Op.cit., pp.16-17.
ol
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The typical multinational company is thus supplying its various 
overseas markets by a number of different investment operations. It 
will normally concentrate its primary producing chemical or ferment­
ation plants in one to four locations around the world, with several 
more subsidiaries being supplied with bulk pharmaceuticals from these 
locations for further processing. In addition it will set up many 
small packaging plants in markets the size of which is too small for 
production to be economical. Some pharmaceutical markets are too 
small for investment even in marketing facilities. "For a country 
with a small pharmaceutical market, the effort and expense involved 
in establishing a marketing subsidiary may never be worthwhile, how­
ever attractive the market may be in other respects. Amongst the 
sample companies, by the time a firm has developed a turnover of 
£rj£--£l million per annum in a given market, it will generally have 
begun to consider the establishment of a marketing subsidiary."'1'
2. The International Pharmaceutical Firm in Egypt
Until the 1950s, as described in Section 1, international pharma­
ceutical firms supplied the markets of developing countries with ex­
ports from a limited number of industrialised countries. In Egypt, 
all foreign drugs (which accounted for over 90% of the total value of 
sales in 1952) were exported to the market in their finished form. The 
absence of any trade restrictions on the direct export of finished 
drugs to developing markets made local production unattractive to 
international firms. £ven where economies of scale are important as 
in the manufacture of penicillin and sulpha drugs, the opportunity to 
set up pharmaceutical subsidiaries in one of the largest markets in 
the less-developed world, India, was not taken up by ICI for instance, 
which already had other long standing interests in, and substantial 
trade with the Indian market. A representative of ICI explained that,
1. Ibid., p.17.
J\
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as long as pharmaceutical products were on the priority list for
imports and foreign currency appropriation in India, there was no
need for ICI to establish manufacturing facilities there, and it was
now felt that it was unfortunately too late to start building such
facilities,1 (presumably because many other companies who took the
initiative before ICI in setting up subsidiaries were now in control
of the major share of the market).
In Egypt, when the government began to encourage the expansion
of local production by the existing private pharmaceutical companies,
by giving preference to the purchase of their products and offering
them loans to purchase foreign equipment, many of these firms sought
the cooperation of international firms in license agreements. But the
famous and well established foreign companies were reluctant to enter
3into such arrangements, the reason being that m  the absence of trade 
barriers this method of operation is less profitable than direct ex­
ports. "Where alternatives are available, licensing to non-associated 
companies will generally not be used, primarily for reasons of loss 
of control but also because of lower earning potential.11 It was only 
in 1956 that an important multinational firm, the Belgian UCB, agreed 
to enter into a licensing and management arrangement with Egypt's CID, 
on terms which were later felt to be too costly to the Egyptian party, 
and are in perspective the most favourable that any foreign company 
has received in Egypt.
1. Interview with Mr. Percy Tinker at ICI House, Millbank, London,
April 7th, 1971.
2. About 70% of the Indian pharmaceutical industry is already dominated 
by the production of multinationals.
3« The few license agreements which were negotiated before 1956 were 
with little known Swiss and Italian firms.
*f. Reaching World Markets, Op.cit., p.l^ f.
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With the growth of trade restrictions in the developing world, 
the outlook and attitudes of international companies has radically 
changed. Restrictions of one type or another are continually being 
introduced in developing countries either as protective measures for 
local industry, or as means of conserving foreign exchange, or because 
of political considerations. Import quotas, foreign exchange restrict­
ions, tariffs, all with a discernible degree of discrimination against 
the traditional trade structure in pharmaceuticals have been instituted 
by developing countries. In Egypt, the special government committee 
set up to supervise the growth of the domestic pharmaceutical industry 
was gradually taking over the control of all imports and distribution 
of pharmaceuticals while offering foreign firms the opportunity to take 
part in the internal development of the domestic sector on terms which 
they could negotiate with the committee itself, as described in Chapter
II.
The only alternative to losing business in such circumstances has 
been for international firms to start producing inside the developing 
world. The setting up of subsidiaries or licensing arrangements in these 
countries can only be seen as a defensive policy on the part of the 
foreign investor. Tftis was described in detail by the President of an 
American company, Merck Sharp and Dohme International: "Not realising 
the facts would have meant a loss of these markets. Basically our action 
was a defensive one... Let me add that one of the largest U.S. chemical- 
pharmaceutical firms did not take action and as a consequence their 
international position became very weak - their way back seems to be 
very difficult and costly."'1'
The basic factor which will affect the cost and profitability of 
any particular foreign firm's operation in this new situation is Timing.
1. Dr. Antoine T. Knoppers, "The Choice between Exports and Overseas 
Operations", The Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University 
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 195^-63*
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The governments of developing countries, by putting restrictions on 
the import of finished pharmaceuticals and inviting international firms 
to join the now protected market in actual production and/or licensing 
arrangements, are in fact inviting these firms to join an oligopoly club, 
far more concentrated in membership than the pre-restrictions situation. 
To be among the first is therefore essential since only a limited num­
ber of firms will be sufficient to satisfy total domestic consumption 
of a developing market as compared to the total number of potential 
suppliers from outside. The international firms which have been aware 
of the implications of a developing country's decision to put restrict­
ions on imports and have accepted to take the risk in setting up oper­
ations inside those countries are now reaping the advantages of great 
opportunities in terms of substantial increases in sales as well as the 
benefits of a secure and stable market for which production programmes 
can be well planned in advance and safely executed.
By 1958 the Egyptian Higher Organisation for Drugs had drawn its
final plans for increasing the domestic capacity of the pharmaceutical
industry to become the major supplier of the country's needs for drugs.
The purchase of technology from abroad formed an integral part of these
plans, since local companies had limited experience in the manufacture
of modern drugs requiring advanced skills and know-how. While the
Higher Organisation was striving to encourage foreign firms to enter
into license agreements with local producers, four offers were made by
some of the largest international companies to set up subsidiaries in
Egypt. T h e s e  were Pfizer, Wyeth, Hoechst and a Swiss consortium of
Ciba, Sandoz and Wander. Long negotiations took place over the extent
of ownership, Egypt demanding as m\jch aontrol as would enable it to
consider the investments as 'national'. Agreement was reached with
three of the offers,1 which gave the foreign companies 60% of share
1. The agreement with Wyeth failed to materialise, although the site for 
the plant was chosen and a capital loan from the American government 
was secured.
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capital, and hence the effective control of the joint ventures (the 
remaining kOf/o of issued capital was sold as shares to the general 
public)* For these international companies to accept the participation 
of Egyptian investors was a major concession, and to further agree on 
terms which limited the transfer of profits considerably meant a partial 
surrender to Egypt's growing strength in negotiation. Joint ventures 
are not widely utilised in the pharmaceutical industry because of the 
relatively low capital requirements. The non-capital advantages they 
confer can usually be obtained through a marketing agreement.1 "In 
pharmaceuticals they (joint ventures) may be conceived, like other 
methods of market entry, as a stage on the way to the eventual full 
representation by the newcomer through a wholly-owned subsidiary. Only 
when this can be catered for in the agreement are joint ventures likely 
to occur.1'^
The manager of the Hoechst subsidiary operating in Egypt explain­
ed that although his firm had opportunities to set up plants in Argen­
tina or Mexico, where it could ohtain much more favourable terms as
compared to Egypt at the time (1958), the choice of Egypt was based on
3
the awareness that the opportunity might not be available for long.
The uncertainty involved in starting manufacturing operations in 
developing countries as compared to developed ones, can be a very in­
hibiting factor to foreign companies. The instability of laws and 
regulations governing a new nation makes commercial calculations most 
difficult, and the ruling political climate can mean sudden or drastic 
changes of policy towards foreign interests. International pharma­
1. Reaching World Markets, Op.cit., p.l6.
2. Robert H. Jones, "The Modern Multinational Structure of the Pharma­
ceutical Industry", in The Pharmaceutical Industry and Society, 
ed., Op.cit., p.6.
3. Interview with Mr. Shetto, Director General of Hoechst-Orient, Al- 
Matarieh, Cairo, June 11, 1972.
4. An often quoted example is that of Evans, which was invited by the 
Burmese government to set up a joint venture only to be nationalised 
within four years of its starting to produce.
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ceutical firms have hedged against such risks by making their capital 
outlay as small as possible at the start of their project. Swiss 
Pharma borrowed funds in Egypt equal to five times the value of its 
authorised capital by 1965, the first year of production. Hoechst- 
Orient designed the outlay of their plant to allow for future growth 
in the event of continuity of favourable conditions to their operations.
It was now, in 1972, building a new plant adjacent to its older build­
ings and with a production capacity five times as large.
In this new situation, it is extremely difficult to compare the 
profitability to an international pharmaceutical firm of different 
types of operation in a developing market. The income generated from 
subsidiaries or license agreements depends much more on the terms which 
the international firn can obtain than on the form of ownership itself.
The general policies and regulations of the developing country deter­
mine the conditions under which any form of operation can be conducted 
(e.g. price control, registration requirements, royalty payments and 
profit distribution) and therefore constitute the upper limit on the 
possible income flows the company can derive. Within this framework, 
one can describe the profitability of the two main types of activities 
in which multinational firms have engaged in Egypt, subsidiaries and 
license agreements. We have borrowed for this purpose the classifica­
tion used by Constantine Vaitsos to analyse income flows derived by 
international firms operating in developing countries.^ According to 
this classification the four sources of income are: royalties, commi­
ssion fee for services and overhead allocations, intermediate goods 
overpricing, and interest and profit payments to parent,
a) Royalties
For manufacturing industry: "Generally royalties range from
1. Constantine Vaitsos, Income Distribution, Welfare and Transnational 
Enterprise,
of
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J>% to 10%, but lower and higher percentages occur; for example, in 
the pharmaceutical field royalties on modern drugs are around 20$» or
M 1more.11
In Egypt, an upper limit of 5% on royalties has been instituted 
since 195&. Although this seems very small in comparison to the 
royalties international pharmaceutical firms can obtain in other 
countries, the second and third types of income flows which are dis­
cussed below are a good compensation for the moderate royalty payments. 
Since the upper limit applies to license agreements as well as subsid­
iaries, neither form of investment has an advantage to the foreign firm 
in this respect.
It is important to note that in Egypt royalty payments are calcul­
ated on net sales (defined as sales minus all normal commercial dis­
counts) and are not liable to any deductions for purposes of income 
or sales taxes.
Royalties of 5% are a very small return to international pharma­
ceutical firms when compared to a percentage of gross profits to sales
of 20% in Britain, our country of reference, or an average markup on
2
sales of 59*3% for that same country in 1965*
Yet when the operation of the international pharmaceutical firms 
is viewed in the context of a defensive strategy to supply a marginal 
market, its decision is based on the balancing of all its incremental 
revenues and costs from such operations and any net revenues are better 
than none, providing proper allowance is made for all opportunity costs,
b) Commission foe for services and overhead allocations
Income flows of this type can be an important additional source 
of revenue to the parent firm under both licensing arrangements or the 
operation of subsidiaries.
1. Peter Mainhardt, Inventions, Patents and Trade Names, A Gower Press 
Handbook, 1971*
2. Sainsbury Report, Op.cit., p.108, Table l6. Average markup is 
defined as sales minus manufacturing cost of sales.
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In Egypt agreements have included the payment of commission fees 
for the purchase and installation of machinery (which often originates 
from the parent firm). But the more substantial, continuous and quest­
ionable payment which is included in most agreements between the Egyptian 
government or Egyptian firms and the international pharmaceutical firms 
is the allocation of a fixed percentage of the sales of licensed pro­
ducts towards the advertising expenses of the publicity office of the 
parent firm in Egypt, payable in local currency.
In the 1958-60 period, after studying and supplementing the nego­
tiations over the first license agreements, the authorities at GOPCA 
prepared a model or standard agreement document to be consulted by both 
parties to all future agreements. This document, reproduced in full 
on p. lV7 , stipulates a maximum royalty payment of 5% in foreign 
currency. It is normally accompanied (i.e. in 90% of all cases) by a 
separate marketing agreement which stipulates the payment by licensee 
to licensor of 10% of net sales of agreement products as a contribution 
to the licensor's local 'scientific office1, to be paid in Egyptian 
currency. It was gathered from discussions with GOPCA officials res­
ponsible for drawing these standard rules that the allowance of an 
additional 10% payment to the foreign firm was allowed as a kind of 
compensation for the low level of royalty payments, while limiting the 
transfer of foreign currency to the parent company to the 5% maximum.
As far as our analysis is concerned, however, the percentage con­
tribution to advertising or scientific offices can be treated ident­
ically to the percentage royalty payment made to foreign firms, on 
account of two factors. In terms of the foreign currency outflows which 
the Egyptian government is so careful about checking, the international 
pharmaceutical firms have been saved the percentage of sales which they 
would otherwise have transferred from abroad to maintain their publicity 
offices in Egypt. Even where the advertising expenses might have been
k
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less than the full 10% which is remitted to these offices, the fact
that several pharmaceutical companies are allowed to run their advert-
1ising activities through a joint office in Egypt means that those 
foreign companies with no revenues in local currency (because they only 
import directly from abroad) can make arrangements with those receiving 
the percentage contribution and repay them abroad.
The second factor which allows us to treat the licensee*s partic­
ipation in the advertising expenses of the foreign partAer as a
net flow of income to the foreign firm is that the payment of a full 
10% of the sales value of licensed products is an enormous burden on 
the local company. The average percentage spent by Egyptian firms on 
their total advertising and sales budget is a modest 3-5% of the value 
of all their sales (see Table 13) t where this figure includes all the 
overheads of running their own publicity offices.
c) Intermediate goods overpricing
One of the best methods for the multinational firm to retain 
large profit margins once it has decided to conduct subsidiary or lic­
ensing operations in a host country is to include in the agreement a 
restrictive clause allowing the purchase of all necessary raw materials 
and intermediate products only from the source that the licensor in­
dicates.
In host countries where imports of raw materials are made indepen­
dently by private domestic firms, there is very limited control over 
tjfcie price at which these raw materials are obtained when compared to 
competitive international prices. Vaitsos defines overpricing as:
Price paid by subsidiary less Competitive price quoted internationally 
divided by Competitive price quoted internationally times 100. Using 
the above measure of overpricing, Vaitsos found that in the Columbian
1. See Chapter II, Section 2, p.^5*
<k
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pharmaceutical industry, overpricing accounted for the major source 
of income flows to the foreign parent companies. "Befining as Effect­
ive returns' to the parent corporation the sum of reported profits of 
the subsidiary, royalty payments and intermediate product overpricing, 
the following data can be inferred from a sample representing close 
to W o  of the Columbian pharmaceutical industry. Reported profits 
constitute of effective returns, royalties l*f.O% and 'overpricing'
82.696".1
The international firm's incentive to increase its income flow 
by overpricing intermediate products is obvious in the case of joint 
venture or license agreements since this leads to a redistribution of 
income from the investment favouring the foreign investor at the ex­
pense of the local partner. One also finds a tendency on the part of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries to purchase intermediate products from the 
parent firm at greatly inflated prices. The explanation lies in the 
presence of unequal trade barriers such as tariffs, taxes, maximum 
repatriation rates or the existence of tax havens. It is also possible 
that due to its monopoly patent rights, the subsidiary is making em­
barrassingly high profits as compared to the local firms and therefore 
feels compelled to reduce the book value of its profits by reporting 
higher costs.
In Egypt, when GOPCA took over the import of all pharmaceuticals 
in I960, it made it clear that price competition was to be encouraged 
and respected within a restricted sellers market of 90 large reputable 
international firms to ensure quality (previous to the nationalisation 
of imports, the industry was importing pharmaceuticals from 3^ -0 foreign 
firms)•
1. Constantine V. Vaitsos, "Transfer of resources and Preservation of 
Monopoly Rents", Economic Development Report No.168, Development 
Advisory Service, Center for International Affairs, Harvard Univer­
sity, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970.
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In spite of these considerations, a confidential report showed 
that as late as 1965* one of the subsidiaries had imported raw mater­
ials chemicals necessary for all its production of that year with a 
rate of 159% overpricing, where overpricing is defined in the same way 
as in the previous example for Columbia. The absolute difference be­
tween the total value at the price paid by that subsidiary and the 
total value at competitive prices for the imported chemicals was in
fact larger than the sum of royalties plus profits transferred to the
parent firm by the subsidiary in that same year.'1' Overpricing was a
more important source of income than royalties and profits put together.
It is small wonder that GOPCA introduced a clause in its model or 
standard agreement document specifying that domestic production would 
be supplied with pharmaceutical raw materials from the licensor only
2if the prices charged by the latter were competitive with world prices. 
This clause was applied to all new agreements after I960.
In the case of license agreements with wholly domestically owned 
firms, the domestic firms themselves have an incentive to keep a watch­
ful eye on the level and movement of prices of raw materials necessary 
for their production. One can observe many cases where argument and 
pressure are exerted on the licensor to bring his prices down to com­
petitive levels. With relatively old or standard products, competing 
prices are obtained from among the international firms themselves.
'Nile* has asked one of its American licensors to review the price of 
one of its raw materials which was being offered by one of the large 
Swiss firms at half that price. With newer products, competing prices 
are usually obtained from Italian firms which do not observe patent 
rights and are quick to market innovations in their semi-finished form 
at greatly reduced prices. One British firm specifically included in
1. Report obtained from Dr. Abdou Sallam, Minister of Health, Cairo, 1971.
2. See Article 8 of Standard Agreement Document, p.lA-7*
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its licensing agreement with Kahira that Kahira should be allowed to 
buy raw materials from any reliable international source with the ex­
ception of Italy.
When the licensor is the sole holder of the patent for an agree­
ment product and there are no competing suppliers for the chemical 
ingredient, he becomes a pure monopolist and will charge whatever 
price he chooses to. A case in point is the active ingredient for the 
production of Lycanol,1 a branded patented drug belonging to Bayer.
This ingredient was priced higher than the finished preparation when 
directly imported. The licensee, Alexandria, refused to buy the ingred­
ient or to produce the speciality until Bayer reduced its price three 
times.^
Italian producers have been the most efficient and competitive 
source of patented raw materials for GOPCA, and because they were also 
potential suppliers they provided a standard reference for GOPCA's ne­
gotiations with international licensors. The active ingredient for 
Terramycin - Pfizer's branded patented name for Oxytetracycline Hydro­
chloride - was made available from Italy at /80 per kilogram as compared 
to Pfizer-Egypt's parent price of #200 per kilogram in 1962. GOPCA 
asked Pfizer to reduce its price but Pfizer argued that Italian supplies 
were of doubtful quality and therefore not comparable for negotiation 
purposes. By the time GOPCA had performed the necessary tests on Ital­
ian samples of the product (which proved Pfizer's allegations to be 
false)^ it became aware of the corresponding circumstances of purchases 
by the Defence Supply Agency in America itself. General McNamara had 
approved the import of Italian supplies of the generic product in 1959 
at about 67% of Pfizer's bid for the same product.^ Continued negotiat-
1. This drug stimulates the physiological secretion of insulin.
2. Interview with Dr. Hassan Abbass, Director of Planning, Alexandria 
Co., 1972.
5. F-D-C Reports, Drugs and Cosmetics, "The Pink Sheet", May 27 » 19&3* 
pp.3-6.
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ions between GOPCA and Pfizer brought Pfizer's price down to #150, 
while the same Italian supplier was now offering the product at &k0.
The Director of Imports at GOPCA now decided that it would only accept 
to buy this raw material from Pfizer-Egypt*s parent if it would sell 
it at having allowed a 10% royalty on the estimated #^ f0 cost of
production, Pfizer refused this tender and discontinued the production 
and sale in Egypt of its most important speciality in that market at 
the time, I96*f. Two Egyptian companies started producing the same 
drug, CID and Memphis, using imported raw materials from Italy.'1'
d) Interest payments
This is the one form of income flow which can only accrue 
to the foreign firm operating subsidiaries or joint ventures in the 
host country. Potential profits on capital invested in the pharma­
ceutical industry are higher than average, and this is the main reason 
why international pharmaceutical firms prefer to go it alone rather 
than engage in partnership or licensing agreements; "Merck,... origin­
ally tried to capitalize on the fruits of its research through licenses - 
one of the choices. •••, suffice it to say that generally speaking
the results of this method were unsatisfactory as compared with other
2possibilities - such as exports or overseas operations."
In Egypt, prior to the imposition of discriminatory sales taxes 
which will be discussed below, the following figures describe the pro­
fits of the three foreign subsidiaries after the payment of royalties, 
depreciation, administrative and advertising expenses, but before tax­
ation.
1. Interview with Dr. Moustafa A1 Samaa, Director of Imports, GOPCA, 
Cairo, 1972.
2. Antoine Knoppers, Op.cit., p.5«
1X9.
Firm Year Profit percent 
Sales
Profit percent 
Capital Employed
Pfizer-Egypt 1966 3 **% 53%
Hoechst-Orient 1966 28% 115%
Swiss Pharma 1967 18% 52%
Source: Report Prepared for the Study of Prices of Subsidiary
Products, by Pricing Committee, 1967 •
Company tax is the same in all Egyptian industry,for private as 
well as public enterprise. The rate was raised to 30% after the 1967 
war (it equalled 2k% before the war); it is payable on profit net of 
depreciation and interest payments (to avoid double taxation). Like 
other pharmaceutical firms, the subsidiary must allocate 10% of profits 
to research. It must also by law reinvest 5% in government shares, 
and 5% in statutory reserves. Companies will generally distribute only 
part of the remaining profits, allocating the rest to provisions for 
growth, according to their own policy.
For whatever portion of profits is distributed, company law again 
requires that 75% of profits goes to shareholders and 25% to workers 
and employees of the firm.
To lighten the burden on the balance of payments, the Egyptian 
authorities have instituted a maximum repatriation rate of 50% of the 
final distributed profits accruing to the parent firm. If one looks 
at the figures for transferable subsidiary profits, they are as small 
as 2% of the parent's share of capital employed in 1965 anc* 1966.^
This reflects the subsidiaries' policy of growth and also possibly a 
reluctance to risk asking for very large transfers in foreign currency, 
a step which might lead the Egyptian authorities to enforce more re­
strictions or perhaps even consider nationalisation of the concern.
1. Report Prepared for the Study of Prices of Subsidiary Products, 
Op.cit., 1967»
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In 1967, the prices, profits, manufacturing and other costs of 
sales of the subsidiaries were all scrutinised by a specialised 
committee studying the prices of drugs charged by these firms. A 
similar committee had previously determined and fixed the price of 
imported drugs to the consumer, and later fixed and laid general rules 
on the pricing of drugs produced by the domestic firms.
The prices of subsidiary products are all higher than their 
locally produced equivalents.1 The committee started by studying the 
importance of every drug to the consumer in relation to its manufact­
uring cost, allowing the addition of larger markups on those considered
less vital medically. This is the type of judgment used in pricing 
2
drugs generally. But the concept of a fair profit in relation to the
subsidiaries' total operations had to be introduced; this involved
comparing the cost breakdown of total sales as between domestic firms
and subsidiaries. The following Table gives the summary of a detailed
study of the allocation of expenditure for all the pharmaceutical firms.
The first row gives the average for the seven domestic firms.
Table 15* Comparison of Cost Breakdown of Production between Subsidiaries
and Domestic Firms, 1966.
Firm Direct Indirect Costs Profit Value of
Costs   Prod. ex.
Admin. Dist. Advert. Total fac.
Av. Domestic 50.3% 5-7% 4.2% 3-5% 13-^% 36.3% 100%
Pfizer-Egypt 52.5% 6.6% 6.9% 6.1% 19.6% 27.9% 100%
Hoechst-Orient 51.2% 9*5% 9.6% 5.4% 24.5% 24-. 3% 100%
Swiss Pharma 43.2% 16.3% 5.1% 6.2% 27.6% 29.2% 100%
Source: Study prepared by the Pricing Committee, Op.cit., 1967*
The committee decided to apply the average total indirect costs
incurred by the domestic firms as the standard necessary expenditure
1. See Price of Drugs Produced by Foreign Subsidiaries, Appendix
P.157.
2. See Price Control in the Egyptian Pharmaceutical Industry, Chapter IV.
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on these indirect elements of cost, and allowed a 'fair' profit of 
25% to arrive at a new value of production which would be obtained 
by making the necessary reduction in prices ex. factory. In other 
words, it added 15.4% plus 25% to each subsidiary’s direct manufact­
uring costs and subtracted the resulting value for production from 
the actual value of production. This difference it deemed a good 
measure of overpricing.
The committee further decided to reduce the 15% discount allowed 
to chemists on the retail price of subsidiary products to 10% which 
is equal to the discount allowed on imported finished pharmaceuticals • 
This further inflated the ex. factory value of the subsidiary's pro­
duction by 5% of the retail value of this production.
The net reductio.i on the ex. factory sales value or average price 
charged by the subsidiaries was to be 17%i 20% and 20% for Hoechst- 
Orient, Pfizer-Egypt and Swiss Pharma respectively. A reduction of 
varying percentages was made on the different specialities to arrive 
at the total recommended reduction.
But by the time the study and recommendations were ready for 
approval by the higher authorities, the 1967 war took place and funds 
were badly needed to finance the war effort. Treasury taxes (sales 
taxes) were being placed on many consumer goods. The decision was 
therefore taken to reduce the sales receipts of the subsidiaries with­
out an equivalent reduction in the price of their products to the 
public. The recommendation of the committee was now the application 
of a flat rate of treasury tax on all the products of each subsidiary 
by the same original percentage (and including the reduction in chemist 
discount), the burden of the tax falling entirely on the subsidiaries.
Two of the subsidiaries, Hoechst and Swiss-Pharma accused GOPCA's 
measures (the majority of members composing the committee were officials 
of GOPCA), of being discriminatory and liable to cause severe strain on
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their profit and competitive position in the Egyptian market. They 
were represented by the countries' Commercial Attaches as well as by 
the Egyptian Ministry for Industry, which is responsible for their 
operation. The latter brought forward studies of the subsidiaries' 
accounts using full cost methods of calculation, and approached the 
pricing committee with suggested tax rates of 11.28% for Hoechst-Orient 
products and 8.36% for Swiss Pharma products. After a long exchange 
of memoranda on methods and definitions used for calculation, the final 
compromise was reached whereby both Hoechst-Orient and Swiss Pharma are 
paying treasury tax of 14% on ex. factory prices, and Pfizer-Egypt is 
still liable to 20%.
Before we turn to the gains to developing countries from allowing 
the operation of international pharmaceutical firms, we must take note 
of one additional and extremely important advantage to the foreign firm 
from operating through subsidiaries or license agreements in these de­
veloping countries.
As we have shown in Chapter I, the rate of innovation in the pharma­
ceutical industry in the West is perhaps the highest among research 
based industries. The average life span of any brand name is very short 
(the typical successful brand has a commercial life of under three years 
both in Europe and the U.S.). By producing in developing countries, 
the international pharmaceutical firm has the opportunity of lengthening 
the life of its old brand names which are now afforded protection from 
competing imports of other international pharmaceutical firms' old and 
new products. The reason why products can be sold longer in the protected 
market of developing countries is twofold. On the onehand, within every 
pharmaceutical group, the majority of successful innovations do not con­
tribute any significant pharmacological improvement on existing brands 
and their success is a function of aggressive advertising.1 On the
1. See Chapter I, Section 3«
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other hand, demand for any brand name is very slow to change in de­
veloping countries on account of the very large percentage of sales 
made without prescription, i.e. because of self-medication by patients 
who rely on past knowledge of effective drugs.1
Moreover, international pharmaceutical firms are not compelled 
to license the production of their latest innovations in developing 
countries and prefer to delay this until they are old; in the mean­
while they can and do achieve maximum unit profit on these new drugs 
by exporting them to developing countries which give them priority 
over other possible sources for imports of new products. In Egypt, 
it can be observed by looking at the source of finished drug imports 
in 1971 that the majority of manufacturers of these foreign drugs are 
also active inside Egypt, either through subsidiaries or through license 
agreements. These international pharmaceutical firms with manufacturing
links in the Egyptian market, account in fact for over one half of the
2
total number of imported drugs with FOB value over £E.1,000 in 1971.
3. Gains to a Developing Country from the Operation of International 
 Pharmaceutical Firms__________________________
Foreign investment of any form contributes to the growth of a 
host country's national income and employment through the usual multi­
plier effect, provided one can make the assumption that the economy is 
not operating at full employment and has sufficient internal elasticit­
ies so that the result is not merely inflation. In this respect, foreign 
capital investments in the pharmaceutical industry of developing coun­
tries can be a useful complement to domestic capacity for the production 
of drugs. The assertion was made in Chapter I Section 4 that the majority 
of developing countries will find it economic to undertake some form of
1. See Chapter I, Section 2.
2. Author's analysis of all drugs imported into Egypt for 1971♦ acc­
ording to manufacturer, brand name, and FOB value, and also quantity.
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national investment in the pharmaceutical industry, defining 'economic' 
as leading to a positive social net benefit.
Any analysis of foreign operations in the pharmaceutical industry 
must therefore take into account the impact of such operations on the 
development of the purely domestic sector of this industry, delineating 
those forces which act as a hindrance and those which constitute an 
impetus to the growth of this sector.
A second aspect of foreign investment and one with considerable 
weight in decision making of the host country (as well as the lending 
country) is the influence of the capital transfer on its balance of 
payments. To developing countries, this is a very real problem be­
cause one of the principal aims of allowing the operation of foreign 
subsidiaries in the domestic industry is the conservation of foreign 
currency.
The long run effect on the balance of payments of a country re­
ceiving a new injection of foreign capital is known^ to depend on 
the annual rates of growth of this capital as well as the annual amort­
isation rate and interest rates payable on this capital. If the rate 
of growth of the initial investment (from continued inflows of foreign 
capital or from the reinvestment of profits) is less than the interest 
rate (or the rate of repatriated profits to initial investment) received 
by the foreign investor, then the ratio of outflow to inflow of funds 
to a host country gradually becomes greater than one, and will hence 
cause problems to its balance of payments.
Outflows of funds from the operation of foreign pharmaceutical 
firms also include the purchase of raw materials from the parent company 
v/hich, as we have shown in Section 2, normally will far outweigh any 
profit earnings repatriated by subsidiaries.
1. E. D. Domar, "The Effect of Foreign Investment on the Balance of 
Payments", American Economic Review, 1950? pp.805-826.
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Although the net result of the operation of the multinational 
firm's subsidiary on a host country's balance of payments is most 
likely to be negative, the rate of outflow of funds could be matched 
with exports from the subsidiary growing at the same rate of increase 
as this outflow.
Unfortunately, international pharmaceutical firms will seldom 
decide to export pharmaceuticals from developing countries in any mean­
ingful volume. Even for Britain, where foreign owned firms account 
for approximately 7J>% of sales to the home market‘d and k9% of British
exports to overseas markets in 1965» net contribution of these
2foreign firms to the British balance of payments was almost nil.
The most important group of drug manufacturers in Britain are 
United States ov/ned. These companies which have set up extensive pro­
duction facilities in the United Kingdom to serve as a basis for the 
supply of exports to Europe and the Commonwealth showed that in 1965 * 
the value of their export sales from Britain was £20.2 million and yet
the net result of their operations on the British balance of payments
3
was a debit of £1 million.
In judging the balance of payments effect of the operation of 
foreign drug manufacturers on its economy, a developing country should 
therefore realise that although foreign currency savings might be 
achieved in terms of the alternative cost of direct imports of finished 
drugs from the same foreign suppliers, the actual outflow of funds from 
these operations is most likely to outbalance the inflow.
A third aspect of foreign investment is its potential for trans­
ferring technology and know-how from advanced to developing countries.
1. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Relationship of the
Pharmaceutical Industry with the National Health Service, 1965-
1967- Op.cit., p.101, Table 5*
2. Ibid., p.Ill, Table 20.
Ibid., p.Ill, Table 20$
(/
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In this context, one can compare the relative merits of different 
forms of investment in the pharmaceutical industry of developing 
countries. We shall discuss this feature of foreign investment in a 
comparison of the cost of the operation to Egypt of foreign subsid­
iaries as opposed to license agreements.
Egypt's experience with several of the possible foreign investment 
configurations in its pharmaceutical industry provides one with useful 
information to judge the costd and benefits of the different choices 
open to a developing country, and allows one to analyse the effect­
iveness of different policy instruments in the context of each of these 
choices.
Because of the imperfections of the market structure in the inter­
national market for pharmaceuticals Egypt has faced a bargaining sit­
uation with every choice available to it: borrowing capital from Russia 
to build a pharmaceutical plant, allowing international pharmaceutical 
firms to set up subsidiaries, joint ventures or licensing arrangements 
with international and local firms. Negotiation has also been possible 
over prices of imported finished and semi-finished pharmaceutical goods, 
a clear reflection of the monopoly position of both the foreign seller 
and the Egyptian government.
There is a high degree of indeterminacy with respect to the out­
come of such bargaining situation since both bargaining parties can 
make great concessions without incurring actual losses. The bargaining 
strength of a developing country has been partly explained in terms of 
its stage of development and the sophistication of its government mach­
inery. Although this functional relationship has theoretical validity, 
it ignores the influence of the economy's political framework which 
has a far more obvious impact on government control and hence bargaining 
strength. It is our purpose to show that government control takes the
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decisive role in the outcome of the bargaining game, whatever stage 
of development the developing economy has attained, once we take the 
monopoly position of the foreign investor as given.
Given the structure of the international pharmaceutical industry 
and its supply conditions, the price paid for capital, machinery, 
know-how, intermediate and finished products by the Egyptian economy 
has been greatly influenced by the existing power and willingness of 
the government to control the importation, pricing, distribution and 
production of pharmaceuticals.
In Egypt, by 1958, after four years of study of the development 
planning for the pharmaceutical industry, a given number of projects 
were assessed as useful investments to form the basis for the growth 
of the pharmaceutical sector. A number of these were designed to 
expand and diversify the production capacity of the existing privately 
owned Egyptian pharmaceutical firms. This first group of projects was 
financed internally by foreign currency loans from the Ministry for 
Industry to the domestic firms involved, and the purchase of equipment 
and technology was made through license agreements, with international 
firms. The second group of projects involved the setting up of a 
number of plants for the manufacture of basic raw material chemicals 
used in secondary manufacturing by the existing pharmaceutical firms. 
Tenders were invited through the commercial sections of the Embassies 
of those countries with advanced pharmaceutical chemicals industries 
for foreign firms to set up and equip such plants and to train Egyptian 
staff in their management. The most competitive schemes came from a 
number of firms based in Europe. Yet capital was not forthcoming from 
those firms or the countries involved and the Egyptian economy lacked 
the foreign currency necessary for the finance of these projects. The 
choice lay in accepting Russian equipment and technology (since Russia
.f
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had offered Egypt a large fixed interest loan which Egypt was to 
allocate independently on different projects) or doing without that 
group of projects in the pharmaceutical industry. The first choice 
was taken.
At the same time, four offers came from international companies 
based in the West (one from a consortium of three large Swiss firms, 
two offers came from the U.S. firms and one from a German firm), to 
set up wholly owned subsidiaries in Egypt. After long negotiations 
on the terms of the agreements, these subsidiaries were accepted on a 
joint venture basis, the parent firms putting up 60% of the capital 
and private Egyptian shareholders buying the remaining -^0%. Three of 
the subsidiaries involved were able to obtain loans from their govern­
ments or from international financial institutions.
A cost benefit appraisal of the operation of subsidiaries or of 
license agreements will usually distinguish between the direct and 
indirect effects on the host economy. In judging Egypt's experience, 
we shall try to assess the direct cost effects both in terms of the 
price paid for capital and the price paid for final goods. The indir­
ect effects consist of the transfer of technology and know-how and 
their cost to the host country.
The setting up of subsidiaries involves the transfer of capital, 
the opportunity cost of which is the interest payable on loans avail­
able on the international capital market. But as we have shown in 
the case of Egypt, such loans from different governments or internat­
ional institutions are normally restricted to the use of particular 
currencies (as in the case of Russia) or particular projects involving 
the cooperation of international firms, (Wyeth for instance was able 
to obtain a dollar loan for the construction of a plant producing in­
fant milks in Egypt from the Development Loan Fund - Washington).
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Although the interest payable on capital for the Russian built 
chemicals plant was only 5%, the technology transferred and the profit­
ability of the project have on balance and in restospect shown them­
selves to be inferior to those obtained from the setting up of sub­
sidiaries, but the economic study of this problem is reserved to 
Chapter IV Section *f, since the project is not directly comparable to 
the forms of investment under consideration here, on account of the 
differing nature of the production process involved in basic raw mater­
ials manufacture.
If we ignore the question of technology for the time being, it is 
possible to make the ad hoc judgment that since profits in the pharma­
ceutical industry are well above average the cost of capital transferred 
by international pharmaceutical firms will be higher than the cost of 
fixed interest loans in the absence of control by the host government 
on these profits. This is confirmed by the figures we have given in 
Table Ik on page 119* for the profits of the three subsidiaries in Egypt.
Turning now to the prices paid for the international pharmaceut­
ical firms' products, we cannot measure it in terms of the prevailing 
price level for drugs. Actual time series or cross section data on the 
price of drugs reflect in the case of Egypt the pricing policy of the 
domestic pharmaceutical firms (including subsidiaries), which take the 
international prices quoted for trade as the upper limit on what they 
are allowed to charge, and the pricing policy of GOPCA which finally 
fixes prices according to the medical necessity of the different pharma­
cological groups of drugs. Prices charged by subsidiaries are therefore 
not directly comparable1 to international prices or to prices of local
1. Prices of subsidiary products are lower than those quoted by the parent 
firms in the 1st year of production in Egypt, since GOPCA negotiates 
prices with the subsidiaries on the basis of international prices 
which must never be exceeded. But once prices have been fixed by 
GOPCA they are not reviewed regularly except in relation to subsid­
iary profitability.
In relation to the prices of local drugs, snabsidiary drugs are gen­
erally higher priced, whenever there are exact local equivalents for
comparison (see Table 25). But again, several subsidiary products 
a r e  patented and do not as yet have local equivalents.
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products!
What we can do is obtain a rough measure of the opportunity- 
cost of drugs produced under license or by subsidiaries in Egypt, 
both in terms of the price of imported drugs and in terms of the cost 
of producing Egyptian equivalent drugs. V/e can then show that local 
production of the international firms' drugs will cost the Egyptian 
economy less than the direct import of these same drugs and more than 
the local production of equivalent drugs (meaning by equivalent drugs, 
drugs of the same chemical or generic composition.).
In 1960-61, the foreign currency requirement for the production 
of a large number of imported drugs was calculated in order to arrive 
at a measure of the foreign currency saving involved in producing this 
same set of imported drugs in Egyptian firms under license from the 
foreign firms concerned.1 It was found that the total CIF cost of im­
ported raw materials plus depreciation of imported equipment necessary 
for a year's production of the volume of drugs imported was just under 
20% of the FOB value of these finished drugs if imported. If we remem­
ber that almost 100% of raw materials used by the pharmaceutical in­
dustry at this time was imported, we can take this 20% ratio as the
2
real proportion of value of raw materials content in imported drugs,
(it is interesting to note that in spite of this measure depending on 
the FOB value of over 100 drugs, it is a stable average still obtained 
as late as 1971 in a separate study).^ If we now calculate the ratio 
of other costs to the raw material cost of manufacturing in the pharma­
ceutical industry in i960 we can relate total costs to the value of
1. An example of this type of study was made available to the author, 
concerning the seventeen drugs produced under license from Schering.
2. Depreciation is also included, if not mentioned, throughout the 
analysis.
3» Study of Foreign Currency Cost of Drugs Produced Under License, pre­
pared by Dr. Abd El Halim Haridy, Director of Statistics Department
of GOPCA, 1971.
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imported drugs. The most reliable figures we can use are those pub­
lished by the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics.
This agency compiled 350 pages of data on the operation of the Egyptian 
pharmaceutical industry in the years I960 and 1964-65*
Foreign subsidiaries were not yet in operation in i960, and the 
figures therefore relate to the national private industry (nationalis­
ation took place two years later). The method used for the measurement 
of value added is that of the United Nations Statistics Bureau. The 
source of the data is the accounts of forty-one concerns comprising the 
pharmaceutical industry at the time.
Table 16. Distribution of Value of Production at Input Cost for all 
Domestic Pharmaceutical Firms, 19i60
Value in £E. % to total
Industrial Costs 52.4%
Raw Materials 1 ,018,281
Packaging Materials 732,744
Other Indust. Costs 225,175
Services bought outside industry 558,200 14.8%
Depreciation 101,200 2.7%
Net Value Added 30.1%
Adjusted Rent 61,100
Adjusted Interest 203,100
Wages and Salaries 632,400
Profit 240,200
Production at Input Cost 3,772,400* 100.0%
Source of figures from The Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and 
Statistics, Op.cit., pp«331“3^5 and p.262.
* The book value for production at ex. factory prices in i960 was
£E.3,821,421. The adjustment (downward) is obtained by subtracting 
differences in the evaluation of inventories.
It must be mentioned that the above figures for costs which we 
shall use for our calculations seem to overestimate true costs, per­
haps because all firms in I960 were privately owned and would therefore 
tend to report higher costs of production to reduce their reported
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profits for tax purposes. This suspicion is confirmed if we compare 
the figures for manufacturing costs other than wages and salaries 
(which are also lower in 1964-65) for i960 with those compiled for 
1964-/65 when the industry was nationalised.^"
Table 17. Comparison of Input Costs in Total Production of Domestic 
Pharmaceutical Sector Between I960 and 1964/65
Private Domestic Nationalised
Sector, i960 Domestic Sec­
tor, 1964/65
Industrial Costs 52.4% 44.1%
Raw Materials 26.9% 26.6%
Packaging Materials 19.0% 17.0%
Other Indust. Costs 6.5% 0.5%
Services bought outside 
industry 14.8% 6.9%
Depreciation • 2.7% 2.7%
Net Value Added 30.1% 46.3%
Adjusted Rent ) 
Adjusted Interest j
7.1% 7.3%
Wages and Salaries 17.0% 12.0%
Profit 6.0% 27.0%
Production at Input Cost 100% 100%
Source of figures from The Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and 
Statistics, Op.cit., pp.331-345» and p.264.
We find that the percentage of raw material cost to production at
2
factor cost is almost identical for the two years, i960 and 1964/65, 
at 26.9% and 26.6% respectively, whereas the percentage of other manu­
facturing costs plus services bought from other industries to production 
at factor cost is significantly lower in 1964/65 at 7.4%, as compared 
to 21.3% in i960. Given the stability of the proportion of direct costs
1. Local pharmaceutical companies were nationalised over the period 
1961-63 as described in Chapter II. The process of amalgamation 
resulted in the eventual structure comprising seven companies.
2. The similarity in the percentage costs of rent, interest and de­
preciation for the two years reflects the fact growth in capital 
employed was matched with equal growth in value of production.
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of raw materials (which are all imported in both years)1 in contrast
to the sharp fall in the proportion of other manufacturing costs, we
feel that this vast change cannot all be explained by increased effi- 
2ciency.
Turning back to Table 16, we have subtracted raw material costs, 
depreciation and profits from production at factor cost to arrive at 
the figure for all costs other than raw materials, its ratio to raw 
material cost is 2.37si. (If the same procedure is applied to the 
figures for 1964/65, the ratio obtained is 1.63:1). This ratio allows 
us to relate the value of all costs other than raw materials and de­
preciation to the value of finished imported drugs at their FOB price 
in I960. Since we have established that the percentage value of raw 
materials and depreciation to the FOB value of imported drugs in that 
year is 20%, and since we have calculated the ratio of other costs to 
cost of raw materials to be 2.37:1 » then the percentage value of other 
costs to the value of finished drugs is,
20% x 2.37 = 47.4%
We can therefore say that production of Egyptian drugs with foreign 
raw materials would have cost according to the i960 cost structure of 
the industry a total of approximately 67.4% of the value of imported 
drugs, arrived at as follows:
Percentage cost of raw materials plus depreciation
to FOB value of imported drugs 20.0%
Percentage cost of all other factors of production
to FOB value of imported drugs 47.4%
Percentage of total costs to FOB value of imported w
drugs
1. See Chapter IV, Section 1.
2. Ex. factory prices of domestic products at which total production 
is valued remained very stable over the period, having been fixed 
at their I960 level and frozen until the present, with the except­
ion of some vital drugs which were gradually reduced in price.
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The saving involved in national production is therefore 33/° of 
the value of foreign drugs in I960, and becomes even more substantial 
if we measure it using the more recent cost structure of 1964/65*
The calculated saving (asing the ratio 1.63:1* which imples a percent­
age cost of 52.6%) would be estimated at 47.4% in 1964/65-
The saving involved in domestic production by foreign firms (sub­
sidiaries or license agreements) is also positive but lower than that 
achieved by local firms producing independently, because of the add­
itional costs due to royalty payments and overpriced raw materials.
This can be observed from a comparison of the cost structure between 
foreign subsidiaries and nationalised domestic firms.1
This kind of comparison is only valid if it can be shown that 
the products of subsidiaries and of local firms in Egypt are similar.
We have therefore scrutinized the complete list of drugs manufactured 
by the subsidiaries in Egypt for the year when the comparison is made, 
1964/65- Each drug was studied in terms of the quantity and value of 
its output, the raw materials used, and in relation to local equivalents. 
The results are summarised in Table 24 at the end of this section- 
According to our study the majority of subsidiary products have 
identical Egyptian equivalents. This is because the products GOPCA 
approved for production at the subsidiaries date since 1958, when the 
joint venture agreements were signed between the Ministry for Industry 
and the foreign parent companies. By 1964-65, hardly any new products 
had been added to the approved list, while local companies had obtained 
the raw materials and know-how (mainly through patented licenses from
1. To measure the saving involved in production by subsidiaries using 
the same 20% basis would be incorrect in view of the fact that we 
do not have the actual figure for the value of imported raw mater­
ials used in production of these subsidiaries- However, if we assume 
that costs of imported raw materials bear the same ratio of 20% to 
value of imported drugs, the calculated saving is 46.9%, after 
adjusting for the new cost structure.
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foreign firms) to manufacture their own competing products of equiva­
lent generic composition to those of the subsidiaries.
Table 18. Comparison of Input Costs in Total Value of Production Be­
tween Foreign Sector and Nationalised Sector in Egyptian Pharma­
ceutical Industry, 1964/65
Foreign Sector Nationalised
(subsidiaries) Sector
Industrial Costs 56.1% 44.1%
Haw Materials 35.0% 26 • 6%
Packaging Materials 11.0% 17.0%
Other Indust. Costs 10.1% 0.5%
Services (bought outside 
industry)
10.4% 6.9%
Depreciation 3.0% 2.7%
Net Value Added 30.5% 46.3%
Adjusted Rent ) 5.5% 7-3%
Adjusted Interest ;
Wages and Salaries 10.0% 12.0%
Profit 15.0% 27.0%
Production at Input Cost 100.0% 100.0%
Source of figures from the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and 
Statistics, Op.cit., pp.331~345» and pp.262-264.
Although products of subsidiaries are generally higher priced than
their nearest local equivalents,'1' so that the value of their production
2
at factor cost represents a relatively smaller volume of output, the 
percentage cost of raw materials to this value of production is higher 
for the subsidiaries at 35/® as compared to 26.6% for the local firms, 
the difference being 8.4%.
This significantly higher percentage cost of raw materials would 
not necessarily imply overpriced imports of raw materials, if it could 
be shown that the reason lay in the fact that subsidiaries undertake a 
smaller amount of manufacturing inside Egypt than their local competit­
ors. But such an explanation would also require that the percentage
1. See Appendix pl57 1 Table 25 , for a comparison of the prices of 
drugs produced by subsidiaries with their Egyptian equivalents.
2. Table 24 p.155 shows that for almost every type of product considered, 
the percentage of total production accounted for by subsidiaries
in terms of quantity is much smaller than in terms of value.
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of other costs to the value of production be smaller for the subsid­
iaries when compared to the local industry's percentage. The figures 
in Table l8 show that this is not the case, since manufacturing costs 
plus services bought from other industries account for a higher per­
centage of production in the subsidiaries at 66.5% as opposed to 51% 
in the local sector, a difference of 15«5%« The payment of royalties 
(which is included in Services bought outside Industry) can only account 
for 5% of this difference, 5% being the maximum percentage allowed by 
the government as mentioned previously.
We have therefore shown that prices of imported raw materials used 
by subsidiaries are relatively higher than those used by local firms, 
a fact which is not surprising since most of the drugs produced by 
subsidiaries are patented. The magnitude of raw materials overpricing 
becomes obvious to the authorities over time, when competing raw mater­
ial chemicals become available on the international market and their 
prices are compared with the prices charged by parent companies to 
their subsidiaries.1 It is also suggested by the figures in Table 18 
that subsidiaries perform a more limited amount of manufacturing than 
local firms (although this fact cannot explain the higher cost of im­
ported raw materials as shown above). Figures for adjusted rent and 
adjusted interest, and for wages and salaries, show that capital employ­
ed and labour employed by the subsidiaries are both relatively smaller 
than in the local firms.
The actual difference in size of the labour force employed between 
the subsidiaries and the local firms is much larger than Table l8 
suggests, for a number of reasons:
1. One example was described on p. 116 ; more evidence on the extent
of overpricing is given in a report by GOPCA, which is confidential.
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—  Wage and salary payments are significantly higher per worker and 
per employee at the subsidiaries, as is shown in Table 19* 
Subsidiaries also employ a much higher proportion of professional 
and highly skilled labour to total labour employed (see Table 19). 
Thirdly, the number of persons employed in advertising and dis­
tribution (clearly non-manufacturing operations) are relatively 
higher for subsidiaries. This was found in Table 15, p.120, which 
showed that the advertising and distribution budgets of subsidiaries 
were relatively larger than those of Egyptian firms.
Adjusted interest is evaluated by the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilisation and Statistics at 4% of the total finance employed by 
companies (total liabilities, both fixed and current). The figures for 
percentage cost of adjusted interest plus adjusted rent to production 
at Input cost therefore reflect the fact that subsidiaries employ less 
capital in relation to their output than national companies. The ratio 
of production at Input cost to total funds employed (total liabilities) 
is higher for the subsidiaries at 0.89 as compared to 0.80 for the 
Egyptian companies. The ratio of production at Input cost to capital 
employed (fixed liabilities plus long-term loans) is also significantly 
higher for the subsidiaries at 2.1 when compared to the ratio 1.1 for 
national firms.
Average productivity of labour (production at Input cost divided
by labour employed) is again markedly higher for the subsidiaries at
£E. 8,369 as compared to £E. 2,694 for local firms.1 If we measure
capital to labour ratios, we find as expected that national companies
use far more labour intensive production methods. The ratio of total
funds employed to labour employed is £E. 9,422 for the subsidiaries as
2
opposed to £E* 3i3°3 for the local firms.
1. Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, Op.cit. p.353*
2* Ibid., p.353.
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To summarise the results of our study on the comparative cost 
structure between the foreign and domestic sectors operating in the 
Egyptian pharmaceutical industry, it is evident that the difference 
in the breakdown of production at factor cost between the two sectors 
is significant. We have shown that subsidiaries engage in relatively 
fewer manufacturing operations, employing comparatively less capital 
and a smaller labour force. But these more limited production activi­
ties have not resulted in smaller costs of operations. We have thus 
found that in addition to higher priced raw materials and other manu­
facturing costs, subsidiaries also spend relatively more on royalty 
and other service charges (which are probably accounted for by advert­
ising and promotion costs).
The idea that possibly greater efficiency in foreign companies' 
production methods might counterbalance other high costs is totally 
dispelled by looking at the figures for value added. From Table l8 
one notes that the proportion of net value added to production at fac­
tor cost is 30.5% for the three foreign subsidiaries as compared to 
46.3% for the seven nationalised pharmaceutical firms. Another measure 
of the contribution to national product of the two different sectors 
is the percentage of net value added to total funds employed in each; 
this percentage is found to be 27% for the foreign companies as opposed 
to 36.8% for Egyptian firms.1
The above conclusions bear some similarity to the results reached
by the Sainsbury Committee in its comparative study of the operation of
2
national and foreign owned pharmaceutical firms in Britain in 1965*
The cost structure of the Swiss companies in particular implied that 
they were importing raw materials from their parent companies at greatly
1. Ibid. , p.340.
2. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Relationship of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry with the National Health Service, 1965-67* 
Op.cit. , the Financial Appendix, pp.99-112.
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inflated prices and performing only minor processing and packaging
operations inside Britain. The percentage cost of raw materials to
total sales was 57% lor Swiss firms as compared to a figure of 14% for
British firms, and the percentage of direct costs of wages and salaries
to sales was 0.67% for Swiss firms as compared to about J>% for the
British firms.1 In its comment on the figures, the Committee pointed
out that: "The high percentage of material costs and the low percentage
of direct salaries and wages of the companies owned in Switzerland
reflect the relatively small amount of manufacturing undertaken by
these companies in the United Kingdom. Ihe prices paid to affiliated
2
companies are not at arm's length."
If we consider the fact that many of the drugs produced by sub­
sidiaries or under license (in theory, all of their drugs produced in 
Egypt) cannot be produced by the host country independently of the 
foreign firms' assistance, then we are not in a position to compare 
social costs without analysing the transfer of technology effected by 
such production in the host country.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the Egyptian pharmaceutical in­
dustry has made substantial gains in learning from the operation of 
international pharmaceutical firms in its midst, a proposition all 
those engaged in the Egyptian industry will admit, even the most active 
critics of foreign manufacturers. The clearest proof of this is that 
although GOPCA is placing increasing restrictions over the number of 
new license agreements or licensed products allowed (because of their 
drain of foreign currency which is much higher than that attributed 
to Egyptian products),"' Egyptian pharmaceutical firms are still seeking
1. Ibid., The percentages are calculated using figures in Table 8, 
p.103, and Tattle 16, p.108.
2. Ibid., p.103.
3. Gee Study of Foreign Currency Cost of Drugs Produced under License, 
prepared by Dr. Abd El Halim Haridy, Op.cit.
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the assistance of international firms wherever there are problems in 
production processes.
We feel, however, that the transfer of technology and know-how 
is much more direct and immediate in the case of license agreements 
than with the operation of subsidiaries. The following are some illus­
trations of the way in which Egyptian firms benefit from license agree­
ments :
At the simplest level, the Director of Planning at Alexandria 
Company described how his firm had been producing a drug which consisted 
of a combination of active ingredients, but the resulting tablet in­
variably turned yellow in time. When this local firm started the pro­
duction of a licensor's branded drug containing some of the same active 
ingredients, it was revealed that the problem could be overcome by com­
bining the compounds in a different sequence in the processing stage. 
Alexandria Co. is now using the production method learned from the 
licensor on this particular drug with success.1
At a more complex level, another local firm - the Nile Company - 
is producing all the market's requirements of parenteral solutions, 
blood anticoagulants and blood plasma under license from Don Baxter, 
an American company. The preparation of these solutions involves ad­
vanced technical know+how and the most exacting standards of hygiene 
and quality control. When the license agreement is terminated the 
licensee will have acquired all the necessary experience and know-how 
to carry on a process which it has been using inside the walls of its 
own factory for a reasonable number of years (unlike the standard length 
of license agreements of five years for every individual product, the
1. Interview with Dr. Hassan Abbass, Director of Planning, Alexandria 
Company, May, 1972.
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duration of this agreement between Nile and Baxter is for twenty years, 
but the payment of royalties is limited to 5% of ex-factory sales 
with no additional payments towards advertising.^).
Another way in which local firms can benefit from an international 
firm's experience and which may be valuable in the first years of their 
life is related to marketing skills. One Egyptian firm arranged with 
an international pharmaceutical firm to have all its advertising and 
marketing methods organised by a team of experts from the parent com­
pany which also licensed the production of many of its specialities.
In return, the local firm paid 5% royalty on all its sales, whether 
of licensed or of the local firm's specialities. Eventually, the cost 
of this arrangement became very high, as the firm's sales soared, but 
the managerial skills had been acquired by the Egyptian staff. The 
agreement was conveniently terminated before its legal duration, on 
the pretext that political relations between Egypt and the country of 
incorporation of the parent firm in question had been severed.
One of the most valuable gains of local firms from license agree­
ments is the confidence these agreements generate among the consuming 
public. It becomes evident to both doctor and patient that the large 
international firms consider local Egyptian companies reliable enough 
to allow them to produce under their own highly reputable brand names. 
But when the agreement is terminated and the local firm is forced to 
stop using the foreign brand name and select its own new brand name 
for the same generic product, this leads to frustration, especially 
among patients who feel that they are being sold a different drug 
from that which is prescribed for them. This is the reason why local 
firms choose brand names that are as close as possible to the original 
foreign brand name.
1. Terms of the agreement between Nile and Don Baxter for production 
under license of thirteen products the manufacture of which began 
in 1965*
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This problem makes a very strong case for the outright use of gen­
eric or pharmacopeal names in Egypt, for all domestically produced 
drugs, whether licensed or not. In 1962, the Director General at GOPCA 
presented a memorandum in which he recommended that GOPCA should insist 
that any new products licensed for manufacture in local companies should 
be marketed under local brand names or the generic names of the drugs in 
question.'1' He further proposed that, the name of the licensor should 
appear together with the local brand name and licensee for a maximum 
period of six months after which the licensor's name should be come less 
prominent on the packaged product, and disappear altogether after one 
year. But this recommendation was not carried through because foreign 
firms opposed it and GOPCA did not feel that the measure was suffic­
iently urgent and there were other more imperative questions to be 
negotiated with the foreign firms.
In contrast to the complex interaction which license agreements 
create between licensor and licensee and the resulting benefits which 
accrue to local firms, the foreign subsidiary stands aloof from the 
host economy, an island of advanced technology, ‘^here is a consensus 
of opinion among leading pharmacologists and doctors in Egypt that con­
trary to the earlier belief that subsidiaries would be the most efficient 
source of learning for a new generation of graduates who would soon be 
absorbed into the local pharmaceutical sector, these subsidiaries have
not transferred any of the acquired skills or production know-how to
2the rest of the industry. This criticism has also been voiced by the
1. Dr. Aziz A1 Bindary, Memorandum for the Suggested Modification of 
Current Policies on the Production of Drugs under License, GOPCA, 
Cairo, 2k October 1962.
2. This opinion is widespread among research staff in various depart­
ments in the industry and at Cairo University, and is also recorded 
in the minutes of the meeting of the Technical Committee, GOPCA, 2k 
Oct. 1962, when the above memorandum was discussed by a large panel 
of physicians and pharmacologists.
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Chairman of GOPCA's Board of Directors in a report assessing the 
role of foreign subsidiaries in the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry.1 
Dr. Abdou Sallam states that experience has proved it impossible for 
local firms to obtain any technical cooperation in production from 
the subsidiaries, since these consider themselves in competition with 
the Egyptian sector and refuse to divulge any of their patented know­
how. It seems therefore that the sole gain to the Egyptian economy 
from the operation of subsidiaries and in terms of technology trans­
fer, has been the training of staff and skilled workers who will 
eventually and if persuaded to, become employed in more directly 
useful occupations from the point of view of the Egyptian economy.
So far, the setting up of subsidiaries in Egypt has in fact drained 
it to a certain extent of its existing skilled pharmaceutical per­
sonnel. With the incentive of much higher pay than in similar occu­
pations in Egyptian firms, subsidiaries are able to attract and 
maintain their needs of chemists, pharmacologists, technicians and 
skilled workers. The following Table gives a comparison of labour 
employed and wages and salaries between the nationalised sector and 
the foreign sector in 196^/65*
At first glance, Table 19 seems to indicate that the entire pattern 
of employment differs significantly between the subsidiaries and the 
local firms, with the subsidiaries employing a far greater proportion 
of highly skilled and semi-skilled personnel, and also far less labour. 
But on closer analysis, it can be shown that the large difference in 
the comparative distribution of skills between subsidiaries and loca} 
firms is entirely due to the differences in the employment of one group 
only, unskilled labour.
1. Confidential Report, Op.cit., 1971
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Table 19. Composition of Skills in Total Labour Employed by Egyptian
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1964/65
Skill Nationalised Sector 
(7 Companies)
Foreign Sector 
(3 subsidiaries)
No. of % to 
employees total
No. of 
employees
% to 
total
Professional
Medicine 44 13
Pharmacology 217 33
Chemistry 52 11
Commerce 145 28
Other 56 23
Total 514 7% 108 18%
Intermediate
Industrial 27 1
Commercial 405 33
Other 256 132
Total 688 10% 166 27%
Other Skills
Technical 69 2
Non-technical 642 126
Total 711 10% 128 22%
Unskilled 5323 73% 202 33%
Total Employed 7236 100% 604 100%
Av. Monthly Salary £E. 31.071 £E. 65.744
Av. Daily Wage (un­
skilled labour)* £E. 0.465 £E. 0.641
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, Op.
cit., pp.528-532.
* Actual wage per hour is £E..057 for nationalised sector and £E.0.093 
for foreign sector.
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This can be clearly demonstrated by dividing the number of em­
ployees in every individual group of skills, for the foreign sector 
and for the local sector, by the value of production of each sector.
Table 20. Ratios of Employment to Production in Public and Private 
Sectors of the Egyptian Phamaceutical Industry 196^/65
Skill Group to Production 
(ex factory Prices)
Nationalised 
Sector (7 
companies)
Foreign Sector 
(3 subsidiar­
ies)
Ratio of Total Professional 
skills to Production 33 : 1 3^ : 1
Ratio of Total Intermediate 
skills to Production 43 : 1 52 : 1
Ratio of Total Other Skills 
to Production Jf6 : 1 *f0 : 1
Ratio of Total Unskilled 
Labour to Production 3^1 : 1 61 : 1
Source: Ratio calculated from figures from Central Agency for Public
Mobilisation and Statistics, Op.cit. pp.328-332, and p.15*
Table 20 clearly shows that comparative employment of the first 
three groups of skills does not differ significantly between subsid­
iaries and local firms, especially the group of professional skills 
which thows almost identical ratios for both the nationalised and the 
foreign sectors. But a comparison of the ratios for unskilled labour 
employed between the two sectors shows a considerable difference which 
is even more striking than Table 19 suggests. For every pound's worth 
of production, the local companies employ 3^1 workers, which is more 
than five times the ratio employed by the subsidiaries.
The great disparity in the ratio of labour to production between 
local companies and subsidiaries cannot all be accounted for by differ­
ences in methods of production and reflects to a very large extent the 
policy of GOPCA which seeks to employ the largest possible number of 
workers in nationalised companies. This is clearly expressed by the 
Head of the Production Office of GOPCA when he affirms that one of the
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chief targets of GOPCA is to offer employment to the largest possible 
number of workers.1 He also asserts that through GOPCA's efforts, 
the companies in the public pharmaceutical sector have raised the 
total employment from 3»300 workers in 1960/61 to 8,000 in 1963/64 
and that it is hoped that the figure would reach 10,000 by the end 
of the first five year plan and 22,000 by the end of the second five 
year plan. As a result of this policy, companies are under great 
pressure to increase their labour force at a much faster rate than 
required by increased production, an opinion shared by managers in 
most local companies.^
In view of the above considerations, and if one accepts that a 
relatively high level of employment is a benefit in itself, it would 
then seem that the local companies have achieved even better results 
than was judged by our comparison of production and costs between local 
firms and subsidiaries in the analysis of pages 134-138 • Local com­
panies have thus been able to employ relatively far greater numbers of 
workers than the subsidiaries, and in spite of higher total wage pay­
ments than necessitated by the production process, the local companies 
were successful in absorbing the increased costs and still maintained 
higher levels of efficiency (value added to production) and profitabil­
ity than the subsidiaries.
1. Dr. Riad Zein El Din, "The Domestic Production of Drugs", paper
presented to the Second Conference on Phamaceuticals, The Associa­
tion of Pharmacists, Dar El Hekma, Cairo, 12 July 1964.
2. Interviews with Dr. Kamal Motawaa, Chairman of Memphis Company,
and Dr. Mohamad A1 Shahat, Chairman of Arab Drug Company, and
representatives of Misr and Alexandria companies, Cairo, 1972.
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Appendix to Chapter III 
Main Clauses in Standard Licence Agreement Document 
Article 1
Licensors grants to Licensee the right to manufacture in Egypt 
their Products mentioned in Appendix I attached hereto and such other 
pharmaceutical Products as may be agreed from time to time for a 
period of five years commencing on the date which the first Product is 
launched on the market. The manufacturing includes compounding, pro­
cessing, subdividing and packaging of the Products.
Article 2
a) Licensee agrees to the manufacture and marketing of the Products 
under Licensor trade marks or trade names or under Licensee trade 
names or under pharmacopeal names at the option of the Licensor.
b) Licensor agrees that the Products shall be packed and marketed 
by Licensee according to the laws of Egypt.
c) Licensor undertakes to pay all costs and charges for maintaining 
the registration in Egypt of its trade marks during the term of this 
agreement.
Article 3
a) Licensor agrees to grant Licensee the "know-how" to manufacture 
the following Raw Materials as soon as Licensee advises Licensor of 
his readiness to manufacture them:....
b) Licensor does not object to the manufacture of bulk or finished 
product with any local manufacturer the Egyptian authorities would 
indicate, pending the approval of the local manufacturers for those 
products Licensor has already committed.
c) Licensor shall prohibit his subsidiaries, agents and licensees 
from selling preparations covered by this agreement in Egypt.
Article 4
Licensor grants to Licensee the right to export or re-export the 
Products covered by this agreement to territories as specified in 
Appendix II.
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Article 3
a) Immediately after this agreement has been signed and approved 
by the Egyptian authorities, Licensor will forward to Licensee the 
"know-how" of the agreement Products and Raw Materials agreed upon.
[b, c),... g), all give details on the exchange of representatives 
for the purpose of the Licensee acquiring the know-how.]
Article 6
Licensor and L.censee undertake not to disclose to any third 
party any information, except where information is by law required by 
Government authorities, concerning the relations between Licensor 
and Licensee production control and sales methods, and technical and 
clinical data exchanged or evolved by virtue of this agreement.
Further, Licensee will ensure that employees having access to the 
afore mentioned information undertake to preserve the secrecy of the 
information.
Article 7
Licensor shall receive annually, within two months of the pub­
lishing of Licensee's annual balance sheet, a net royalty amounting 
to 3% (five percent) calculated on Licensor's net wholesale price of 
the Agreement Products and on the Agreement Raw Materials. Remittance 
of royalty shall be effected in Egyptian, in Licensor's, or in any 
convertible currency.
Royalties shall be paid against complete "know-how" being complete 
descriptions of the methods of manufacture and control of the Products, 
active ingredients and Raw Materials agreed upon as well as all tech­
niques in general in order to ensure a perfect production.
Article 8
As regards purchase of raw materials, a governmental organisation 
is presently handling all imports of pharmaceutical specialities, raw 
materials as well as medical requisites in Egypt. The said organisation
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is setting tenders for raw materials, and importing at lowest possible 
prices from the world reputed suppliers. Licensee thus, is not allowed 
to import pharmaceutical specialities, raw materials or even medical 
requisites for his own account except through said organisation. Bulk 
raw materials will preferably be purchased from Licensor at world com­
petitive prices. If purchased from other manufacturers Licensor will 
be ready to examine and analyse samples of purchased materials to est­
ablish their conformity with international standards or to standards 
to be decided by both parties, 
rArticle 9
(This agreement or any future amendments are subject bo Egyptian 
legislation.).
Article 10.
a) The term of this agreement shall extend five years from the date 
at which the first Product is launched on the market unless sooner 
terminated and will thereafter be automatically prolonged from year to 
year, unless one of the parties cancels the agreement by a registered 
letter despatched not later than six months preceding the expiration 
of the agreement.
[b) and c) reserve the right to either party to terminate the agreement.]
d) Licensee agrees that except with the prior consent in writing of 
Licensor, he will not apply trade marks or trade names covered by this 
agreement to any products manufactured or marketed by him after the 
termination of same.
Author's notes and clarifications:
With reference to twelve of the actual license agreements which 
were contracted in the period 1960-68, it is possible to elucidate 
the meaning and relevance of the above conditions to the contracting 
parties.
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Article 1 and Article 10 Section a), together specify that 
while the term of the agreement is for five years for any specific 
product, the general agreement between the two parties can be prolonged 
by the addition of new products to the list of those products initially 
agreed upon. This means that the licensee pays royalty and other ser­
vice charges (namely advertising contributions which are negotiated 
in a separate marketing agreement appended to the basic licence agree­
ment shown above) for a maximum period of five years on any single 
product. After the expiry of five years from the date when the pro­
duct was first marketed, the licensee can continue to manufacture this 
product, provided he does not use the licensor's brand name any longer 
(Article 10, Section d).
Article 2 gives the licensor the option to choose the name under 
which licensed products are marketed. In the twelve contracts studied, 
the licensor's brand name was chosen.
Section b) of Article 2, refers to the marketing laws of Egypt 
whereby all products are sold via GOPCA's commercial company which acts 
as the sole distributor of drugs to chemists and other retail outlets. 
Advertising and promotion however, are carried out by the publicity 
offices of the licensor which are run independently by his represent­
atives and normally financed by a 10% 'advertising contribution' paid 
by licensee.
Registration fees are £E*5 per product in Egypt, an insignificant 
amount when compared to similar charges in most advanced countries.
Article 3 dictates that each license agreement must include the 
provision for the transfer of basic manufacturing know-how of at least 
one raw material agreed upon in negotiations. The value to Egyptian 
firms of the inclusion of this clause is discussed in Chapter IV.
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Article which lists the territories to which licensed products 
can be exported is a restrictive clause. In the twelve contracts 
studied, the only countries to which exports are allowed are Yemen,
One exception was a contract that allowed the export or re-export of 
licensed products to "Arab and African countries with which Egypt has 
concluded treaties for preferential treatment of customs duties and 
in which Licensor has no agent or distributing organisation."
The definition of "net wholesale price" in Article 7 is gross 
ex-factory price less all normal discounts and price reductions granted 
to customers. All relevant taxes and transfer costs are paid by 
licensee.
The organisation referred to in Article 8 which handles all 
imports is*the General Organisation for Phamraceuticals, pharmaceutical 
chemicals and medical Appliances, GOPCA.
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Table 22. Value of Production of Licensed Products 1966-1970 
Value in £E. (ex-factory prices)
Licensee Licensor 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70
Nile Baxter 297,618 299,399 372,731 450,675
Evans 19,855 30,021 35,773 25,800
Clin Byla - - 10,131 31,779
Organon 31,449 88,954 203,691 293,691
Richter - 28,407 88,943 130,17*
Biochemie - - 2,162 144,186
Delalande 35,391 47,683 27,136 65,157
CID Schering 648,936 979,365 990,981 965,389
B.D.H. 1,225 9,104 12,746 23,539
Carlo Erba 195,652 205,469 270,919 308,080
Berna 19,579 22,882 9.610 29,772
Wyeth 33,875 20,468 33,576 34.850
Aaron - - 37,932 75,047
Misr Delft* 1,448,761 1,155,823 - 27,650
Lepetit 11,638 11,197 12,849 475,763
Memphis Roussel 12,090 12,626 9,352 13,835
Kahira Merck Sharp 7,050 201,634 345,921 615,003
Smith Kline 
8c French - 737 160,792 280,989
Arab Medimpex 32,024 26,788 63,007 344,855
Alexand
ria Bayer 293,307 265,224 158,160 367,436
Horamel 9,798 1,441 8,149 54,620
Mowath 8c Moore
179,412 323,448 60,745 175,490
Total Value of Licen­
sed Production 3,278,690 3,740,670 2,904,765 4,933,777
Source: Department of Statistics of GOPCA.
* The significant decline in the figure for total value of production 
for 1968/69 is due to the agreement between Misr and Delft (a Dutch 
firm) on the production of 18 licensed drugs having been terminated 
in that year. Misr continued the production of these drugs under 
its own and newly chosen brand names. In 1969/70, Delft licensed 
the production of another drug which accounts for the figure shown 
above.
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Table 25- Total Foreign 
plus CIF Value of
Currency Cost of Licensed Products (Royalties 
Raw Mterials), 1966-70. Values in £E.
Licensor 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70
Baxter 198,002 20,600 159,072 196,880
Evans 8,660 15,427 10,083 11,262
Clin Byla - - 5,204 13,77$
Organon 13,570 42,664 81,675 128,505
Richter - 18,497 43,692 57,465
Biochemie - - 925 56,232
Delalande 13,416 17,973 10,024 26,353
Schering 297,516 466,924 483,403 506,867
B.D.H. 572 4,083 6,889 8,879
Carlo Erba 86,689 95,013 111,499 135,555
Berna 8,987 13,015 11,408 13,074
Wyeth 11,517 6,958 13,904 11,849
Aaron - - 15,409 25,516
Delft 506,769 402,100 3,980 12,166
Lepetit 4,524 4,805 11,347 197,955
Roussel 4,786 4,864 889 8,050
Merck Sharp 3,009 79,384 176,477 298,699
Smith Kline & 
French - 6,570 69,318 120,349
Medimpex 13,269 14,883 25,490 120,208
Bayer 117,413 122,977 94,652 176,014
Hommel 3,796 2,087 9.289 24,533
Mowath & 
Moore 69,558 138,369 37,136 74,516
b 1,362,055 1,477,192 1,381,765 2,224,702
Nile
CID
Misr
Memphis 
Kahira
Arab
Alexand­
ria
Total Cost
Source: Department of Statistics of GOPCA
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Table 24. Production of Drugs by Subsidiaries in Relation to Total 
Domestic Production, in Quantity and in Value, 1964/65
Generic Name* Unit Dosage
Form
Quantity % to Total 
Dorn. Prod.
Value 
£E 1000
% to Total 
Dom. Prod.
Tetracyclin + 
Oleandomycin, 
"Sigmamycin" 1000 cap.s 1,834 100% 162 100%
11 litre syrup 11,924 100% 145 100%
11 1000 vial 9.5 100% 1.7 100%
Oxytetracyclin, 
"Perramycin" 
lOOmg litre syrup 10,328 98.4% 133 99.1%
" 250mg 1000 ampoule i4o 100% 57 100%
" 250mg 1000 cap.s 693 33% 60 50%
Penicillin 
400,000 U 1000 vial 318 2% 20 6%
Penicillin 
+ Streptomy­
cin 1000 vial 1,073 5% 106 7%
Tetragryclin,
lOOmg litre syrup 4 1.6% .06 0.8%
Other Com­
binations kg oint. 2,357 100% 44 100%
11 1000 supp. 82 45% 5 39%
TOTAL ANTIBIOTIC GROUP 884 20.2%
TOTAL VITAMINS (no patented raw materials) 330 41.9%
TOTAL ANTIPYRETIC (No patented raw materials but
see Dipyrone below) 525 33%
Mixed Enzymes 1000 tablet 27,452 90% 144 94%
TOTAL DIGESTIVE GROUP (lipotropics, anzymes and 
proteins 152 13.6%
TOTAL BRONCHO-PULMONARY GROUP 18 1.6%
Iodochlorhydrox 
yquinoline and 
combinations of 
same + sulphas, 
"Enterovioform" 
and "Nimarol"
1000
litre
tablet
syrup
22,149 
17,209
41%
15%
221
49
62%
24%
TOTAL ANTIDYSENTERIC GROUP 270 36%
Sulphisomid- 
ine,
1000 tablet 1,372 100% 11 100% *
"Elkosin11 litre syrup 5,788 100% 11 100%
TOTAL SULPHAS GROUP 26 3.7%
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Generic Name* Unit Dosage Quantity % to Total Value % to Total
Form Dorn. Prod. £E 1000 Dom. Prod.
Supra-renal 
Gland Hormones
5 mg 1000 tablet 5,159 76% 203 92%
5 mg kg oint. 50 100% 4 100%
10 mg 1000 ampoule^ 9 16.8% 2 62%
Testicular
Hormones
50 mg 1000 ampoule 12 42% 4 ky/o
100 mg 1000 ampoule 11 30% 5 37%
500 mg 1000 ampoule 10 39% 8 41%
Mixed Hormones 1000 ampoule 15 100% __6 100%
TOTAL HORMONE GROUP 236 4i%
TOTAL ANTISPASMODIC GROUP 144 26.7%
TOTAL OPTHALMIC GROUP 52 lk.7%
Tolbutamide
"Rastinon" 1000 tablet 24 ,932
v 0iR0000 212 93%
TOTAL ORAL ANTIDIABETIC 232 93%
TOTAL DERMATOLOGICAL GROUP 32 13%
TOTAL NEURO-SEDATIVES HYPNOTICS AND TRANQUILIZERS 87 35%
TOTAL ANALEPTICS AND STIMULANTS 70 65%
TOTAL ANTIHISTAMINICS GROUP 22 26%
TOTAL CARDIACS AND VASCULARETICS AND HYPOTENSIVES 26 35%
Sennoside (A & B) 
"Pursennide"
CATHARTICS 7 100%
Acetyl Digitoxin 
0.2 mg. "Acylanid"
1000 tablet 6?4 100% 5 100%
0.5 mg. " 1000 litre 733 100% i l 100%
TOTAL CARDIAC GLYCOSIDES 18 100%
TOTAL OTO-RHINO-LARYNGETICS GROUP 58 25%
OTHER GROUPS (Orodentals and Urologies) 16
TOTAL OF ALL GROUPS 3,198 17.04%
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, Op.cit.
pp.22-120 and pp.266-315* Also the Index of Medical Special­
ities, published by GOPCA, 1969*
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The Column headed Generic Name gives detail of both the generic 
(official) name of the drug as well as the brand name under which the 
preparation is sold (in inverted commas). For those drugs for which 
the exact quantities of production could not be ascertained, only the 
group totals (which might include several preparations) are given under 
this heading, together with the value of production of the total group.
a - The value of patented brands of Dipyrone imported as raw material 
chemicals for the production of the subsidiaries in 196^/65 are:
£E 1^6,000 of "Novalgin11, the brand name used by Hoechst-Orient 
for Dipyrone, £E 7^»000 of "Baralgin" (a combination of Dipyrone 
plus two other active ingredients), and £E 1,000 of "Novalgin- 
Quinine".
b - The figures for production ampoules is for 1965/66 because these 
for 196^/65 could not be ascertained.
Table 25• Price Comparison of Subsidiary and 
Generic Compositions -
Local
Retail
Drugs for Identical 
prices in £E
Dosage
Form
Subsidiary Product 
Name Price
Local Equivalent 
Name Price
Generic Name
16 caps. 
250 mg.
Terramycin 1.69 Oxytetrin 0.70 Oxytetracyclin 
HCL
caps. 
250 mg.
Sigmamycin 1.79 Sigmacid l.*fO Tetracyclin Hcl 
+ Oleandomycin
50 tab. 
25 mg.
Niamid 0.^2 Nialamide
30 caps. Viterra 0.35 Vi.ci.Ferrol 0.26 Vitamins $ Min­
erals
20 tabs. 
250 mg.
Doriden 0.17 Dormine 0.16 Glutethimide
20 tab. Elkosin 0.22
Gantrinil
Renosulfan
0.30
Sulphisomidine
Sulphisoxazole
10 tab. Optalidon 0.08 Calmidon
Kahira
Amidopyrine + 
Barbituric Acid 
+ Caffeine
30 tab. fiantozyme 0.28 Zymogen 0.25 Protease + Lipase 
+ Amylase + Pepsin 
+ Cellulose
20 tab. 
10 mg.
Autrenyl
Duplex
0.28 Curenil 2 mg . 0.20 Oxyphenonium
Bromide
15 ml. Coramine 0.28 Coracid 0.10 Nikethamide 25%
15 ml. Coramine
Ephedrine
0.29 Cardiamine
Ephedrine
0.10 Nikethamide 250 mg 
+ Ephedrine HCL
500 tab. Enterovioforme 5*00 Paramibe 2.00 Iodochlorhyd-
Roxyquinoline
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Dosage Subsidiary Product Local Equivalent Generic Name
Form Name Price Name Price
20 tab. Asmac 0.26 Asmacid 0.15 (Pulmonic)
20 tab• Antistine 0.25 Histazine 0.20 Antazoline HCL
0.1 ml.
50 tab.
Serpasil 0.19 Ravoline 0.15 Reserpine
20 tab.
500 mg.
Novalgin 0.18 Novacid O.lk Dipyrone
Tab, 5mg. Hostacortin 
(10 tab)
0.31 Oricortone 
(20 tab)
0.28 Prednisone
20 tab. 
500 mg.
Rastinon 0.25 Diabetol 0.20 Tolbutamide
Source: Department of Statistics of GOPCA and Index of Medical Spec­
ialities (published by GOPCA).
Pfizer produces 11 brand names in 21 dosage forms.
Swiss Pharma produces 58 brand names in 53 dosage forms.
Hoechst Orient produces 20 brand names in 38 dosage forms.
Note: The sale of subsidiary drugs listed in Table 25 accounts for
more than 75% of total subsidiary sales (including for each 
drug its various dosage forms).
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Chapter IV.
APPRAISAL OF DOMESTIC PERFORMANCE UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL
In Chapter II we have reviewed the changes in the economic frame­
work in which domestic production has developed in the period 1952 to 
1963* an<* have also given an account of the role and responsibilities 
which GOPCA has finally assumed as the supreme advisory body controlling 
imports, production and distribution of pharmaceuticals. We are now 
in a position to analyse the performance of the public pharmaceutical 
sector in the twelve year period, 19&0-71, for which we have obtained 
comprehensive data for all the relevant indices of growth in production, 
investment, value added, prices and profitability.
Section 1 of the present chapter begins with a broad description 
and analysis of the performance of the public pharmaceutical sector 
as a whole (including the Nasr company for production of basic pharma­
ceutical chemicals and the public company which produces packaging 
materials), followed by a more detailed study of the seven pharma­
ceutical processing firms alone.
Section 2 looks at the pricing policy of GOPCA and its impact 
on the profitability of the seven pharmaceutical firms.
In Section 3i the role of GOPCA is assessed for its influence 
on present and future growth of the industry, with special reference 
to the critical impact of import restrictions on the performance of 
the industry.
Section 4 is devoted to a close examination of the problems 
which the industry has experienced with backward integration, as 
shown in the performance of the Nasr company for pharmaceutical chem­
icals.
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1. Investment, Production and Value Added
As explained in Chapter II, private domestic firms were set up
in the pharmaceutical industry as early as 1937• By 1952, there were
approximately fifty such establishments engaged in the final process­
ing of drugs into their dosage forms. With the exception of Memphis 
company (which specialises in the extraction of active substances from 
local medicinal plants) and some very small laboratories selling house­
hold preparations, growth of the industry was very slow and total sales 
of domestically produced drugs had reached only £E. -^85 thousand at 
retail prices'*" by 1952*
The existence of idle capacity in the pharmaceutical industry in 
the mid-fifties was discussed in Chapter II with particular reference 
to the limited market available for the drugs manufactured by domestic 
firms. Egyptian drugs were unable to compete with foreign preparations 
which dominated consumers' preferences.
The supply of foreign drugs in Egypt can be seen from the figures 
in Table 26 to have a very considerable influence on the sale of dom­
estic drugs. Imports fell in 1956 as a result of the Suez War and
the economic blockade oh Egypt, and sales of domestic drugs almost 
doubled in the same year to a level which was more or less maintained, 
indicating an ability to meet demand that had previously remained un­
exploited.
Table 26. Import and Sale of Drugs, 1952-57, thousand
Year 1952* 1955 1956 1957
Imports ^,365 5,778 ^,702 5,273
Sales of Dom. 
Prod. 0,^85 0,867 1,653 1,696
Source: Egyptian Federation of Industries Yearbook, 1957-58? Cairo,
p.152. The source does not specify the prices at which im­
ports or sales are valued.
* Figures for 1952 from Table 30? p.165.
1. See Table 30 , pa£e 165.
Investment in the pharmaceutical industry was one of the prime 
objectives of the first plan for industrialisation in 1957* Substant­
ial loans were made available by the Ministry for Industry to the 
larger private firms for the expansion and diversification of their 
production capacity, with emphasis on the installation of new and 
modern facilities for the manufacture of vital drugs such as peni­
cillin, streptomycin and insulin.
Table 27 gives a comparison of production according to dosage 
forms for 1956, 1957 and I960 and also compares existing capacity 
between 1957 and i960.
Table 27 • Production and Capacity in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
1956, 1957 and I960
Dosage Form Unit Production (Quantity) Capacity (Quantity)
1956 1957 I960 1957 i960
Ampoule and Vial million 3A.3 17.1 46.8 43.5 77.1
Tablet million 190 232 421 530 1220
Capsule million 0.0 0.0 4.2 1 17-5
Suppository million 0.3 0.4 1.2 2.3 4.1
Source: Figures for 1956 and 1957 obtained from Egyptian Federation of
Industries, Op.cit., p.l51» Figures for I960 obtained from 
Memo presented at the first meeting of the Consultative 
Committee, GOPCA, Op.cit. (i960 figures relate to the ten 
largest firms only). A comparison of production and capacity
in some dosage forms is omitted here because the units used
are not comparable.
Table 27 clearly shows a significant increase of productive cap­
acity in the major dosage forms between 1957 and i960, as a result of
the considerable financial support from the government in this period.
The production capacity for ampoules and vials increased by **3%, that 
for tablets increased by 130%, suppositores by 80% and capsules by 
1,650%.
The following Table gives production figures in quantity and value 
for the ten largest pharmaceutical companies, which accounted for 85% 
of the total value of production of the industry in I960.
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Table 28. Production and Existing Capacity of Ten Largest Domestic 
Companies in I960. Values in £E thousand
Dosage Form Unit Quantity
Produced
Value of 
Production 
£E 1000
Production 
Capacity 
(quant•)
Antibiotics 1000 ampoule 20.1 900.5 30.8
Syrups, Solut­
ions & Extracts
1000 litre 
1000 bottles
668.7 ) 
8136 ) 890.6
1543.5
9240
Tablets 1000 tablet 420.8 786.2 1220.4
Granules
11
1 ton 
1000 packages
55.8 ) 
1134.9 )
87.4 190.11226
Powders
11
1 ton 
1000 packages
151.3 ) 
16.9 )
37.4 242.9
45
Capsule 1000,000 4.2 30.0 17.5
Ampoule & Vial 1000,000 26.7 523.2 46.3
Suppository 1000 1223.1 18.8 4086.1
Ointment 8c Cream
ii
1 ton 
1000 packages
21.7 ) 
3080.4 ) 150.1
311.9
4100.0
Total Value of Production in £E thousand 3,423
Source: Summary Report on Birth of GOPCA and its Activities, Memo
presented at the first meeting of the Consultative Committee, 
GOPCA, 6 Nov. 1962.
Note: Because the manufacture of antibiotics (maihly penicillin,
streptomycin and their derivatives) requires specialised 
production installations and because of the critical import­
ance attached to the output of this group of drugs, the 
existing capacity and production figures for this group 
are given separately at the top of the Table.
It can be seen from Table 28 that production capacity was far 
greater than actual production figures recorded for i960. Indeed, 
only two-thirds of newly installed capacity for the production of 
antibiotics was being used, 62%  for powders, 57 for ampoules and vials, 
33% for tablets, 30% for suppositories and 24% for capsules. This 
unused capacity was rapidly utilised in the following years and allowed 
for considerable expansion in the output of the firms.
By I960, the total domestic pharmaceutical sector comprised 
forty-one private local companies, according to the census taken by 
the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics. These
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companies were gradually reduced in number and merged into seven 
large companies after nationalisation which began in 1961.  ^ The 
following Table describes the development in production of the entire 
pharmaceutical sector from i960 to 1971/72.
Table 29- Development in Production of Pharmaceutical Sector, Valued 
at existing ex-factory prices £E millions
Year Foreign
Subsid­
iaries
Local
Pharm.
Cos.
Nasr Chem. 
Company
Packaging 
& Other *
Total Production 
of Sector
I960 — 3.821 - - 3.821
1961/62 - 5.100 - - 5.100
1962/63 1.200 8.200 - - 9*4-00
1963/64 2.300 11.200 - - 13.500
1964/65 3.278 15.881 0.329 19.4-88
1965/66 4.500 20.216 0.4-51 25.167
1966/67 4.300 18.100 1.14-3 23.543
1967/68 3.600 19.070 1.074 23.7V*
1968/69 3.968 20.856 0.874- 25.698
1969/70 5.752 25.248 2.323 1.868 35.191
1970/71 6.972 29.443 3.610 2.4-27 42.4-52
1971/72 7.800** 33-400** n.a n.a n.a
Source: Figures for i960, 1964/51965/66 taken from Central Agency
for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, Op.cit. Figures for 
1962/63-1967/68 from Statistics Department of GOPCA. Figures 
for 1968/69-1970/71 from balance sheets of all firms.
* Production of Packaging company not known for period up 
to 1968/69 and accounts for over 80% of figures given for 
1969/70 and 1970/71» remaining 20% attributed to Opticals 
company.
** Figures taken from Ahmad Aly Gaber, Problems of Domestic 
Distribution in the Pharmaceutical Industry, M.A. Thesis 
in Business Administration, Ein Shams University, 1973» 
p.78.
Notes: Production of pharmaceutical companies consists of drugs and
non-drug products, the latter accounting for 2.7% of total in 
I960, 2.02% in 1964/65, 2.05% in 1965/66, and 3-3% in 1970/71.
1. See Section 3 of Chapter II
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Total production has proceeded to grow at a very high rate between 
I960 and 1965/66. In this six year period, the major increase can be 
seen in the growth of production of the large domestic firms which 
were nationalised and amalgamated in the period 1961-63- From i960 
to 1965/66, production of the local pharmaceutical firms thus grew by 
430%, a much higher rate of growth than the 128% in total domestic 
consumption^ in this six year period, during which GOPCA also re- 
duced its expenditure on imported drugs by 43%.
Two of the foreign subsidiaries - Pfizer-Egypt and Hoechst-Orient - 
began producing in 1962/63, and the third subsidiary - Swiss Pharma - 
started production in May 1965- The increase of 280% in production 
of the foreign subsidiaries for the period 1962/63 to 1965/66 is there­
fore not as significant as the rate would suggest, since the manufact­
uring plants of these subsidiaries were not yet on-stream in those 
years. Similarly, producion of the Nasr Chemicals plants only started 
in L964/65 and was not on-stream for another three years.
By the end of 1962, the ten largest local companies accounting 
for 85% of domestic output had been nationalised. Their capital em­
ployed amounted to £E 6 million and GOPCA boasted an increase of 45% 
in their sales^ over the previous year, when the state first partici­
pated in their capital. Table 29 shows an increase of 6l% in production
of all domestic firms over the same one year period. This consider­
able increase in production and sales was made possible by the exist­
ence of unused capacity in the firms, and by the significant rise in 
total demand unaccompanied by a matching increase in imported drugs.
In the two year period 1960/61 and 1962/63 consumption rose by 51% 
while drug imports fell by 3%» and the percentage of domestic drugs
1. See Table 30 p. 165.
2. See Table 46 Section 3 of the present Chapter, p. 202.
3* Summary report on Birth of GOPCA and its Activities, Op.cit.
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to total consumption rose from 28% to 53%» as can be seen from Table
30.
Table 30. Growth in Consumption of Drugs at Retail Prices, Value in
£E millions
Year Consump­
tion of 
Imported 
Drugs
(1)
Consump­
tion of 
Locally 
Produced 
Drugs 
(2)
Total 
£E mil.
(3)
Consump­
tion 
Index 
60/61 = 
100
Percent­
age
(2) to (3)
Consump­
tion per 
Capita
(3) - 
Pop.- 
£E
1952/53 4.365 0.485 4.850 33 10% 0.22
1960/61 10.600 4.300 14.900 100 28% 0.58
1961/62 9.300 7.900 17.200 115 45% 0.64
1962/63 10.400 12.100 22.500 151 53% 0.82
1963/64 9.500 16.000 25.500 171 62% 0.91
1964/65 9.610 21.390 31.000 208 69% 1.08
1965/66 8.000 26.000 34.000 228 77% 1.15
1966/67 6.800 27.800 34.600 232 81% 1.18
1967/68 5.3^0 27.900 33.240 223 82% 1.08
1968/69 5.140 33.000 38.140 256 86% 1.16
1969/70 ♦ 5.932 39.079 45.110 302 87% I.36
Source: Statistics Department of GOPCA.
In 1962/63* GOPCA continued to expand capital investment by build­
ing the latest andmost modern of all existing pharmaceutical firms,
Nile at a starting cost of £E 1.25 million to begin production in 
1963* GOPCA also decided to buy a small private establishment, the 
Arab company, which had scope for expansion and added to it existing 
machinery and equipment taken from the smallest three newly nationalised 
laboratories. Total funds employed in 1962/63 (fixed and current lia­
bilities) stood at £E 115*845 for the Arab company.
Growth in total production of the pharmaceutical sector was inter­
rupted in the two years 1966/67 and 1967/68, as a result of the reduct­
ion in raw material imports which began one year previous"*- to the war 
of June 1967. The shortage of imported raw materials proved to be just
1. See Section 3 of the present Chapter for a detsiled explanation
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as critical to the country as the shortage of imported drugs had been 
in 1956 since the result was the same inability to satisfy existing 
demand. The growth in consumption was held back in 1966/67 and then 
suffered a reversal in 1967/68 with a 4% fall in total consumption.
Figures for the development in production in Table 29 can be 
studied in conjunction with those describing the development in imports 
of raw material chemicals to give an idea on the extent of backward 
integration in the pharmaceutical industry and its dependence on im­
ported chemicals. Data in Table 46 describing the development in ex­
penditure of foreign currency on the import of chemicals by GOPCA does 
not give an accurate picture for the years i960 to 1963/64 because 
GOPCA was assigned in the first years of its operation the task of 
importing chemicals such as pesticides for sectors other than the pharm­
aceutical industry.However, figures can be obtained on the cost to 
Egyptian firms of imported pharmaceutical chemicals actually used in 
production for the years I960, 1964/65^, and 1968/69 to 1970/71.^
The percentage value of raw material chemicals employed to the 
value of production at ex-factory prices in local firms was 26% in 
both i960 and 1964/65* and can be seen to have fallen to somewhere be­
tween 14% and 20% in the late sixties. Raw materials actually imported 
in any given year are not necessarily used in that same year, and final
reports by GOPCA point out for instance to a great depletion in stocks
II
in the three years 1966/67 to 1968/69.
1. Memorandum on the Functions of GOPCA, 6 Nov. 1962, which reports that
GOPCA imported £E 13 million's worth of pesticides for the Ministry
of Agriculture, £E 1.5 million of pharmaceutical chemicals of which 
iiE^ - million were for Ministry of Health laboratories and £E 1 million 
for production of pharmaceutical companies. Official figures on raw 
material imports according to Table 46 for 1961/62 give £E 2.5 
million F.O.B.
2. Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, Op.cit.
3- Figures for 1968/68 to 1970/71 found in final annual reports of
GOPCA, and relate to operation of seven public companies plus Nasr.
4. See Section 3 of the present Chapter, p. 202.
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In order to perform a similar calculation for the proportion of 
imported raw materials used in the production of the three subsidiaries, 
the only reliable figures are those of 196^f/65«^ These show that the 
percentage of imported raw material chemicals used in their production 
(ex-factory prices) was 3k% in that year, as compared to 2.6% for the 
local firms. When it is also remembered from Chapter III that prices 
of drugs produced by subsidiaries are higher priced than similar pro­
ducts of domestic firms, it becomes evident that the percentage cost 
of raw materials used by subsidiaries is much higher than its counter­
part in local firms.
The decline in the proportion of imported raw materials used in 
production of the public firms over the period 196^/65 to 1970/71 would 
seem to be a result of backward integration in the pharmaceutical in­
dustry. The production of basic pharmaceutical chemicals by Nasr rose 
by a factor of ten in this same period, while the increase in imported 
pharmaceutical chemicals was comparatively small at 6$%» But such a 
deduction would overestimate the importance of Nasr in reducing the 
total dependence of the pharmaceutical industry on foreign raw materials. 
As will be detailed in Section 4-, Nasr itself employs for its production 
a higher percentage of imported chemicals than other local processing 
firms. Moreover, the ex-factory prices at which Nasr sells its output 
to the processing firms (only the nationalised firms use Nasr output), 
are approximately twice the level of international prices (Aspirin, 
Chloramphemicol, penicillin, and sulphas in their bulk form). These 
two observations mean that the decline in percentage raw material imports 
are large due to other reasons which will be investigated when studying 
the performances of the seven processing firms.
1. Figures taken from the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and 
Statistics, Op.cit.
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Turning now from production to investment for the public pharma­
ceutical sector as a whole in the period i960 to 1970/71 we have ob­
tained three separate groups of figures which we have tabulated below • 
Table 31 describes total investment expenditure for the period 
1960-63 according to the revised five year plan of the public pharma­
ceutical sector for which increased allocations were made in 1963*
Table 31» Total Investment Expenditure in Public Pharmaceutical Sector 
according to revised five year plan for 1960/61 to 1964/65-
£E millions
Nasr Nile Ein
Shams
Arab Kah- Alex, 
ira
CID Misr Mem- Other Total 
phis
5.976 1.296 0.358 0.950 0.492 0.151 0.693 0.314 0.250 0.505 10.986
Source: The Treasury, Approval for GOPCA Annual Finance, 30 June 1963*
•Other' includes the distribution company and depots belonging 
to GOPCA. Ein Shams was merged into Nile Company in 1966.
It is interesting to note that the revised figures of 1963 are 
much larger than those in the original five year plan which totalled 
£E 2.166 million as compared to the £E 10.986 million above. The main 
cause of the increase is to be found in the allocation to Nasr Chemicals 
company which was originally to require only £E 0.637 million in this 
five year period, but in fact necessitated an additional £E 5-339 million 
according to the revised figures for capital investment. The remaining 
increase in the revised plan is distributed among all the pharmaceutical 
firms in more or less equal proportions.
The first five year plan (revised) was financed by the Treasury 
as far as the newly formed Nasr and Nile companies were concerned, where­
as established companies (including those amalgamated) paid for their 
own investment projects. This can be clarified in relation to the 
following Table which shows investment in 1962/63 and 1963/64 for the 
nationalised pharmaceutical sector.
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Table 32. Investment Expenditure in Public Pharmaceutical Sector, 
1962/63 and 1963/64. £E millions
Nasr Nile Ein
Shams
Arab Kah-
ira
Alex. CID Misr Mem­
phis
Other Total
0.637 0.500 0.179 0.060 0.013 0.025 0.231 0.166 0.051 0.200 2.061
0.700 0.650 0.200 0.152 0.400 0.100 0.200 0.099 0.150 0.350 3.000
Source: The Treasury, Op.cit., 30 June 1963. The first row gives the
actual investment expenditure in 1962/63 and the second row 
gives the projected figures for 1963/64. Ein Shams was merged 
into the Nile company in 1966.
In 1962/63, pharmaceutical firms (all except Nasr and Nile) con­
tributed £E I.36I million towards total investments of £E 2.06l million 
and in 1963/64, the same firms allocated £E 2.700 million out of total 
investment allocations of £E 3 million for the entire public sector. 
These firms also transferred to GOPCA a large proportion of their annual 
profits since it is the major shareholder.
But the public sector's internal finances was not sufficient to 
cover all of GOPCA's obligations^ in the first years of its operation 
and it therefore relied to a large extent on external loans and sub­
sidies. The government contribution to GOPCA in loans and grants 
amounted to £E 3*908,700 and £E 2,899*500 in 1962/63 and 1964/65 re­
spectively.2
According to figures published by GOPCA, the total contribution 
of the government (through the Treasury) to capital investment in the 
public pharmaceutical sector for the ten year period 1960/61 to 1969/70 
was £E 10,616,726.^
The following Table gives the annual total investment expenditure 
of the public pharmaceutical industry for the period 1960/61 to 1970/71.
1. These obligations are discussed in Section 3 of the present Chapter.
2. The Treasury, Op.cit.,
3. Dr. Abd El Halim Haridy, the Economics of Pharmaceutical Industry in 
the Seventies, pamphlet distributed with the Al-Ahram Economic Mon­
thly, 1st October, 1970, A1 Ahram, p.3^.
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Table 35* Annual Investment Expenditure in Public Pharmaceutical 
Sector 1960/61 to 1970/71 £E millions
60/61 61/62 62/63 63/64 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69 69/70 70/71
0.720 1.743 2.825 3.008 2.130 2.226 1.439 1.003 1.776 1.949 1.555
Source: Statistics Department of GOPCA.
By adding the figures for investment expenditure for the five 
years 1960/61 to 1964/65 from the Table above, and comparing the total 
with the projected figure in the revised five year plan in Table 319 
it can be observed that actual expenditure on investment was slightly 
higher at £E.11.425 million than the £E. 10,986 million estimated
by the revised five year plan. This implies that GOPCA's investment
plans were implemented for the first five year period,
1960/61 to 1964/65. It will also be shown in Section 3 of the present 
Chapter that all the necessary foreign currency allocations were voted 
to GOPCA in this period, and it was therefore able to import all the 
sector's requirements of machinery and raw materials. An assessment 
of the sector's performance is therefore reliable within this five 
year period, since no external factors were actively obstructing the 
execution of plans.
Since 1965/66 and for most 6f the period until 1970/71, there was 
a significant change in the ability of GOPCA to obtain foreign exchange 
from the Treasury, either in sufficient amounts or in the appropriate 
currencies to enable it to provide the pharmaceutical sector with its 
production or investment requirements. The severe restrictions imposed 
by the Treasury on the use of foreign currency in the period 1965/66 
to 1970/71 have had little to do with the sector's ability to finance 
its own growth. In the second five year period, the results of invest­
ment made in the first half of the sixties have shown substantial pro­
fit margins for the entire production and distribution operations of 
the public pharmaceutical sector. Whereas GOPCA was a net receiver of
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subsidies in the first six years of its operation, the situation has 
actually been reversed and GOPCA has transferred significantly large 
net revenues to the Treasury in the late sixties.
The contribution of the public pharmaceutical sector to the 
national economy can be judged by looking at figures for value added 
and profits in the late sixties. The following figures include the 
profitable distribution operations of the two GOPCA companies engaged 
in the distribution of drugs, pharmaceutical chemicals and medical 
appliances.
Table 34. Value Added and Profits of the Public Pharmaceutical Sector
1968/69 to 1970/71. £E. millions
Year 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71
Net Value Added 12.924 16.465 20.985
Net Profits before Taxes 6.249 8.516 11.026
Distributed Profits 4.105 7.514 9.129
Source: Final Annual Reports of GOPCA for the three years. All
figures based on the annual financial accounts of all firms 
comprising the public sector: the seven processing firms,
Nasr Chemicals, the Packaging Materials Company, the Optical 
Company and the two distribution companies.
Growth in value added in the three years 1968/$9 to 1970/71 is 
particularly high, but this is partly due to production of the pharma­
ceutical industry making a fast recovery after the decline it suffered
in 1966/67.
As Table 34 show s, the nationalised pharmaceutical sector has 
achieved very high profits, amounting to more than half of the net 
value it added to the Egyptian economy in the three year period con­
sidered. The figures for Value Added and Profits are net of deprecia­
tion. Distributed Profits are calculated as net profits after the 
companies have set aside allocations for future growth but before tax 
payments. Tax payments are calculated on net profits before allocations 
or distribution (Net Profits after Taxes do not appear in Table 34).
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The net contribution of the sector to the Treasury consists of 
direct taxes on company profits at approximately 30% of profits net 
of depreciation, plus the share of the State (which is transferred 
through GOPCA) in profits at 75%» In 1968/69 to 1970/71 the net con­
tribution of the pharmaceutical sector to the Treasury in direct taxes 
and distributed profits has amounted to three-quarters of 'Net Profits 
before Taxes'. But the State has also derived indirect revenue from 
the retail sales of the sector's output by the imposition of sales 
taxes (Treasury taxes) after 1965* In 1970/71 alone, the nationalised 
sector has thus contributed £E.8 million to the Treasury in direct 
taxes and profits, and approximately £E.*f million in Treasury taxes.1
For a comparison of value added to production, we have limited our 
analysis to the manufacturing pharmaceutical firms alone, because avail­
able figures give production valued at ex-factory prices, and because 
this also enables us to relate the figures for 1968/69 - 1970/71 to 
those for i960 and 196*f/65.
Table 35. Development in Gross Value Added in relation to Production 
(ex-factory prices) in Manufacturing Pharmaceutical Firms, Public
Sector. £E. millions
Year I960 196V65 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71
Gross Value Added 1.238 7.050 9.510 12.183 15.116
Production (ex-factory) 3.821 15.881 21.929 27.571 35.052
% GVA to Production 3 2% *f3% k6%
Source: For I960 and 196^/65 the Central Agency for Public Mobiliz­
ation and Statistics, op.cit., For 1968/69 to 1970/71* Final 
Annual Reports of GOPCA.
Notes: In i960 the industry was not yet nationalised and comprised
kl establishments. In 196^/65 the domestic sector was nation­
alised and firms were merged into seven processing companies.
In 1968/69 to 1970/71* the public manufacturing sector com­
prises the same seven processing companies plus Nasr Chemicals.
1. Dr. Abdou Sallam, Minister of Health, Cairo, 1971
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Table 35 shows that precentage gross value added to production 
increased significantly between i960 at 32% and 1964/65 at 44%. When 
it is remembered from our earlier analysis that percentage cost of 
raw materials used in production was identical at 26% in both years, 
it becomes evident that increased production efficiency cannot account 
for all of the increase in percentage value added. In Chapter III, 
page 132, Table 17 was used to compare the cost structure of the 
industry between i960 and 1964/65, and it was mentioned that private 
ownership in i960 was probably responsible for partly overstating 
reported costs of production so as to reduce book values of profits 
and hence taxes. But apart from this qualification, it must be con­
sidered that the process of amalgamation between i960 and 1964/65 might 
also have resulted in some economies of scale in production. Although 
it has been emphasized throughout the thesis that the processing of 
drugs does not involve economies of scale (and the identity of the 
percentage of raw materials to production in both years confirms this 
proposition), there are two other important cost factors which do in­
volve economies of scale. These are storage and distribution costs.
It is therefore possible that in the process of merging more than twenty 
small pharmaceutical firms into seven large units, some savings were 
achieved in these two directions.
The importance of storage in the pharmaceutical industry should 
be fully appreciated. Pharmaceutical firms rely for their production 
operations on the availability of stocks of several thousands of 
different pharmaceutical chemicals, auxilliary chemicals and packaging 
materials, each in many different stages of processing. The wide range 
of finished drugs must again be stored in different dosage forms under 
special conditions. This fact can be illustrated by comparing the 
percentage value of inventories of finished stocks and raw materials 
to capital employed between the pharmaceutical sector and the whole
17^ .
chemical industry (which includes pharmaceuticals) in Egypt. The 
aggregate balance sheet for the pharmaceutical industry shows that 
the percentage value of inventories to capital employed stands at 
68%, as opposed to 19% in the aggregate balance sheet of the chemicals 
industry.1 In relation to fixed assets, stocks of finished output 
and raw materials are again very much higher in the pharmaceutical 
industry than in the chemical industry, or than in the manufacturing 
industry as a whole. The ratio of inventories to fixed assets is 
1.53 ; 1 in the pharmaceutical industry, 0.3^ : 1 in the chemical 
industry, and O.58 : 1 in the manufacturing industry as a whole.
The costs of maintaining and transporting such large stocks of 
materials, finished and semi-finished products must therefore ob­
viously account for a high proportion of the firm*s total costs, 
especially when it is remembered that manufacturing proper accounts 
for a relatively small percentage of total costs in the pharmaceutical 
industry.
1. The aggregate balance sheets of the pharmaceutical industry and 
the chemicals industry can be found in the Central Agency for 
Public Mobilisation and Statistics, National Economic Indices, 
Part I, Financial Indices for Public Sector Companies (except 
Banks and Insurance Companies) for 1966/67* Publication No. 
(711-01), Cairo, December 1969* PP»5^» 80, 100, 126.
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In comparison to other manufacturing industries in Egypt, the 
nationalised pharmaceutical industry has again exhibited a very high 
performance. The Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statis­
tics has begun to publish in 1969 aggregate financial data on the 
operation of each nationalised industry, obtained by adding the indi­
vidual figures from the annual financial accounts of every company 
belonging to the public sector. The first section of this publication 
gives the aggregate detailed financial accounts of all industries, 
classified according to the type of economic activity they engage in. 
There are eight broad sectors: extractive, manufacturing (subdivided 
as in Table 36), transport, commerce, services etc... The second 
section gives aggregate detailed financial accounts of each group of 
companies belonging to an independent General Organisation - There 
are 39 General Organisations: army factories, petroleum, cotton, 
spinning and weaving, chemicals (does riot include pharmaceuticals), 
pharmaceuticals, etc.... - Complete details of an industry's assets, 
debits, manufacturing and other costs, profits and losses, can be 
found in 2 separate Tables, eafch showing details of five different 
financial accounts.
We have tabulated below some figures taken from the aggregate 
accounts of the nine major manufacturing industries as well as total 
manufacturing, for comparison with the pharmaceutical industry. We 
have then calculated (Table 37) turnover to capital,sales and capital 
per worker and return on capital, as basic indicators of the financial 
results of the different industries in 1966/67, the first year whose 
figures were published by the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation 
and Statistics. The nine industries in Table 36 and Table 37 accounted 
for 88% of total sales of all manufacturing industry under public con­
trol in that year. The pharmaceutical industry is included in the
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chemical industry according to this classification. We have then 
entered at the bottom of Tables 36 and 37 the separate figures per­
taining to the pharmaceutical industry alone, as given in the second 
section of the publication, where the individual groups of companies 
are grouped according to the General Organisation supervising their 
operation.
Table 36. Sales, Capital Employed, Labour Employed and Gross Profits 
in Egyptian Manufacturing Industry 1966/67. Values in £E millions
Industry Sales Capital
Employed
Labour
Employed
Gross
Profits
Food Products 107.393 86.067 49,336 8.012
Tobacco 120.487 45.475 11,245 9.913
Spinning and Weaving 209.817 326.424 190,877 41.810
Chemicals 110.219 217.133 46,080 25.473
Petroleum and Coal 
Products 14.994 89.938 10,375 10.207
Basic Metals 43.251 113.628 24,098 3.867
Electrical Equipment 25.107 46.048 13,959 6.738
Transport Equipment 24.760 45.635 13,987 4.652
Total Manufacturing 748.454 1176.641 432,069 126.268
Pharmaceuticals 46.865 37.927 14,128 7.192
Source: The Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics,
National Economic Indices, Part I, Financial Indices for 
Public Sector Companies (except Banks and Insurance Compan­
ies) for 1966/67. Publication No.(711-01), Cairo, Dec. 1969.
Notes: Capital Employed is calculated from figures taken from the
debit side of the balance sheet of each industry and is de­
fined as the sum of : paid up capital, reserves (except for 
reserves used in the purchase of government bonds), mndis- 
tributed profits, provisions, long-term loans and accumulated 
depreciation. Gross profits is calculated from figures taken 
from the profit and loss account, the distribution account, 
the manufacturing account, and the trading account. Gross 
Profits is defined as the sum of: net distributed profits, 
total annual depreciation, annual interest payments, and 
annual allocations (provisions).
Table 36 shows that the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry accounts 
for 17*5% of total capital employed in the chemical industry, 30% of 
the total labour it employs, and 42.7% of its total sales. These 
percentages exemplify the statement made in Chapter I that in most
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developing countries which have made a start in industrialisation, 
the production of pharmaceuticals accounts for a relatively large 
percentage of the chemical industry’s output than in developed coun­
tries where the percentage is 10% on average. The above figures also 
correspond to the general observation that the development of a pharma­
ceutical industry requires relatively small investments in capital.
As can be seen from Table 37, the capital to labour ratio in the pharma­
ceutical industry is 2.69 in contrast to 4.6l in the chemical industry.
Table 37* Average Sales and Capital per Worker Employed, Turnover and 
Profit percent. Capital Employed in Egyptian Manufacturing Industry
1966/67
Industry Sales
per
Worker
£E.
Capital
per
Worker
£E.
Turnover 
to Cap­
ital
%
Profit per­
cent Capital
Food Products 2,177 1.74 125% 9.2%
Tobacco 10,715 4.04 265% 21.5%
Spinning and Weaving 1,099 1.71 64% 12.8%
Chemicals 2,341 4.61 51% 12.3%
Petroleum and Coal 
Products 1,445 8.67 17% 11.9*
Basic Metals 1,795 4.72 38% 3.0%
Electrical Equipment 1,799 3.30 55% 14.2%
Transport Equipment 1,770 3.26 54% 9-7%
Total Manufacturing 1,732 2.72 64% 11.4%
Pharmaceuticals 3,317 2.69 124% 18.2%
Source: The Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics,
National Economic Indices, Part I, Financial Indices for 
Public Sector companies (except Banks and Insurance Com­
panies) for 1966/67. Publication No.(711-01), Cairo, Dec. 1969*
Figures for the value of output of the different industries are 
not given in the source we have used for the above Tables, but we 
have found that the value of sales are a good approximation to output 
because changes in inventories (which could be calculated from the 
financial accounts) were not a significant percentage of sales for any
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industry considered.1 It is therefore possible to judge productiv­
ity of capital and labour in terms of sales as an indication of the 
relative performance of the different manufacturing industries.
Both turnover to capital (sales divided by capital employed) and 
sales per worker in the pharmaceutical industry are very much higher 
than the manufacturing industry average. Turnover to capital is 12*f% 
for the pharmaceutical industry as opposed to 6*f% for all manufacturing 
and 51% for the chemical industry. Sales per worker are £E.3i317 for 
the pharmaceutical industry as opposed to £E.1,732 for all manufact­
uring and £E.2,3*fl for the chemical industry. This implies that the 
average productivity of both capital and labour are relatively high in 
the pharmaceutical industry.
Gross value added in production of the pharmaceutical industry is 
comparatively high at more than *f0% in the mid-sixties, a rate which is
probably very near to that prevailing in the chemical industry and much
2
higher than that in the food industries or in spinning and weaving.
In terms of profitability, Table 37 shows that return on capital 
in the pharmaceutical industry is second only to the rate achieved in 
tobacco manufacture. The prices at which the pharmaceutical industry 
sells its output is currently regulated by the government through GOPCA. 
Although Section 2 of the present Chapter is devoted to a detailed ana­
lysis of the price structure for drugs in Egypt, it can be stated here 
that prices of Egyptian drugs are generally very competitive with inter­
national prices. If one also adds the consideration that the pharma­
ceutical industry as a whole is no longer subsidised (not since the mid­
sixties) it is then fair to conclude that the performance of the pharma­
ceutical industry has been most impressive.
1. It is interesting to note that changes in inventories (defined as end 
of year inventories minus start of year inventories) were all nega­
tive, implying a possible reduction in output as a result of the 
June war in 1967-
2. See Bent Hansen and Girgis A. Marzouk, Development and Economic Pol- 
~i oy in thg UAR (Egypt). North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 
1955- P-121, Table 5.$
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Indices of growth in production, value added and profitability 
have shown considerable progress and success for the public pharma­
ceutical sector as a whole over the period i960 to 1971 but this 
success has not been shared by all companies in the nationalised in­
dustry. Whereas all seven secondary manufacturing firms which account 
for 89% of total output in 1970/71 have shown continued profitability, 
the primary producing company, Nasr Chemicals, has proved to be a heavy 
loser for most of the period, as will be detailed in Section 4 of the 
present Chapter.
In order to assess the performance of the seven nationalised 
pharmaceutical companies over the twelve year period 1960-71, we have 
chosen as basic indicators values for production, value added and pro­
fits in relation to capital and labour employed.
The source of our data for the period 1960-1971 is the complete 
annual accounts of the firms from 1965/66 to 1970/71, the census of 
the industry made by the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and 
Statistics for i960, 1964/65 and 1965/66, and the studies and reports 
prepared by GOPCA.
The level of disaggregation of the figures is surprisingly high, 
allowing one to calculate the necessary measures with a high degree of 
accuracy. In 1967» accounting methods were standardised for all in­
dustry, to facilitate the work of the Central Agency for Public Mobil­
isation and Statistics and its census taking, and accounts have since 
been disaggregated even further and follow a classification according 
to stages of production in manufacturing. For instance, to obtain a 
figure for total annual depreciation or wage payments, one must add 
the separate entries in four different accounts - one for manufact­
uring, one for manufacturing services, one for distribution and one 
for administration and finance.
l8o.
Capital Employed by the company is defined as the sum of its 
long term liabilities: 
paid up capital,
total reserves except those used to buy government bonds (and 
cannot therefore be considered part of capital employed), 
total allocations (or "provisions") except allocations for dis­
puted taxes (which are a short term liability),
long term loans. Capital employed is therefore gross of deprec­
iation.
Gross Profit is defined as total profits after the payment of 
administration expenses but before the payment of interest, depreciat­
ion or taxes. We have also included in our calculation of gross pro­
fits annual allocations (1 provisions *) which have not been currently 
spent, because net profits in the books of all firms are net of sub­
stantial allocations to different funds for growth, an intersting 
indication of the wish of their Board of Directors to distribute less 
total profit, (these unspent allocations are of course included in the 
calculation of profit for tax purposes).
Gross Value Added is obtained by subtracting from production at 
ex-factory prices the value of products and services purchased from 
outside the firm. The distribution of value added is such that the 
shares going .to capital, and to land and buildings are adjusted by 
imputing values for interest and rent on owned capital and buildings. 
The standard rate for imputed interest payments is 4% of owned capital 
and imputed rent is 7% of the value of owned land and buildings. Owned 
land and buildings are valued at ten times their rateable value.1
1. Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, The Pharma­
ceutical Industry, Publication No.(319-10), December 19&7» p«335*
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Table 38. Development in Production, Value Added, Capital Employed, 
and Labour Employed for the Seven Nationalised Pharmaceutical Firms
Year Production ex­
factory prices 
£Emil. Index
Value Added 
(Gross) 
£Emil. Index
Capital Em­
ploy. (Gross) 
£Emil. Index
Labour
Employ.
Thousand
. Ind.
Gross 
Profits 
£Emil. In­
dex
I960 3.772 100 1.238 100 3.217 100 3.329 100 0.578 100
62/63 8.200 217 6.000 4.463*
63/64 11.200 296
64/65 14.378 381 7.050 569 12.640 392 7.236 217 5.169 894
65/66 20.750 550 16.800 522 5.830 H O O VJ1
66/67 17.860 473 20.067 623 5.503 952
67/68 19.070 505 21.420 665 8.205 246 5.460 945
68/69 20.856 552 9.085 733 23.210 721 8.418 252 6.221 1076
69/70 25.248 669 10.964 885 24.520 762 9.674 290 7.246 1254
70/71 29.443 780 13.513 1091 26.750 831 10.064 302 9.079 1571
Source: Annual financial accounts of seven companies Central
Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics and Final Annual 
Reports of GOPCA.
* Figure for labour employed does not include Ein Shams Company 
in 1962/63.
Table 38 and the graph (see p.l82) show that output of the pro­
cessing firms rose very steeply between i960 and 1965/66, together 
with investment (capital employed) in the industry. Whereas capital 
employed rose by 422%, the production index shows an increase of 450% 
over the five year period. After 1965/66, the process of capital acc­
umulation continued, although growth in investment was much slower; 
whereas production dropped in 1966/67 and only regained its 1965/66 level 
three years later, in 1968/69.
From 1968/69 to 1970/71♦ production again rose by 40% over the 
two years, while capital employed rose by 15%. Changes in investment 
can therefore be seen to have been much more gradual, and are probably 
much less sensitive to external influences (shortages of foreign curr­
ency to the industry) than changes in output. Production of the
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pharmaceutical firms has suffered over all of the second half of the 
sixties from raw material shortages, and a significant percentage of 
production capacity has remained idle over this period, as reports of 
the firms and GOPCA confirm.
Ofrer the whole twelve year period considered, capital employed by 
the seven firms has risen at a much faster rate than labour employed. 
This implies that the manufacturing process has become more capital 
intensive*1 either because the production function in processing pharma­
ceuticals is such that increased output requires relatively small in­
creases in labour than capital inputs, or because manufacturing firms 
have deliberately selected more capital intensive production techniques 
over time. The first explanation does not seem to be important in the
context of the pharmaceutical industry, judging from our description
2
of the processing techniques involved. But the second explanation 
can be verified in Egypt as well as many advanced countries. In the 
industrialised world, the process of substituting capital for labour 
has been taking place in most of the OECD countries.^
In Egypt, after nationalisation, many production processes which 
were carried out manually have been replaced by machines. This is es­
pecially true in the processing of ampoules and capsules and in the 
packaging of most dosage forms. The process of automation has been 
greatly encouraged by the closer association which has developed between 
local firms and their foreign licensors whose production techniques 
have been largely adopted by Egyptian firms. But what has probably 
accounted for the major increase in capital employed by local firms
1. Unless of course increases in capital accumulation, which are fin­
anced internally by the companies' undistributed profits,have not 
been fully utilized in the purchase of capital goods. This possib­
ility is excluded by looking at figures in Table *fl.
2. See Chapter I, Section 2.
3» OECD, Gaps in Technology : Pharmaceuticals, Op.cit., p.59.
l8*f.
is the setting up of entirely new and highly sophisticated quality 
control and research units. According to GOPCA these departments were 
of acceptable standard at only two of the private companies before 
nationalisation.
Egyptian pharmaceutical companies have also entered into new 
fields of production which did not exist before nationalisation and 
which have required increasingly expensive manufacturing installations 
and equipment. Examples are the manufacture of parenteral solutions 
at Nile company and the production of hormones at CID company.
To judge the development in productivity of labour or capital using 
production figures alone would conceal the extent to which backward 
integration within processing firms has increased over the period.
It will be recalled from Chapter II that most pharmaceutical firms in 
the 1950s were engaged in very limited processing activities. As an 
extreme example, more than 70% of CID's operations were shown to be 
concentrated on the packaging of imported finished drugs in their bulk 
form.
We have therefore calculated in Table 39 the productivity of 
labour and capital both in terms of output and in terms of value added.
Average output per worker has increased from £E.1,130 in I960, to 
£E.2,920 in 1970/71* an increase of 175% over the period. Output pro­
ductivity of capital has fallen over the same period by 6%. The rise 
in productivity of labour is to be expected as a natural arithmetical 
consequence of the large increase in capital intensity. But these 
measures of labour and capital productivity have concealed the great 
increase in percentage value added in production. If we therefore 
measure productivities in terms of value added, it can be shown that 
backward integration has taken place in the processing of drugs.
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Table 39» Development in Capital Intensity, Productivity of Capital 
and of Labour in the Seven Public Firms. Values in £E.
Measure Definition I960 1964/65 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71
Capital In­
tensity
Capital Em­
ployed 
Labour 
Employed
960 1,740 2,750 2,530 2,650
Output Pro­
ductivity 
of Labour
Production
ex-factory
Labour
Employed
1,130 1,980 2,470 2,600 2,920
Value-added 
Productivity 
of Labour
Gross Value 
Added 
Labour 
Employed
370 970 1,070 1,130 1,340
Output Pro­
ductivity 
of Capital
Production
ex-factory
Capital
Employed
1.17 1.13 0.89 1.02 1.10
Value-added 
Productivity 
of Capital
Gross Value 
added 
Capital 
Employed
O.38 0.55 0.39 0.44 0.50
Source: Calculations made using figures in Central Agency of Public
Mobilisation and Statistics, The Pharmaceutical Industry, 
Op.cit., and Final Annual Reports of GOPCA.
Value added productivity of labour has risen by 260% over the 
period i960 to 1970/71, while value-added productivity of capital has 
risen by 31%* The fact that the rates of increase in value-added 
productivity are higher than the rates of increase in output product­
ivity for both labour and capital points . to an important increase 
in backward integration. Moreover, the fact that value-added product­
ivity of capital has risen at the same time as the productivity of 
labour in spite of the capital labour ratio having more than doubled 
over the period is an obvio us indication that production efficiency 
is greatly increased.
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A closer look at the development of value-added productivity of 
capital in Table 39 shows that it attained its peak in 1964/65 at 
£E 0.55 (after which it fell together with production in 1965/66).
Until 1970/71, value-added productivity has not regained its maximum 
level of 1964/65. This confirms the proposition that the pharmaceut­
ical industry has a significant potential for production which is not 
being utilised.
Growth in value added has outpaced the growth of production, 
capital employed or labour employed. It can also be seen from Table 3^ 
that the share in value added going to profits has increased at the 
expense of the shares paid out in wages and salaries; whereas gross 
value added increased by 991% over the period i960 to 1970/71, gross 
profits increased by 1471% over the same period. Wages and salaries 
rose from £E 0.58 million in i960 to £E 3*5 million in 1970/71, an 
increase of 500% over the period. But it must be remembered that 
workers and employees receive 25% of the net distributed profits of 
the firms, although only 10% rather than the full 25% are paid out 
in cash, with a maximum annual payment of £E 50 to each employee.
Table 40 gives return on capital at the level of each of the 
seven processing firms and shows that high profitability is a feature 
shared by all firms alike.
The decline in production in 1966/67 and 1967/68 has had a direct 
effect on the profitability of the seven firms in these same two years. 
Average return on capital fell from 35% in 1965/66 to 27% in 1966/67 
and 25% in 1967/68.
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Table 40. Return on Capital Employed for the 1Seven Public Firms
Firm 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71
Nile 20% 12% 14% 16% 19% 23%
Arab n.a. n.a. 21% 23% 26% 30%
CID 44% 29% 28% 25% 27% 34%
Kahira n.a. 30% 31% 38% 41% 40%
Alex 32% 31% 31% 28% 42% 51%
Memphis 50% 39% 38% 39% 36% 40%
Misr n.a. 35% 28% 28% 30% 35%
Average 35% 27% 25% 30% 30% 35%
Source: Annual financial accounts of the seven firms. Return on
Capital employed is defined as the percentage of gross pro­
fits to gross capital employed.
To test the proposition that firms have actually utilized this 
large increase in capital accumulation in investment in productive 
capacity rather than liquid assets or inventories, we have calculated 
for seven years the percentage of fixed assets and projects under con­
struction (on the asset side of the aggregate balance sheets of the 
seven firms) to total capital employed (gross of depreciation).
Table 4l. Fixed Assets as Percentage of Capital Employed for the Seven
Public Firms
Year 1960/61 1964/65 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71
Percentage 31% 32% 35% 39% 39% 40% 41%
Source: Annual financial accounts of seven public firms. 1960/61 figures
relate to the forty-one concerns which existed before nationalis­
ation.
Table 4l shows that the percentage of fixed assets (and projects 
under construction) in capital employed has increased over the period, 
implying a better utilisation of accumulated profits. Productive capac­
ity in the form of fixed assets has grown even faster than capital em­
ployed and has therefore contributed to the percentage growth of value 
added to capital employed.
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2. Price Control in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Throughout Section 1 in which we dealt with the development of 
the industry, we did not include any particular reference to prices.
The use of a price index as a deflator has been unnecessary in the 
accepted sense because prices of domestically produced drugs in Egypt 
have been fixed since 1961, the last date when they underwent some 
change in a downward direction.
However, we are now going to concentrate more closely on prices 
because of the degree to which they limit the ability of firms to oper­
ate with a reasonable amount of independence and because of the extent 
to which indices of output and profitability are affected by prices.
Until 1959* there had been no price control on domestically pro­
duced drugs, although imported drugs had been subject to an element 
of control since 1952 by the reduction and fixing of the maximum profit 
margin allowed on their FOB cost. But this measure was soon found to 
be ineffective, as described in Chapter II, because it was exercised 
at the distribution level only and therefore had no influence on import 
prices which began to rise subsequently.1
As long as government control of the pharmaceutical market was ab­
sent, domestic drug prices were determined according to competitive 
conditions. The price structure of domestically produced drugs followed 
the international structure very closely since foreign drugs dominated 
90% of the market. But across the entire range of products, domestic 
producers generally offered their products at prices well below those 
of their foreign substitutes in order to be able to compete with the 
well-established multinationals whose brands were generally accepted as 
superior.
1. Effective control of foreign drug prices was introduced in I960, 
when the Higher Organisation for Drugs was assigned the role of 
sole importer and distributor of foreign drugs in Egypt. See 
Chapter II, Section 2.
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As explained in Chapter I, the pricing of newly discovered drugs 
bears little relationship to their cost of manufacture, while older 
drugs have normally been reduced in price together with the reduction 
in the degree of monopoly governing their production and sale. This 
meant that foreign prices for modern drugs allowed domestic producers 
relatively higher percentage mark-ups on cost than those preparations 
which had been on the market longer.
In 1959* the Ministry for Industry made a study of domestic drug
prices in relation to cost of manufacturing of domestic firms, in order
to establish the first set of tariffs for domestic drugs on the market.
This study was made without consulting the Higher Organisation for Drugs
or the producing firms, but with the use of data provided by those
firms in their annual financial accounts for the year 1957/58. The
Ministry fixed the price of each drug by adding a number of standard
cumulative percentage allowances on its direct manufacturing cost (cost
1
of raw materials plus direct wages). These allowances or cumulative 
percentages were supposedly calculated on the basis of the overall cost 
structure of the firms studied, but as can be seen from the Table below 
they were arbitrarily chosen. Four out of the five percentages allowed 
can be seen to stand at an identical 25% of the cumulative figure for 
total cost.
Although the tariff basis implied a cost structure which was far 
from real, it made a very generous total allowance for expenditures 
other than direct manufacturing costs incurred by pharmaceutical firms, 
allowing an average mark-up on costs of 200% as can be seen from Table 
42.
1. The idea of using cumulative percentages is itself nonsensical, 
and there is no reason to expeot any kind of relationship between 
direct manufacturing costs and sales and distribution expenses, 
administration costs, or free samples.
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Table 42. First Basis Used for Tariffication of Domestic Drugs
Type of Expenditure Cumulative
on-cost
Allowance
Cumulative
Total
Expenditure
Cost Structure 
Implied
Direct Manufacturing Cost - 100 100 34%
Cost of Free Samples 20% 120 20 7%
Other Industrial Costs 25% 150 30 10%
Administrative Expenses 25% 187.5 37.5 13%
Sales and Distribution 
Costs 25%
234.4 46.9 16%
Profit 25% 293.0 58.6 20%
Value of Sales 293.0 293.0 100%
Source: Mohamed Abd El Moneim Said, Problems in the Measurement of
Costs for the Purpose of Tariffication in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, project presented for diploma in Costing, Cairo 
University, 1964, p.76.
But the problem that occurred when applying the established per­
centages to individual drugs was that price adjustments were necessary 
in both the upward and downward direction. The Ministry faced a sit­
uation which agrees very closely with our analysis of price determinat­
ion in a free market for drugs. Prices of all those drugs which were 
relatively old on the market, such as penicillin, streptomycin, insulin 
and some of the vitamins, were priced below the estimated price which 
would have been allowed by using the full on-cost allowance, while 
drugs in relatively modern groups such as tranquilisers and antihistam- 
inics were priced above the estimated price using the standard allowances.
Because of the medical importance attached to the older group of 
drugs which were priced very near to cost, the Ministry decided that it 
would not allow the domestic firms to raise these prices (and these 
firms would have found it impossible to do so in any case, without los­
ing their competitive position vis-a-vis foreign brands). But the Min­
istry still imposed the full reduction in price on all those drugs 
which were higher priced than allowed by the cost standard.
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This measure was to put many local companies in a very difficult 
position in terms of their profitability. For instance, 34 of the 
products sold by CID had to be reduced in price by varying percent­
ages. Those products which were to undergo large changes in price 
were obviously those on which CID was realizing the largest mark-ups, 
allowed for by the high international prices for drugs such as tran­
quilizers, eye and nose drops, cough syrups. Although the price 
reductions imposed on most products were small percentages, the total 
result would have seriously affected the profit position of CID who 
had only achieved a rate of profits before taxes of 9*3% of sales for 
the fiscal year 1957/58.
The Chairman of the Board of Directors of CID immediately brought 
forward a detailed memorandum on behalf of his Company and of the 
entire group of local companies which would have been affected by the 
newly announced tariff.'*- Two studies were included to show the effect 
of applying the tariff on CID's financial results, one for the year 
ended 1957/58 and the second for the estimated results of CID*s oper­
ations in 1958/59. The effect of the tariff would have been a reduct­
ion in the value of sales for 1957/58 of £E 22,071 or a fall in pro­
fits percent sales from 9*3% to 4.6%. According to the sales volume 
estimated for 1958/59* applying the tariff would have meant a net loss 
over sales of 8%, due to a fall in the value of sales equal to £E 42,621. 
The second study also showed that if the basis of the tariff were 
applied to all CID products, allowing for price increases as well as 
the imposed reductions, the estimated value of sales would rise by 
£E 118,053 instead of falling by £E 42,621.
1. Dr. Abdou M. Sallam, Chairman of Board of Directors of CID, Memo­
randum on the Tariffication of Domestic Drugs and its Effect on 
CID Company, 30 March 1959.
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CID raised two main objections to the principles applied in 
establishing the first tariff. On the one hand, the fixing of prices 
of local drugs when similar control for imported drugs was non-existent 
maant that price differentials between foreign and local brands would 
become even higher than before tariffication. According to CID, this 
would cause a deterioration in its competitive position as far as 
chemist sales were concerned, since the profit made on low priced local 
brands would become so small that chemists would be encouraged to only 
sell foreign brands at the expense of their local equivalent. Two 
striking examples1 of the new price differential between CID products 
and their foreign equivalents were used to demonstrate the effect of 
the new tariff:
CID also maintained that the increased price differentials between 
local and foreign brands would cause the loss of confidence of the 
public for the quality of the local brand. With the foreign brand 
"Antistin" for instance, retail price to the public was fixed at 38
imposing a reduction on "Toloxan" (15 cc bottle) from CID's price of 
15 piastres to 9 piastres. The public could hardly be expected to 
believe that the local brand contained the same type and quality of 
ingredients as the foreign brand when the price of the first was less
Wholesale Pro­
fit Margin
Chemist Pro- 
fit Margin
"Metonal" (CID) 73 milliemes 
225 milliemes"Litrison" (Roche equivalent)82 milliemes
"Toloxan" (CID) 5 milliemes 20 milliemes 
60 milliemes•'Antistin11 (CIBA equivalent) 22 milliemes
piastres^ for a 10 cc bottle, while the Ministry for Industry was now
than half and contained 1-jr times as much of the medicament.
1. Ibid., p.18.
2. One Egyptian pound, £E = 1000 milliemes.
3. One Egyptian pound, £E = 100 piastres.
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In relation to competition between local manufacturers themselves, 
CID criticized the effect of the new tariff as being discriminatory.
The Ministry had chosen to scrutinize and fix the prices of only t£e 
largest nine local pharmaceutical companies, while the small laborat­
ories were left free to determine the price of their own products. For 
those companies whose prices were fixed, the tariff basis was discrim­
inatory against the firms who were more efficient in keeping down their 
costs of production (either by finding cheaper sources for their raw 
materials or by having lower wage costs). One local company, for in­
stance, "Ama" was allowed to charge much higher prices than CID for 
two products, Insulin and Penicillin, on account of its higher manu­
facturing costs in their production (both CID and Ama were producing 
these drugs under license from foreign manufacturers). As a result 
of the complaints made by CID and other local companies, the tariff 
on some products were readjusted upwards to a compromise level between 
their original price and the first tariff imposed.
The most valuable lesson to be drawn from the industry's exper­
ience with the first tariff is that to price drugs using the cost 
standard alone is bound to run into difficulties on account of the 
international price structure which is far from competitive. In a 
relatively free market, domestic producers are forced to price their 
drugs in the same way as international firms which dominate the market. 
These firms use price discrimination in two directions. Within the 
total range of products sold, some products are sold at prices far 
above their average cost levels, and the profit margins on these drugs 
contribute the major share of the firm's overheads, distribution and 
selling costs. Other products are sold at prices very near to marginal 
cost, for reasons of competition, prestige gained in offering esswntial 
drugs at low costs and because this policy limits the entry of small 
competitive producers to those markets with easy access in terms of
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technology and raw materials availability. Price discrimination is 
also used in the sale of the same product to different consumers.
Many Egyptian firms explained that until the late fifties they were 
seldom able to sell products to the Ministry of Health because of the 
policy of the multinationals which were often bidding for those ten­
ders at prices below raw material costs.
When GOPCA took over the control of domestic firms in 1961-63, 
it was also made responsible for establishing a pricing policy for 
locally produced drugs. GOPCA decided to apply two rules for fixing 
the price of local drugs. The first was the international price stan­
dard. No local drug would be allowed to be priced above the price of 
its equivalent on the international market, as judged by the quotat­
ions received by GOPCA in importing. The second standard used to 
price drugs was to become the therapeutic value of the drug. For all 
those groups which were deemed as essential (antibiotics, contracep­
tive pills, antidiabetic drugs), prices would have to be very near to 
cost, whereas prices of inessential groups such as analgesics, tran­
quilizers, vitamins and tonics could include an allowance for relat­
ively higher profit margins.
The prices of imported drugs had somewhat fallen in I960, follow­
ing government control over the purchase of foreign drugs, and these 
prices were further reduced by 25% at the end of i960. This meant that 
GOPCA's price review of domestically produced drugs after i960 dictated 
some reductions in their prices to conform to the new rules. The 
prices of several local brands were therefore reduced by rates ranging 
between 20% and 60%. After this perind, ex-factory prices have remain­
ed fixed. But new drugs are constantly being produced by local firms 
and prices suggested by producing firms are therefore reviewed by 
GOPCA for approval.
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The prices of all new drugs produced are carefully studied in 
relation to their imported equivalents1 so as to set the upper limits 
on what local firms are allowed to charge. A comparison with manu­
facturing cost is then used to calculate a profit margin in relation 
to the medical importance of the drug on the market.
In this new centrally controlled price structure, it is evident 
that the product mix chosen by any single firm will directly affect 
its overall profitability. This is why GOPCA had to be very careful 
when it applied its production policy - which aimed at introducing 
specialisation within the group of seven firms - not to restrict any 
one company to the production of the less profitable group of drugs.
Of course price discrimination between drugs is also exercised within 
a particular therapeutic group. With antibiotics for instance, the 
more commonly used and older preparations will allow a much smaller 
profit margin than the newer preparations, because the international 
price standard will dictate this kind of cost structure for any part­
icular group of drugs. CID supplies the Egyptian market with approx­
imately kO% of its requirement of antibiotics, and the following Table 
describes the relationship between manufacturing costs and ex-factory 
prices on some of the preparations sold.
The pricing policy of GOPCA also allows for price discrimination 
for the same drug between different buyers, in accordance with the 
pricing policy of multinational firms. Sales to bulk purchasers 
(government agencies, the armed forces, and insurance organisations) 
are thus priced at only a fraction of the fixed prices charged to the 
retail consumer. This can be clearly shown by comparing the percent­
age mark-up on sales realised by CID in the second half of 1963*
1. Imported equivalents continue to be available on the market for a 
period of two years to enable the public to learn of the existence 
of local brands.
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Table V3. Mark-up on Sales of Different Antibiotics Preparations 
in the Egyptian Market. Value in Piastres*
Generic Name Brand Name Manufact­
urers
Manufactur­
ing Cost
Retail
Price
Percent
Mark-up
Penicillin 
Procaine 
*4-00,000 U
Penicillin 
Procaine 
1 vial
CID 1.38 2.70
Penicillin 
Procaine + 
Benzyl 
^00,000 U
Penicid 
1 vial
CID 3.52 5.00 33%
Streptomycin Streptomy­
cin 1 vial
CID 3.77 6.50 W o
Chloramphen­
icol 250 mg, 
12 capsules
Cidocetine
Memcocetin
Veracetin
Chloromy­
cetin
CID
Memphis
Nile
Parke-
Davis
21.2
18.6
*f0.00
35.0 
Jf2.00
75.0
bo % 
55%
Tetracyclin 
HCL +
Oleandomycin 
250 mg, 16 
capsules
Sigmacid
Sigmamycin
CID
Pfizer/
Egypt
61.9
85.3
l^fO.O
179.0
66%
Oxytetracy- 
clin HCL 
250 mg 
16 capsules
Oxytetracid
Oxytetrin
Terramycin
CID
Memphis
Pfizer/
Egypt
2*f.6
18.7
90.0
65.0
191.0
72%
71%
Tetracyclin 
HCL 250 mg, 
16 capsules
Tetracid
Tetracyclin
HCL
CID
Bayer
15.6 65.0
1^2.0
75%
Source: Pricing Department of GOPCA. Manufacturing cost includes raw
materials, packaging materials and industrial costs. Per­
cent Mark-up is calculated as the difference between retail 
price and manufacturing cost, percent retail price.
* One Egyptian Pound, LE = 100 piastres
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Table 44. Mark-up on CID Sales to Different Purchasing Sectors 
for the period from 1.7»1963» to 30.12.1963* Value of Sales
in £E thousands
Dosage Form Retail 
Value of Sales
Sector
% Mark-up
Government 
Value of Sales
Sector 
% Mark-up
Antihiotics* 24-1 58.6% 172 24.1%
Tablets 268 61.8% 46 17.7%
Syrups 161 65.6% 3 60.9%
Ointments 9 52.6% 0.4 43.9%
Ampoules and sol­
utions 138 59.2% 2 48.5%
Extracts 7 25.9% 11 29.1%
Tartar Emetic - - 2 50.2%
Capsules 30 69.5% 2 27.3%
Total 834- 61.0% 24-3 23.3%
Source: Moham»d Abd El Moneim Said, Op.cit., p*58.
% Mark-up is defined as the difference between direct manu­
facturing costs and sales valued at ex-factory prices, per­
cent sales (valued at ex-factory prices). Tartar emetic 
is an antibilharzia drug.
* Antibiotics are not groupsed according to their dosage 
form because of their critical importance to the firm 
which leads them to be classed separately (antibiotics 
are sold mainly as vials, ampoules or capsules).
During the three years, 1961/62, to 1963/64, the nationalised 
pharmaceutical firms introduced 137 new preparations in the market.
Of this total number, 107 preparations were identical equivalents to 
imported drugs which still existed on the market, when the local brands 
appeared. It is therefore possible to verify that G0PCA*s pricing 
policy was enforced and all domestic drugs can be checked to have been 
priced below their foreign equivalents, with price differentials ran­
ging from under 10% to over 50%.^ Of the total 107 preparations for 
which we could directly compare prices, 18 domestic brands were priced 
less than 10% below the price of the foreign brand, 22 domestic brands
1. Price information was obtained from GOPCA's Department of Statis­
tics which also has complete records of the new entries of domes­
tically produced drugs each year, their generic composition, and 
the names of the foreign brands which are being replaced.
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were priced between 10% and 30% below the price of the foreign equi­
valent, and 64 domestic brands were priced at more than 30% below 
the price of their foreign equivalent. Only three preparations were 
priced at exactly the same level as the foreign equivalent.
When measuring the volume of domestic production of drugs in 
terms of the value of output over time, one can safely say that the 
ex-factory price level for all existing drugs has remained fixed 
for the period I960 to 1970/71, even though sales taxes (Treasury 
taxes) were imposed on the retail price of most drugs after 1965/66 
at an average of 10% over their existing levels. But it must be 
remembered that the general price level for all drugs including new 
entries will tend to rise over time, in line with rises in the general 
international price level1 for drugs. The effect of such price in­
creases in the Egyptian market will be a tendency to overestimate real 
increases in volume when measured by increases in value of output.
But this overestimate is certainly more than compensated for by an 
opposite trend which has taken place over the period 1960-1970/71*
As illustrated in Table 5 of Chapter I (page 16) the percentage share 
of government institution purchases in total expenditure on drugs has 
grown significantly over time, and we have just observed that the 
prices at which firms sell their output to government institutions 
is approximately one-third of the ex-factory prices charged to whole­
salers. The overall result of the two trends described is therefore 
that the index of production valued at ex-factory prices has slightly 
underestimated the true indix of volume of production of drugs. The 
following Table fcompares the actual value of sales'of the seven nation­
alised firms to the public sector (all government institutions) with 
the estimated value which would obtain if such sales were priced at 
the same ex-factory prices charged to wholesalers.
1. The international price bevel of new drugs within any given thera­
peutic group can be observed to l?e higher than the price level of 
existing ana older preparations m  that group (see Chapter I;.
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Table 45. Sales to Government Institutions Valued at Actual Prices 
and Wholesale Prices, 1962/63 to 1968/69, Values in £E millions
Year 62/63 63/64 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69
Actual Sales 
Value 1.4 1.7 2.4 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.9
Estimated 
Sales Value 
(Wholesale 
Prices)
2.3 2.8 4.0 5.8 5.8 7.5 8.2
Source: GOPCA annual report for 19691 p.58.
3. The Role of GOPCA
The success achieved by the Egyptian pharmaceutical industry since 
nationalisation can be directly attributed to the role played by GOPCA. 
This central supervisory body has been actively concerned with every 
aspect of the industry*s operation throughout the 1960s, with the 
mammoth task of reorganising production, distribution and imports.
GOPCA planned and supervised the merging of small firms into larger 
units, the capital investments in new production installations, the 
patent and know-how agreements between foreign and local firms, the 
import of machinery and raw materials, and the control of domestic 
drug prices. The result was a remarkable performance in the first five 
years 1960-65, with considerable increases in output, productivity, and 
profits. The seven processing firms were thus able to contribute large 
amounts of net revenue to GOPCA, which, together with Treasury grants 
in this five year period enabled GOPCA to finance many expensive obli­
gations.
When the Higher Organisation for Drugs (later to become GOPCA) took 
over the distribution function from private importers and wholesalers, 
considerable reorganisation and rationalisation was necessary. The 
number of employees required fell from 2,500 to 1,800, but wages had
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to be paid to all the surplus staff until they could be transferred 
to new jobs in the industry. This was achieved by 1963» and wage 
payments fell as a result from £E 60,000 per month to £E 25*000 per 
month.'*' Whereas importing agents and wholesalers had been allowed 
approximately 30% profit margins on the CIF cost of imported drugs, 
GOPCA was operating on an average 5% margin on the retail price of 
both domestic and foreign drugs. Moreover, GOPCA had to absorb the 
difference between the new retail price for foreign drugs (which were 
reduced by 25% in I960) and the purchase price at which it was buying 
these drugs on the international market. This proved very costly for 
some time until GOPCA was able to obtain lower prices from multinat­
ional firms by setting tenders and seeking competitive levels for its 
bulk purchases.
GOPCA was also assigned the task of setting up distribution depots 
and retail pharmacies to serve remote areas which were hitherto unpro­
fitable to the private distributors. This development was vitally 
needed in conjunction with the plans of the Health Ministry for 1960- 
65, which resulted in a 58% increase in the number of rural health 
units for instance.
Imports
GOPCAfs control and reduction of foreign drug imports gave the 
domestic pharmaceutical industry an important measure of protection 
which enabled the firms to make full use of their increased production 
capacity. But local companies have nevertheless remained totally de­
pendent on GOPCA for providing them with the necessary imports of raw 
materials and foreign machinery which we have shown to be of critical 
importance to their operation. Planning and coordination of imports
1. Memorandum on Working Conditions at GOPCA and the Compensation of 
Employees, presented by Dr. Nabawi A1 Mohandes, Minister of Health, 
to the Treasury, 11th May 1963*
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for the various needs of the industry can therefore be considered 
as the major responsibility of GOPCA to this day.
Since 1965/66, and in spite of GOPCA*s increased autonomy and 
the financial self-sufficiency of the pharmaceutical sector as a 
whole, the execution of plans has been continuously frustrated be­
cause of the inability of GOPCA to obtain its annual projected needs 
of foreign currency from the Treasury. This situation began in 1966, 
when GOPCA had aggregated all the estimated requirements of imported 
drugs, pharmaceutical chemicals and medical appliances for the market 
for the following financial year, 1966/6?• The estimated needs of 
foreign currency were put at £E 16.600 million, and applied for from 
the Treasury. This figure constituted a lk% increase over the actual 
expenditure of foreign currency in the previous financial year (as 
can be seen from Table *f6), and can therefore be judged as consistent 
with the general increase in consumption of drugs and health services 
which was taking place in this period. From 1960/61 to 1965/66,
GOPCA had annually increased the import of raw materials chemicals 
at the expense of finished drug imports and thus achieved very real 
savings in foreign currency when measured in relation to the total 
supply of foreign and domestically produced drugs on the Egyptian 
market. The value of sales of all drugs (total consumption) can 
thus be seen to have grown by 128% (p.165, Table 30), while expendit­
ure on foreign currency increased by only kk% over this five year 
period, 1960/61 to 1965/66.
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Table 46. Development in Foreign Currency Devoted to the Import of 
Drugs, Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Medical Appliances. £E mill­
ions. FOB prices
Year Hard Curren­ Trade Agreement Total Allocation of Total
cy Funds Funds Drugs 
£E mil
Pharm. 
Chem/f. 
£E mil
Medical 
Appliances* 
£E mil.
£E mil. % to 
Total
£E mil. % to 
Total £E mil.
60/61 9.333 7.844 1.030 0.459
61/62 10.621 92% 0.879 8% 11.500 6.802 2.530 2.167
62/63 12.677 94% 0.823 6% 13.500 7.625 3.194 2.681
63/64 12.600 96% 0.537 4% 13.138 6.443 4.097 2.597
64/65 11.483 81% 2.728 19% 14.211 4.899 5.080 4.232
65/66 9.238 73% 3.406 27% 12.645 4.440 5.299 2.905
66/67 5*607 64% 3.144 36% 8.751 2.806 3.386 2.558
67/68 4.699 62% 2.938 38% 7.638 2.813 3.216 1.668
68/69 6.876 65% 3.782 35% 10.657 4.151 3.876 2.630
69/70 10.473 63% 6.092 37% 16.565 5.102 6.708 3.248
70/71 9.199 61% 5.818 39% 15.017 3.000 8.375 3.747
71/72 7.513 49% 7.650 51% 14.963
Source: Department of Planning of GOPCA.
* This column includes all medical appliances for hospitals, all 
laboratory equipment for research and University departments, 
and all machinery for the manufacturing pharmaceutical firms.
The Treasury now decided, in 1966, to reduce GOPCA*s allowance of 
foreign currency for 1966/67, and made available £E 12.1 million in­
stead of the £E 16.600 million applied for by GOPCA.^ In addition to 
this great reduction, more than half of the total allowance was to be 
executed in trade agreement funds, which further magnified the problems 
faced by GOPCA. The Chairman of GOPCA*s Board of Directors warned that 
the limitations placed on GOPCA's use of hard currency would result in 
a complete rundown on inventories of drugs and raw materials in the 
country by the end of 1966/67* and that only two-thirds of the
1. Memorandum on the Suggested Allocation of Foreign Currency voted 
to GOPCA for 1966/67* Dr. Abdou M. Sallam, Chairman of the Board 
of Directors of GOPCA, 15 September 1966.
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£E 6.75 million allowance in trade agreement funds could actually 
be spent because of difficulties in finding the appropriate needs 
of the Egyptian pharmaceutical market in countries of Eastern Europe1 
(with whom Egypt operates through trade agreements). A look at Table 
46 shows that in fact only £E 3*144 million were spent by GOPCA through
trade agreement funds, or less than half of the total allowance for
1966/67.
The difficulties faced by GOPCA in having to rely on Eastern 
European countries for its supply of pharmaceuticals seem to stem 
from two related factors. On the one hand, Egypt's needs for imported
drugs is limited to the small group of most recently discovered thera­
pies for which domestic firms have not yet acquired the know-how to 
produce (or the necessary patented raw materials). But Eastern Euro­
pean countries are not in a position to produce these drugs either, 
since they are discovered and patented by the multinational firms 
based in the Western World. On the other hand, Egypt's needs for 
imported pharmaceutical chemicals can normally be supplied from 
Western Europe at far more competitive prices than those tendered by 
Eastern European countries. According to the Head of the Department 
of Planning at GOPCA, GOPCA has consistently favoured imports from 
countries with whom Egypt has trade agreements, and this has meant 
allowing a 10% preferential treatment on the prices quoted by these 
countries. However, GOPCA has in fact been forced to accept prices 
of Eastern European countries to stand at up to 23% above competitive 
quotations from Western Europe so as to be able to purchase pharma­
ceuticals from Eastern Europe. Dr. Al-Kattan also pointed out that
1. Ibid
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Eastern European countries would much prefer to export finished 
drugs to Egypt.1
It would therefore seem that Eastern European countries are in 
a very similar situation to Egypt in terms of their competitive pos­
ition on the international market. The potential for supplying 
finished drugs at competitive prices on the world market exists for 
Egypt , as it obviously does for Eastern Europe (and this is con­
firmed by the observations made in Footnote 2 on page 103). But the 
supply of raw material chemicals at competitive prices is generally 
difficult for such countries because they themselves are dependent 
to a very large extent for their raw material needs on imports from 
the West. Eastern Europe is of course moving much faster than Egypt 
towards becoming self-sufficient in this respect, and countries like 
Roumania for instance, are reported to have become major suppliers 
of penicillin on the world market at very competitive prices.
*f. Experience of the Industry with Backward Integration
The idea of setting up domestic primary producing facilities for 
the more widely consumed drugs in Egypt started in 195^» as described 
in Chapter II. The earliest assessment of the market for drugs was 
made by the Committee for Health Services, who collected data on the 
consumption of different groups of drugs, and recommended that drugs 
in the five most commonly used groups should be manufactured domestic­
ally. The logic behind the recommendation was very simply that the
1. Interview with Dr. Madhat Al-Kattan, Head of Planning Department 
at GOPCA, Cairo, 1972.
2. This potential has not been exploited as yet, although GOPCA is 
fully aware of the possibility of exporting a large number of 
domestically produced drugs to markets in Africa and the Middle 
East at competitive prices and with significant earnings of foreign 
currency. A very interesting field study was performed by Dr. 
Hassan Abbass, Director of Planning, Alexandria Company, during 
his visit to Nigeria in 1972, which showed that there exists a 
very large potential for Egyptian exports of drugs to that market.
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sales value of these groups - salycilates(mainly aspirin), sulpha 
drugs, penicillin, streptomycin, and chloramphenicol - accounted for 
a substantial portion of total sales on the market, and economies of 
scale could therefore be achieved in their bulk manufacture, with a 
resulting saving in foreign currency.
Concrete projects for the basic manufacture of each group of 
drugs were made in conjunction with the first five year economic plan 
started in 1957 • As detailed in Chapter II, capital investments in 
the existing private processing firms were encouraged by the Ministry 
of Industry who supplied long-term loans to these companies for the 
expansion and diversification of their production capacity, with the 
technical co-operation of foreign firms. But production capacity 
required for, or experience in, backward integration was totally non­
existent in the pharmaceutical industry and plans for primary produc­
tion had to be formulated and executed by the government alone.
As mentioned in Chapter III, foreign currency was in short 
supply and the capital requirements for setting up primary producing 
chemicals and fermentation plants are relatively large. Russian co­
operation was therefore sought for the finance of the projects, the 
import of machinery and the transfer of technical know-how. In Jan­
uary 1958, the Nasr project was included in the economic and techni­
cal agreement signed between Egypt and Russia. The decision was also 
taken to build all five plants in one area, with prospective economies 
of scale in the cost and maintenance of public utilities required by 
the five plants (road works, electricity and water supplies, sanitat­
ion, effluent disposal), and in the costs of buildings and equipment 
necessary for research and quality control. A desert site of 120 
feddans (165 acres) at Abu Zaabal, North East of Cairo, was chosen 
to set up the five plants.
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The first serious economic evaluation of the project was started 
in 1959 by members of the General Organisation for the Implementation 
of the First Five Year Plan for Industry. Capacity was estimated at 
25% above existing consumption levels, but this level was still below 
what Russia considered as the minimum economic size. It was therefore 
decided to build plants of twice the size first estimated and it was 
thought that excess output would be exported to neighbouring countries. 
In retrospect, domestic consumption levels more than doubled within a 
few years of the study, and by the time the plants were working at 
full capacity, the output of aspirin and penicillin were below the 
total requirements of the Egyptian market. The first miscalculation 
can therefore be seen to have been a shortsighted view of the growth 
of domestic demand for drugs.
An Egyptian delegation of doctors, chemists and engineers first 
visited Russia from September to November of 1959 to discuss the pro­
ject. The Egyptian party requested from its Russian counterpart an 
economic evaluation of the project, but this was refused on the pre­
text that such an evaluation was not one of the conditions agreed upon 
in the preliminary talks, and that it was also outside the sphere of 
negotiations in any other agreement between Russia and Egypt.1 But 
Russia would supply Egypt with figures on quantities of raw materials 
required for production and their international prices, figures on 
fuel and other services needed in the production process, as well as 
figures on depreciation allowances made on Russian machinery and 
equipment.
The Egyptian General Organisation in charge of implementing the 
first five year plan for industry was therefore assigned the task of
1. The General Organisation for the Implementation of the Five Year 
Program for Industry, "The Economic Study of the Nasr project for 
Pharmaceutical Chemicals", 22 June I960.
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making the project appraisal with the aid of figs. supplied by the 
Russian party. According to the study prepared, it was obvious that 
the project would be running at a loss in the first years of its oper­
ation, as most required raw materials would not yet be available domes­
tically (and this would raise the falue of imported chemicals with 
shipping and transport charges), and capacity at the plants would not 
be fully utilised. At full capacity, the estimated annual loss from 
the project was not very large, as can be seen from Table 48. But the 
calculations made included the processing and packaging by Nasr of 36% 
of its output of sulphas, 33% of aspirin, 87% of chloramphenicol. The 
addition of a processing unit to the Nasr project for the formulation 
of bulk active ingredients into their dosage forms was in fact estimated 
to raise the value of total output at full capacity from £E 708,695 to 
£E 1,332,595. The contribution of processing operations was therefore 
crucial as a means of counterbalancing the loss from the primary pro­
ducing operations. This is even more clearly shown by the fact that 
the study suggested that an additional processing unit for 5*29 tons 
of penicillin and streptomycin plus 1.25 tons of chloramphenicol would 
bring in net profits of £E 115»000 annually.1 
Capital Costs of the Project
As can be seen from Table 4-7 total expenditure on fixed assets in 
1964/65 (the first year of operation) stood at £E 8 million as opposed 
to the i960 estimate of £E 4.4 million. This considerable increase in 
capital expenditure can be identified as increased expenditure on three 
main types of assets: utilities and roads, machinery, and preliminary 
expenses.
1. Ibid
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Table 47. Estimated and Actual Balance Sheet of Nasr Chemicals
Values in £E. millions
I960 Estimates Actual Figures for 1964/65
Debits Debits
Capital 3.000 Capital 6.000
Russian Loan 2.200
5.200
Russian Loan 2.000
8.000
Assets Assets
Land 0.040 Land 0.060
Buildings 0.740 Buildings ) 
Utilities and Roads^
2.171
Utilities and Roads 0.607
Machinery 1.867 Machinery 2.852
Means of Transport 0.048 Means of Transport 0.064
Preliminary Expenses 0.410 Preliminary Expenses 1.489
Liquid Assets 0.655
4.367
Liquid Assets 1.364
8.000
Source: Economic Study of the Project, by the General Organisation for
The Implementation of the Five Year Program for Industry. Figures 
for 1964/65 (first year of operation) from actual balance sheet 
of Nasr.
Note: The difference between total debits and total assets in the es­
timate for i960 (£E 833»000) consitutes an addition to Nasr's 
capital over and above the estimated cost of assets and was 
supposed to cover the estimated losses in the first years of 
operation.
Table 48. Estimated and Actual Costs and Revenues of Nasr Chemicals
Values in £E. millions
i960 Estimate Actual Figures 1966/67
Value of Output 1.333 Value of Output 1.143
Production Costs Production Costs
Raw Materials 0.333 Raw Materials
Wages and Salaries 0.197 Wages and Salaries 0.525
Indirect Manufact­
uring Costs 0.520
Indirect Manufact­
uring Costs
Distribution Costs 0.058 Distribution Costs
Administration Costs 0.137 Administration Costs
Interest Payments 0.150 Interest Payments O.I63
Total Cost 1.395 Total Cost 2.099
Annual Losses 0.062 Annual Losses 0.956
Source: Economic Study of the Project, by the General Organisation for
the Implementation of the Five Year Program for Industry. Fig­
ures for 1966/67 from actual profit and loss account of Nasr.
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The cost of supplying the site with water, electricity and roads, 
in a desert area which lacked any existing facilities proved to be sev­
eral multiples of the estimated £E 607,000 in the I960 study. The 
water station alone cost Nasr £E 600,000 because of the enormous quan­
tities of water necessary for the chemical synthesis operations. The 
supply of electricity and sanitation works were again to cost Nasr 
gigantic sums in relation to the estimates.
The cost of machinery can also be seen to have risen to more than 
twice the estimate of £E 1.867 million in the I960 study. This was due 
to the need for various modifications to the Russian plans, as will be 
detailed further on. An additional plant for the production of chlor- 
sulphonic acid (which was not accounted for in the original study) was 
also built because the needs for imported quantities of that raw mater­
ial was going to cost Nasr annual sums in excess of £E 90,000.
Preliminary expenses were again greatly inflated by the need to 
reorganise production processes because of numerous difficulties which 
arose during the construction period. Completion of the plants was 
therefore delayed, and caused increased expenditure on research at 
£E 978*521 and on Russian advisors at £E 110,056.'*'
Because of the large increases in expenditure on fixed assets, 
the annual general meeting of the Board of Directors of Nasr voted in 
July 1963 in favour of an increase in capital from £E 3 million to £E 6 
million, the increase being financed by annual allocations from the 
Treasury (through GOPCA) in the period 1964/65 to 1966/67. But contin­
ued losses by Nasr over this period prevented it from recovering pre­
liminary expenses which amounted to one-quarter of Nasr's owned capital. 
In March 1968, the Board of Directors of Nasr therefore decided to re-
1. Memorandum to the General Meeting of GOPCA's Board of Directors 
concerning the Reduction of Capital of Nasr Chemicals by £E 
1,489,000. Summer 1967.
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duce owned capital by £E 1.5 million, equal to the sum exhausted 
by the company on preliminary expenses.
Costs and Revenues from the Operation of Nasr
The results of Nasr's operation have shown large and sustained 
losses throughout the 1960's, although its position has slightly 
improved in later years. Before going into details of the specific 
production problems met in each of the plants, one can identify three 
basic problems which have considerably affected the profitability of 
all Nasr operations.
Labour Costs - The number of workers and employees required for 
the operation of Nasr were originally estimated at 898, receiving 
annual wage and salary payments of £E 196,000. By 1964/65 total 
numbers employed in the construction of the plants were naturally 
very high, standing at 2,245* According to employment policies in 
Egypt, Nasr was forced to keep all the excess labour until alternat­
ive occupations could be found at other establishments for the num­
bers which were not needed. Total employment at Nasr fell very slowly 
as can be seen from the following Table, with the obvious additional 
costs incurred on wage and salary payments.
Table 49. Employment and Wage Bill at Nasr, 1964/65 to 1970/71
Year 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69 69/70 70/71
No. of Workers 
and employees 2,2 45 1,985 1,666 l,6l4 1,577 1,582 1,572
Wages and Salaries 
£E million 0.525 0.497 0.548 0.590 0.628
Source: Figures obtained at Nasr Chemicals Co. 1972.
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Cost of raw materials - According to the economic study of the 
Nasr project, a great number of raw material chemicals necessary for 
production were to become available domestically during the first 
five year plan as by-products of the petrochemical, fine chemicals 
and food industries. The estimated prices of these raw materials 
were calculated at prevailing international prices without the addition 
of shipping or customs charges. The prices of foreign imports of 
chemicals were estimated at their CIF cost at Alexandria docks with 
the addition of a mere allowance of 2% for customs charges plus £E 25 
per ton for transport to Nasr.
But most raw materials that were expected to be produced domes­
tically failed to become available in sufficient quantities or at the 
required standard of purity. Although many of these raw materials were 
extremely low in price per ton on the international market, the addit­
ion of shipping and other import charges was to multiply their total 
cost to Nasr. A comparison of actual costs of the taw materials to 
Nasr in 1966/67 with the estimated costs of the i960 study shows 
actual increases of between kk% and 760% for twenty essential raw 
materials.'*' This resulted in considerable increases in total costs 
of raw materials per unit of output. Table 50 compares the actual 
with the estimated total cost of raw materials necessary for the pro­
duction of one ton of each pharmaceutical chemical manufactured at 
Nasr, columns (1) and (2).
A comparison of columns (2) and (4) in Table 50 shows that the 
ratio of raw material costs per unit of output to the value of this 
unit of output (one ton) at 1966/67 prices was ridiculously high.
1. Report on the Economics of the Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical 
Chemicals, prepared by Nasr Company, 1967* Appendix 1.
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Table 50. Comparativei Raw Material 
Values in
Costs of 
£E.
Production at Nasr.
Product Unit (1)
I960
Estimate
(2)
1966/67
Costs
(3)
Modified
Costs*
(4) 
Price of 
Product 
1966/67
Sulphanilamide 1 ton 890 1,835 916 1,250
Sulphaguanidin 1 ton 1,058 2,036 1,462 1,600
Sulphadimidin 1 ton 1,907 3,385 2,672 3,750
Aspirin 1 ton 279 412 950
Sodium Salycilate 1 ton 383 477 1,000
Methyl Salycilate 1 ton 296 416 1,250
Salycilamide 1 ton 1,091 1,304 1,250
Penicillin 1 : 3 1 ton 9,138 20,299 9,617 14,500
Chloramphenicol 1 ton 25,834 30,061 11,114 23,000
Source: Report on the Economics of the Nasr Company for Pharmaceut­
ical Chemicals, Op.cit., Appendix '41 and *5*.
* Modified costs were those incurred in using a modified production 
process.
Nasr management therefore studied all possible means of lowering costs, 
and found that raw material costs per unit of output could be reduced 
considerably by actually reducing backward integration. A reduction 
in the number of processing stages carried out at Nasr could be ach­
ieved by importing semifinished chemical intermediates instead of 
basic raw material chemicals and performing a more limited number of 
operations (synthesis).
The savings in raw material costs per unit of output achieved by 
using the modified production operations at Nasr were significantly 
high as can be judged from a comparison of columns (2) and (3), which 
shows savings ranging from 20% to 38%. This new and curtailed method 
of production was first applied to Chloramphenicol, Penicillin and the 
Sulpha compounds, and in later years was also adopted for the product­
ion of aspirin and the salycilates. The new method obviously achieved 
savings in other manufacturing costs as well as in raw material costs,
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and a third result was an increase in production capacity for every 
single type of product. In the first year when the new production 
process was applied for instance, the output of different sulpha com­
pounds increased by 50% to 600% over original capacity of the project, 
and chloramphenicol more than doubled.
But this new solution to Nasr problems was only able to reduce 
the losses from the project, not eliminate them. It can be seen from 
Table 50 that raw material costs of the modified process were still 
above the original estimates, which had involved some losses - compar­
ison of columns (3) and (2). The exception was chloramphenicol, whose 
price had gradually fallen since I960 due to increased competition on 
international markets and its raw material intermediate could also be 
purchased at lower prices. Finished Chloramphenicol in bulk powder 
could thus be purchased on the international market at £E 10,063 per 
ton in 1966.^
Formulation into Dosage Forms - The original economic study of
the Nasr project planned that the company would process a very large
proportion of its output of pharmaceutical chemicals into dosage forms,
thereby increasing sales value and profitability of the project. But
by the time Nasr began producing in 1964/65, pharmaceutical processing
firms (the seven) had been nationalised and their capacity for dosage
formulation was very large. GOPCA therefore felt that on account of
the long experience of processing firms with formulation, they could
perform the formulation and packaging operations with greater effic- 
2lency than Nasr. Nasr was thus deprived of an important source of 
revenue from processing operations.
1. Tenders obtained by GOPCA in 1966.
2. Memorandum from Nasr Chemicals to GOPCA concerning the pricing 
of Nasr output, 5 July 196?•
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The three sets of problems detailed above can be judged as exter­
nal to the company's performance since Nasr could not be held respon­
sible for their causation. But there were many specific technological 
problems in the operation of each of the five main production plants 
at Nasr which made productivity of capital equipment and installations 
very low in comparison to international standards.
Penicillin Production"*"
In the manufacture of penicillin, economies of scale are extremely 
important in fermentation and extraction stages of production. The 
capacity of single fermentors used by the multinationals for instance 
range between 200 and 250 cubic metres, pilot scale capacity is up to
50 cubic metres and laboratory scale is often 10 cubic metres. At
£ .Nasr, eight fermentprs were imported from Russia, with a capacity of
10 cubic metres each. The small size was expected to minimize the
risk of losing output during the fermentation process (which lasts six
to seven days) when sterile conditions must be maintained. Differences
in the productivity of the strain producing penicillin can also cause
considerable differences in the efficiency of production. Whereas
strains used by multinational plants have a productivity ranging between
15,000 and 17,000 units per million, those strains delivered by the
Russians had a much lower productivity of 6,000 to 7,000 units per
million. It was also explained that in Russia, strains with a much
higher yield than those delivered to Nasr are available.
Two of the raw materials used in the fermentation process - Lactose 
(a by-product of the dairy industry), and Corn ste^p liquor (for which 
local output was contaminated with traces of copper) - failed to be­
come available from domestic industry as expected during the first five
1. Information obtained from interview with Dr. Ahmad A1 Fikjr, Dir­
ector of the Fermentation Plant at Nasr Company, Abu Zaabal,
21 February 1972.
215.
year plan 1960-65. This raised the cost of shipping and transporting
these raw materials to Nasr.
The fermentation process is followed by filtration and extract­
ion. The extraction equipment delivered by the Russians is again re­
ported to have been of very low efficiency. Instead of providing Nasr
with one large separator as used by plants of the multinationals, 
twelve separators were delivered, each requiring longer steps and there­
fore more costly stages to arrive at the intermediate product.
The equipment used in transferring technical penicillin to sterile
salt ready for sale was also found to be of low standard, the pipes 
having rusted and needing replacement. First batches of penicillin 
salt were therefore contaminated with rust and had to be destroyed.
Because of the problems encountered and the low productivity of 
equipment, the whole manufacturing process was finally costing Nasr 
£E 300 per kilogram of finished penicillin salt in contrast to a price 
ranging between £E l8 and £E 20 per kilogram on the international mar­
ket. Egyptian management at Nasr eventually decided to build an entirely 
new plant for the production of penicillin with machinery imported 
from England (Gusti Co.) and know-how purchased from a Dutch firm 
(Delft Mycofarm). In 1967/68, with a complete reorganisation of the 
production line and sterile area, the production of penicillin was 
experimented. Actual production was restarted in March 19^9, with a 
smaller degree of backward integration. The production process is now 
started at a more advanced stage, by-passing fermentation. Potassium 
salt technical grade is now imported for manufacturing procaine peni­
cillin and sterile potassium salt in the sterile area.
Because of the difficulties encountered in penicillin production, 
the management at Nasr refused to begin producing streptomycin on 
account of similar problems which it was expected would arise. The
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capacity of fermentors was too small, the yield of the strain too low, 
and at full capacity, the plant could only supply an estimated 2.5 tons 
per year while domestic consumption had already risen to 40-50 tons 
per year in Egypt.
Since the fermentors could not be efficiently used for their in­
tended purpose, the group of managers began experimenting for alternative 
possibilities for their use. After screening a large number of products, 
three types of enzymes were chosen which could be manufactured econom­
ically with the unused fermentor capacity: Amilase which is used in 
desizing fabrics in the weaving industry, proteaze which is used in 
leather tanning, and ladinaze which is used in the production of deter­
gents. All these production processes were developed independently of 
foreign know-how, but with some assistance from research departments 
of Egyptian universities. The processes used employ locally produced 
raw materials and the three enzymes are commercially successful pro­
ducts.
Salycilates"*"
The basic chemical raw material for the production of this group 
of chemicals is coke, but the raw material failed to become available 
domestically. The main product manufactured by this process is Aspirin 
which is available at very competitive prices in the world market be­
cause of its long history since discovery and development.
The production of aspirin starts with the synthesis of chemicals 
into salycic acid on which a further chemical process is performed to 
arrive at sublime salycilic acid from which either aspirin or methyl 
salycilate or sodium salycilate can be synthesized.
1. Interview with Dr. A1 Sawy, Managing Director of Nasr Chemicals 
Company, 21 February 1972.
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Russian equipment had a capacity for sublimation of 100 tons, 
when the economic scale is 2000 tons.
Because the basic raw materials did not become available domest­
ically, Nasr management decided to cut down the number of processing 
stages and reduce dependence on a vast number of imported raw material 
chemicals. It was decided to buy salycilic acid from Roumania ready 
for further processing into Aspirin. The capacity for sublimation was 
also increased and the purchase of additional acetylators increased 
total capacity for Aspirin production from 90 tons in 1965/66 to 250 
tons in 1969/70 to 370 tons in 1970/71. The demand for aspirin on 
the domestic market was estimated at 450 tons in 1969/70. 
Chloramphenicol'*'
Russian technology, when used, involved the use of 300 tons of raw
material chemicals to arrive at 1 ton of bulk chloramphenicol powder.
Chemical processes involved thirteen manufacturing stages which Nasr
mahagement again reduced to two by importing the necessary raw material
intermediates and thus achieving vast savings in costs and an increase
in total capacity for finished Chloramphenicol powder.
A modified process was later adopted with the assistance of Carlo
Erba, an Italian pharmaceutical company in giving Nasr up to date
technology. Terms of the agreement involved the payment of 5% royalty
on the value of production for less than ten years.
2
Sulpha Compounds
Russian technology and know-how again proved to be inefficient. 
Available capacity could be doubled for all processing stages by a 
complete reorganisation of the production process. The co-operation 
of ICI (Britain) was sought in 1971. Until this date, Nasr had been
1. Ibid.
2. Interview with Dr. Aly Sina, Chairman of Board of Directors of Nasr 
Chemicals Company, Abu Zaabal, February 1972.
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importing technical sulfanilamide (intermediate) at an annual rate 
of 120 tons.
ICI would now assist Nasr in the production of this chemical 
intermediate and thus achieve savings to Nasr of between £E 150,000 
and £E 2Q0,000 annually. ICI technology would also increase production 
capacity for finished sulpha compounds to twice their levels before
1971, meaning an increase in the value of their sales to approximately
£E 500,000.
ICI was to charge royalty payments of 5% on production value in 
sterling currency (estimated at £E 25*000 annually). The royalties 
payable would be calculated on production valued at the arbitrary 
price at which ICI sells the same products on the international 
market at the time when the contract was signed.
Development in Prices and Profits
In the two years 1964/65 (first year of production) and 1965/66,
Nasr was allowed to select the price at which it would sell its output. 
Because production was not yet on-streara, pricing was made according 
to projected production costs in the following years. It can be seen 
that the prices chosen were far above the estimates made by the economic 
study in i960.
Table 51* Development in Pricing of Nasr Products, 1964/65 to 1970/71
Ex-factory Prices in £E. per ton.
Product I960
Estimate 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1969/70 1970/71
Sulphanilamide 550 1,979 6,000 1,250 3,093 3,610
Sulphaguanidin 800 4,217 4,751 1,600 3,805 4,619
Sulphadimidin 2,000 9,040 9,6l6 3,750 5,867 6,625
Chloramphenicol 40,000 66,782 51,000 23,000 34,588 44,512
Aspirin 400 1,013 1,000 950 1,135 1,200
Penicillin 5 : 1 15,000 - - 14,500 25,538 25,538
Source: Prices obtained at Nasr Chemicals Company, February 1972.
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During 1965/66 Nasr was also allowed to distribute to local 
firms imported chemicals of the types produced at Nasr (Nasr output 
did not cover more than one quarter of these needs). This policy was 
intended to ensure some balance between the prices at which Nasr output 
and other imported chemicals were being sold to the processing firms.
It also gave Nasr an important source of revenue in that year, since
75% of its sales were of imported chemicals.
In 1966/67, GOPCA decided to fix the prices at which Nasr output
was being sold, to make them more consistent with international prices 
(see Table 52, Columns (1) and (2)). This meant very large reductions 
on prices of 1965/66, as Table 51 shows.
Table 52. Comparison of Price of Products Sold and Raw Materials 
Purchased by Nasr with International FOB Prices, 1 July 1966
Product Unit Inter­
national 
Price of 
Product
(x)
Nasr
Price
of
Product
(2)
%
(2)
to
(1)
Intern­
ational 
Price of 
Raw Mat­
erials 
necess­
ary per 
ton of 
Product 
W
Price to 
Nasr of 
Raw 
Mater­
ials 
necess­
ary per 
ton of 
Product 
(5)
%
(5)
to
W
Sulphanilamide 1 ton • 633 1,250 198 853 1,876 225
Sulphaguanidine 1 ton 69? 1,600 250 913 1,966 215
Sulphadimidin 1 ton 1,3^7 3,750 278 1,92^ 3,076 160
Aspirin 1 ton 558 950 170 2^5 537 221
Sodium Saly­
cilate 1 ton 503 1,000 199 3k0 706 207
Methyl Saly­
cilate 1 ton 465 1,250 269 15^ 371 2 f^l
Salycilamide 1 ton 525 1,250 259 329 1,12*f 5^2
Chloramphenicol 1 ton 10,065 25,000 229 20,602 27,865 135
Source: Memo presented to Board of Directors of GOPCA concerning the
Report by Nasr on the fixing of the price of its Products.
Summer 1967-
Note : Price to Nasr of raw materials necessary for the production of
one ton of each output includes locally produced chemicals.
(. raw materials prices include Shipping and Transport costs).
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The FOB prices in column (l) of Table 52 were average quotations 
received by GOPCA in 1966. For instance, supplies of bulk chlora­
mphenicol powder could be obtained on the international market at 
prices ranging from £E 7*65^ to £E 11,007 and Aspirin could be pur­
chased at prices ranging from £E 306 to £E 605.
The fixing of prices by GOPCA was a temporary measure for 1966/67 
at the end of which Nasr was asked to present a new appraisal of its 
profit and cost position for further study at GOPCA. On July 22nd, 196?1 
Nasr forwarded to GOPCA a detailed report on its operations, and de­
manded that the price of its output be fixed in relation to the costs 
it incurred on the purchase of raw materials. It was therefore decided 
that the international price standard would be used for comparing both 
raw material costs and finished product prices. Nasr would be allowed 
to sell its output at the same multiple ratio to international prices 
as Nasr raw materials cost in relation to international prices for raw 
materials. This calculation was made according to the figures offered 
by Nasr and the international prices obtained from GOPCA*s department 
of imports.
Wherever the ratio of Nasr raw material costs to international raw 
material costs was above the ratio of Nasr prices to international prices 
of products, Nasr would be allowed to raise its price. In other words, 
the percentage in column (6) of Table 52 would dictate the price in­
crease allowed. But it was obvious that Nasr would still be making 
losses since it had an insignificant or negative margin above raw mater­
ial costs from which to recover all other costs of production. Nasr 
also demanded that it should be allowed to process most of its output 
into dosage forms so as to increase the margin between selling price 
and costs, and GOPCA made a study of relative processing costs at Nasr 
and the seven pharmaceutical firms. It was found that the seven nation­
alised companies which specialise in processing pharmaceutical chemicals
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into their dosage forms could operate with much lower costs. GOPCA 
therefore decided that it was more efficient to allow even higher price 
increases bn Nasr output of bulk pharmaceutical chemicals which could 
easily be absorbed by the processing firms, rather than letting Nasr 
perform those processing operations.
It is surprising that all the studies and reports exchanged between 
Nasr and GOPCA made no serious comment on the actual technology of pro­
duction which can be judged to be the major cause of Nasr *s problems. 
Ignoring the variations in cost to Nasr of raw material chemicals, a 
close look at Table 52, which was used by both GOPCA and Nasr to fix 
prices, gives a very clear picture of the effect of using inefficient 
methods of production.
A comparison of international FOB prices for final pharmaceutical 
chemicals in their bulk form, column (1) in Table 52, with the inter­
national FOB value of all raw material chemicals necessitated by the 
production process, (column *f) in Talhle 52, shows that for all types 
of output except the group of salycilates, the value of raw materials 
needed for production are well above the value of the finished product 
on world markets. The ratio between international costs and internat­
ional prices for chloramphenicol is the most amazing, raw material 
needs standing at more than twice the value of the finished output on 
world markets. This confirms the comment made by a Nasr representative 
that the Russian technique for producing chloramphenicol was extremely 
inefficient, using many more stages of synthesis than international 
standards and consuming in the process 300 tons of raw materials to 
arrive at one ton of chloramphenicol.
Because of the many changes which have taken place over the seven 
year period considered, it is not very useful to compare the annual 
changes in accounting profits or losses of Nasr operations. The
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influence of distribution activities, price changes and subsidies 
received has affected the annual results achieved in different direct­
ions. But one can say that the financial position of Nasr has slightly 
improved in 1969/70 and 1970/71- ^he company has received no direct 
subsidies in those two years, although processing firms (the seven) 
have contributed a growing percentage of indirect subsidies to Nasr 
in the form of yet another price increase on products sold to them by 
Nasr in 1970/71 (Table 51).
A comparison of figures for total output and net profits from 
Table 53 a*id 5^ seems to indicate that the large increases in output 
in 1969/70 and 1970/71 are responsible for the sudden change in pro­
fitability. This is true to the extent that prices of Nasr output were 
raised in 1967/68 to a sufficient level to allow it to make a small 
profit margin on pharmaceuticals per unit of output. Before 1967/68, 
it can be judged that increased output would in fact have resulted in 
an increase in total losses, since profit margins were negative on 
most products.
Since 1967/68 (and the new price level acting as a necessary con­
dition), Nasr was able to use economies of scale in production. Since 
profit margins from Nasr's manufacturing operations are so slender, a 
minute fall in production costs (due to economies of scale) or in over­
heads can cause a dramatic increase in profits. This has probably been 
happening in the last few years, and annual financial accounts of Nasr 
point to a falling percentage of direct manufacturing cost to total 
value of output.
Management at Nasr has obviously been aware of the inefficiency 
involved in using the technology and machinery imported from Russia, and 
this is demonstrated in the general move towards reorganising production 
processes and seeking the technical co-operation of giant chemical con­
cerns which have the benefit of many decades of experience in the basic
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manufacture of pharmaceutical chemicals.
Nasr has also moved away from the production of pharmaceuticals 
and into new fields where it could make use of idle machines and equip­
ment and produce commercially successful products. Examples on the use 
of fermentors were given on page 2l6, and Nasr has also begun the pro­
duction of some raw materials chemicals employed in other industries.
Table 53. Development in Value of Production at Nasr, at 1970/71 Prices
Value in £E thousands
Product 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69 69/70 70/71
Sulphanilamide 22 51 54 28 - - 22
Sulphaguanidin 162 124 286 109 49 63 25
Sulphadimidin 36 101 278 197 302 100 193
Chloramphenicol 44 245 490 378 - 124 771
Aspirin 32 60 103 122 154 233 433
Penicillin - - 128 294 203 966 1,163
Other pharma­
ceutical Prod. 84 79 184 224 140 106 195
Non-Pharmaceut- 
ical Products - - 245 288 281 808 1,0)52
Total 380 660 1,768 1,640 1,129 2,400 3,854
Value of Prod­
uction at 
Existing Prices 329 451 1,143 1,074 874 2,323 3,854
Source: Figures obtained at Nasr Chemicals Company, February 1972.
Table 54. Net Profits or Losses at Nasr, 1964/65 to 1970/71* Values in 
£E thousands
64/65 65/66 66/67 67/6fii 68/69 69/70 70/71
Net Losses - 800 - 840 - 960 -1,010 -1,018
Net Profits + 60 + 201
Source: Profit and Loss Accounts of Nasr Chemicals Company.
Note: Profits and Losses are net of depreciation.
Table 53 shows that total value of non-pharmaceutical products in
1970/71 accounted for almost one third of total output of Nasr. When
it is remembered that the output of pharmaceuticals is sold at several
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multiples of competitive prices, it becomes obvious that non-pharma- 
ceutical products are becoming of increasing importance to Nasr’s 
competitive position.
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION
This study has traced the development of the Egyptian pharma­
ceutical industry throughout the two decades 1952 to 1971» and 
examined the structure of the international market for drugs and
changes in the pattern of supply.
In its early stages of development, the private domestic pharma­
ceutical industry suffered from an inability to compete successfully 
with the giant multinational firms which dominated the Egyptian market 
with direct exports of finished drugs from abroad. The major factors 
leading to monopoly concentration and control of the market by the 
large international companies were shown to be marketing advantages 
held in the form of an extensive and well established distribution 
network, as well as expensive and sophisticated advertising techniques 
aimed at both the physician and pharmacist. The physician relied 
almost exclusively for his knowledge of modern therapies on the med­
ical literature supplied by the international firms and was thus 
encouraged to prescribe heavily promoted innovations at the expense 
of the older but still suitable and lower priced preparations. The 
pharmacist, who plays a leading role in the choice of therapy and brand 
by the Egyptian customer, was also dependent for his income on the very 
large discounts and bonuses allowed on the sale of foreign drugs. The 
retail consumer was thus constrained into paying excessively high 
prices for most drugs.
Our analysis has shown that considerable savings could therefore 
be and were achieved by instituting government control on the sale of
drugs. In the late 1950s the distribution of drugs to retail pharma­
cists was nationalised, the government placed more stringent regulations 
on the registration of new drugs and advertising, and a centralised
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purchasing agency was formed for the purpose of importing all drugs 
and pharmaceutical chemicals from abroad. The immediate gain from 
these measures was a reduction in the price of all existing foreign 
drugs on the Egyptian market by 25%*
Since 1957» the government has taken steps to encourage the growth 
of domestic production of drugs. Local pharmaceutical firms had shown 
an ability to produce many drugs, but a significant proportion of exist­
ing production capacity remained idle because these firms were unable 
to market their preparations, even when equivalent to foreign brands. 
Economies of scale in production did not constitute an obstacle to the 
entry of local firms to the market, since the majority of these compan­
ies limited their operations to formulating and packaging finished pharm­
aceutical chemicals into their dosage forms, all of which are profitable 
on a very small scale.
The technology and know-how involved in final processing is fairly 
simple and straightforward for most drug groups, but foreign assistance 
was necessary for some important technical processes involved in the 
preparation of such vital drugs as penicillin, streptomycin, insulin, 
endocrine hormones and parenteral solutions. License agreements be­
tween local and international firms were again initiated by the govern­
ment specialised agency, and the terms reached proved to be very reason­
able and favourable to the Egyptian firms. The bargaining strength of 
a single body representing the group of local firms and the Egyptian 
government enabled the purchase of foreign technology, foreign machin­
ery, and raw materials at low cost to the domestic industry, in spite 
of Egypt*s observance of patent rights.
By the end of the 1950s, the domestic pharmaceutical industry 
was afforded a strong measure of protection from direct imports of 
drugs which could be produced locally, while foreign currency loans
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supplied by the government encouraged domestic firms to invest in the 
more sophisticated and complex production facilities. In a new devel­
opment, agreement was reached between the Ministry for Industry and a 
number of international pharmaceutical firms to set up subsidiaries 
in Egypt, with a view to ensuring that rapid growth would soon enable 
domestic production to supply most of Egypt's needs for drugs.
The extension of state control over the pharmaceutical industry 
was a slow and gradual process, several specialised committees having 
been set up during the 1950s to study the market for drugs and make 
their recommendations. In 1961 the largest Egyptian owned pharmaceut­
ical firms were nationalised and GOPCA was created to supervise their 
operation, in addition to its responsibilities for importing and dis­
tributing pharmaceutical products.
It is often observed that nationalisation of private concerns re­
sults in a decline of managerial incentive to maximise returns, with 
adverse effects on efficiency, productivity and profits. The experience 
of the pharmaceutical industry in Egypt displays a rare example of 
significant progress as a result of public control. The success ach­
ieved by the local pharmaceutical industry can be directly attributed 
to the role played by the Egyptian General Organisation for Pharmaceut­
icals, Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Medical Appliances, GOPCA.
The pricing policy of GOPCA has dictated a price structure for 
drugs in Egypt which is highly competitive with international price 
levels. The industry has also achieved a high rate of growth in pro­
duction and value added, profits accounting for more than 50% of this 
value added.
Loans and subsidies from the government enabled the industry to in­
crease capital investment more than fivefold in the period 1957 to 1965/ 
66. Since this period, the industry has financed its own continued 
growth and has also transferred large surpluses to the rest of the 
economy.
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The Egyptian pharmaceutical industry is still dpendent on the 
international market as a major source of supply for raw material re­
quirements, and this dependence is only likely to diminish when the 
Egyptian chemical and other auxilliary industries have developed suff­
iciently to produce raw materials competitive at world prices.
We have thus shown that in spite of increased self-sufficiency in 
the supply of finished drugs on the market, domestic firms accounting 
for 87% of total domestic consumption are still very heavily dependent 
on the international market for the import of basic raw materials 
and intermediates at competitive prices. But this has in no way ob­
structed the growth or profitability of domestic production.
In addition to providing Egypt with low priced drugs, the pharma­
ceutical industry has contributed all the benefits expected from a pro­
fitable investment. By 1970/71* it has provided employment for seven­
teen thousand workers and employees and has transferred £E 8 million of 
net revenue in that year to the Treasury. But GOPCA has also achieved 
considerable savings in foreign currency to the Egyptian economy; in 
the five year period 1960/61 to 1965/66 alone, total domestic consumption 
of drugs increased by 128% while total expenditure on foreign currency 
(including the purchase of finished drugs, pharmaceutical raw materials, 
machinery and equipment) increased by a mere /fzf%. The ratio of total 
expenditure on foreign currency to total domestic consumption of drugs 
thus fell from 62% in 1960/61 to 57% in 1965/66.
Our study has also suggested that Egypt has a potential for export­
ing a large volume of finished drugs, both in terms of existing product­
ion capacity and in terms of the industry's ability to offer drugs at 
world competitive prices. A more concerted effort from GOPCA towards 
designing an efficient export policy would promote the growth of export 
on a more pernament basis, and also reduce the problems arising from 
foreign currency shortages from which the industry has suffered since 
the mid-sixties.
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The Egyptian pharmaceutical industry has relied on direct foreign 
investment to a very small extent when compared to other countries in 
Egypt's stage of development. Foreign subsidiaries of multinational 
firms account today for 16% of total output of the industry, a rate 
which has been maintained since the mid-sixties, when these subsidiaries 
first began to produce. But the main form of foreign participation in 
the operation of the domestic pharmaceutical industry has been the devel 
opment of numerous license agreements between local and international 
firms for the acquisition of technology and know-how by local firms. 
After taking an active part in the negotiations over the first agree­
ments contracted in the late 1950s, GOPCA standardised the terms for 
any future agreements, and local firms were encouraged to seek new con­
tracts independently, whenever problems in the production of new drugs 
would arise.
The conditions laid down by GOPCA in the standard form of license 
agreements confers benefits on both licensor and licensee when compared 
to conditions obtainable in a free market situation. Transferable roy­
alties are low, and payable for a maximum of five years. To the local 
firm, this means a low price for acquiring know-how which can continue 
to be used long after five years, since the life expectancy of a drug 
is much longer in Egypt than in a free market, and because GOPCA's 
policy insures that only those drugs of sufficient medical importance 
are produced domestically. The licensor's advantage is that he is given 
complete freedom to market his product independently, and he can there­
fore promote the rate of increase of sales and maximise royalty payments 
within the five year period (which is longer than the average life ex­
pectancy on a free market). Moreover, the licensee makes a large con­
tribution towards the licensor's marketing expenditure in local currency
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This expenditure can therefore be expected to make the international 
licensor's returns on sales considerably higher within the five year 
period, especially when it is remembered that the licensor's products, 
like all other domestically produced preparations, are afforded com­
plete protection from imports of equivalent drugs from other producers.
This thesis has shown that production under license costs the 
Egyptian economy significantly less than importing the same group of 
drugs from foreign sources. It has also shown that domestically, local 
firms produce drugs at much lower cost than foreign subsidiaries and 
also sell their output at lower prices. The reasons are mainly the 
fact that local firms purchase foreign raw material pharmaceutical 
chemicals at lower prices, and spend significantly less on selling and 
administration expenses. The cost and price structure of production of 
subsidiaries in Egypt conform with our analysis of the behaviour of the 
multinational firms in the markets of advanced countries. These firms 
rely on excessive and wasteful expenses on innovation and marketing, 
with the result that prices at which they offer their products are 
necessarily inflated to levels which are far above manufacturing costs.
But an important revelation from Egypt's experience in the acquis­
ition of foreign know-how and basic pharmaceutical raw materials is that 
the gian multinational firms are also potentially the most competitive 
sources for the purchase of technology and raw materials. Egypt has 
dealt with countries in both the East and the Western world, and our 
analysis of its experience clearly points to the comparatively lower 
costs incurred in buying raw materials or technology from the old est­
ablished pharmaceutical giants.
The type of drugs most widely consumed (or most appropriate med­
ically) on the markets of developing countries are products which have 
been on the international market for a long time, for which economies
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of scale are of great importance in manufacture and increasingly 
efficient methods of production are continuously being introduced.
The leading manufacturers engaged in the production of the pharma­
ceutical raw materials necessary for processing these drugs are the 
giant multinational firms. T h e r e  is therefore great scope for in­
creased co-operation between local pharmaceutical industries in devel­
oping countries and the large international firms, provided adequate 
provisions are made for obtaining reasonable terms for the developing 
country.
Finally, our analysis has shown that backward integration in the 
pharmaceutical industry is extremely uneconomical to a developing 
country in the absence of any domestic potential for supplying large 
numbers and quantities of raw materials required for primary product­
ion.
It was also shown that the positive benefits obtained by the 
economy from the secondary manufacture of pharmaceuticals were in no 
way dependent on the existence of primary producing facilities in the 
country in question.
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APPENDIX
Table 55* Consumption of All Drugs in Egypt according to Therapeutic 
Groups. Retail Prices, Value in £E. Millions . \^10
Therapeutic Imported Domestically Total % to Total
Groups Drugs Produced Drugs______  Consumption
Local Licensed Total
Anaesthetics 0.133 0.004 - 0.004 0.137 0 .3%
Analgesics 0.184 2.251 1.215 3.487 3.650 8.4%
Analeptics 0.15k 0.101 0.051 0.152 0.306 0.7%
Anthelmintics O.183 0.158 0.082 0.240 0.422 0.9%
Antidysenterics 0.191 0.811 0.478 1.290 1.480 3-4%
Antiobiotics 0.566 3.515 2.900 6.414 6.980 16.0%
Antimalarial 0.0)15 0.021 0.061 0.082 0.096 0.2%
Anticoagulents 0.025 0.016 0.020 O.O36 0.061 0.1%
Antihistaminics 0.0k9 0.334 0.266 0.601 0.650 1.4%
Cardiac 0.kk5 0.717 0.379 1.095 1.540 3.5%
Cathartics - 0.311 0.080 0.392 0.392 0.9%
Chemobiotics App.O 0.010 0.019 0.028 0.028 App. 0
Anti T.B. 0.028 0.612 - 0.612 0.640 1.4%
Spirochaeticidal - 0.004 - 0.004 0.004 App. 0
Sulphonamide 0.012 0.488 0.275 0.763 0.775 1.7%
Cytotoxics O.O38 - - - 0.038 App. 0
Dermatologies 0.999 0.914 0.056 0.970 1.370 3.1%
Anorectal 0.013 o.o48 - 0.048 0.060 App. 0
Diagnostic 0.072 - - - 0.072 App. 0
Endocrine 0.791 1.027 1.222 2.250 3-041 7.0°%
Gastrointest­
inal 0.046 1.038 0.239 1.278 1.324 3.0%
Hepatobilino-
genics 0.018 0.068 0.056 0.125 0.143 App. 0
Haemostatics 0.18 2 App.O - App.O 0.182 App. 0
Immunologic
Agents 0.089 0.233 _ 0.233 0.322 0.7%
Miscellaneous 0.122 0.545 0.092 O.638 0.760 App. 0
Ophthalmics 0.238 0.590 O.63I 1.222 1.460 3.3%
Oroderetics 0.012 0.162 - 0.162 0.174 App. 0
Oto-Rhino 0.022 0.480 0.148 0.628 O.651 1.4%
Pulmonics 0.029 1.312 0.325 1.637 1.666 3.8^
Oxytocic 0.069 - 0.072 0.072 0.142 App. 0
Single Vitamins 0.0001 3.732 0.159 3.892 3.892 8.9%
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Table 55 (Cont'd)
Therapeutic Imported 
Group Drugs
Domestically Produced Drugs
Local Licensed Total
Total % to Total 
Consumption
Complex Vitamins 0.001 2.767 - 2.767 2.769 6.9%
Minerals 0.0001 0.309 0.089 0.399 0.399 0.9%
Vitamins, Minerals 0.0001 1.389 0.016 1.^06 1.^06 3.2%
Lipotropics 0.0001 O.^flO - O.'+IO O.^flO 0.9%
Proteins 0.028 - 0.001 0.001 0.030 App.O
Blood Substitutes 0.028 0.287 0.532 0.819 0.8^8 1.9%
Neurosedatives 0.0001 0.193 0.13^ 0.327 0.327 0.7%
Tranquilisers 0.337 0.5^0 0.2^3 0.787 1.120 2.5%
Spasmolytics 0.02*f 0.570 0.705 1.275 1.299 2.9%
Urologies 0.122 0.716 0.1^9 0.865 O.988 2.2%
Vaginetics 0.0^7 0.187 0.002 0.190 0.238 0.5%
Milk infant diet 1.112 — — — 1.112 2.5%
Total Consump­
tion 5.831 26.88^ 10.707 37.591 ^3.^22 100.0%
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